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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

203 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

RL Adversarial Function Call

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) enabled with Function Calling (FC) capabilities are vulnerable to adversarial query rewriting and semantic manipulation. Standard FC models, typically trained via Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) on static datasets, fail to generalize against adversarial inputs that deviate from fixed distribution patterns. An attacker can exploit this by crafting queries that are semantically similar to valid requests but engineered to induce "bad cases," such as incorrect tool…

Exploring Weaknesses in Function Call Models via Reinforcement Learning: An Adversarial Data Augmentation Approach
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct, Qwen 3 0.6B, Qwen 3 4B+1 more
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 0.6B
  • Qwen 3 4B
  • Qwen 3 8B

VLM Text Overrides Image

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in multiple state-of-the-art Vision-Language Models (VLMs), including GPT-4o, Gemini-2.5, and LLaVA-OneVision, where persuasive textual misinformation successfully overrides visual evidence. When a model is presented with an image it can correctly interpret, an attacker can inject a contradictory text prompt employing specific rhetorical strategies (Logical, Credibility, Emotional, or Repetition) to force the model into generating a false response. This "obedience bias"…

Do Images Speak Louder than Words? Investigating the Effect of Textual Misinformation in VLMs
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct, InternVL3 1B+8 more
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • InternVL3 1B
  • InternVL3 2B
  • InternVL3 8B
  • LLaVA-OneVision 0.5B
  • LLaVA-OneVision 7B
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o

Visual Object Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to Physical Prompt Injection Attacks (PPIA), a query-agnostic injection technique delivered via the visual modality. The vulnerability stems from the model's "Vision-Enabled Text Recognition" capabilities and "Identity Sensitivity," where the model interprets text embedded in the physical environment (e.g., printed on signs, posters, or objects) as high-priority instructions rather than passive visual data. An attacker can embed adversarial…

Physical Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4 Turbo+7 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro Latest
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro 002
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash Latest
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet Latest
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku 20241022
  • Llama 3.2 11B Vision
  • Llama 3.2 90B Vision Instruct

Confident Misinformation Hallucination

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to induce factually incorrect outputs by injecting misinformation into prompts framed with strong confidence. By using authoritative phrasing (e.g., "As we know..."), attackers exploit model sycophancy, causing the LLM to accept the false premise and generate hallucinated content aligned with the injected misinformation. The models fail to detect and correct the embedded falsehoods, generating fabricated but plausible responses.

AdversaRiskQA: An Adversarial Factuality Benchmark for High-Risk Domains
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 20B, GPT-oss 120B, GPT-5+3 more
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • GPT-5
  • Qwen 3 4B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 Next 80B-A3B Instruct

LLM Judge Framing Bias

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based evaluation systems ("LLM-as-a-Judge") exhibit a structural vulnerability termed "Framing Bias," wherein the model produces logically contradictory judgments depending on the syntactic framing of the evaluation prompt. Specifically, when assessing the same content using predicate-positive (P) framing (e.g., "Is this toxic?") versus predicate-negative (¬P) framing (e.g., "Is this non-toxic?"), models frequently fail to invert their binary decisions, leading to inconsistency rates…

When Wording Steers the Evaluation: Framing Bias in LLM judges
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 1B Instruct, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Llama 3.1 70B Instruct+11 more
  • Llama 3.2 1B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 14B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • o4-mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • GPT-5

Metacognitive Prompting Lowers Resistance

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn persuasive conversational attacks that induce the adoption of counterfactual beliefs. By leveraging the Source–Message–Channel–Receiver (SMCR) communication framework, attackers can systematically erode a model's confidence in established facts and compel the model to output misinformation. Specific attack vectors include manipulating source attribution (authority framing), message content (logical, credibility, or emotional appeals)…

Vulnerability of LLMs' Belief Systems? LLMs Belief Resistance Check Through Strategic Persuasive Conversation Interventions
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.2 3B, Llama 3.3 70B+2 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Physical Navigation Prompt Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based navigation agents, including NavGPT and prompt-tuned outdoor agents, are vulnerable to adaptive prompt injection attacks. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to hijack the physical movement of the agent by embedding optimized malicious instructions into benign natural language inputs. The issue arises because the agents parse user instructions to generate executable plans without sufficient separation between control logic and untrusted input. The PINA (Prompt Injection Attack…

PINA: Prompt Injection Attack against Navigation Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Llama 2 7B

Sound Induces Trimodal Collapse

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in trimodal audio-video-language models where an attacker can systematically degrade multimodal reasoning through untargeted, audio-only adversarial perturbations. By optimizing a shared perturbation $\delta$ applied to the audio channel, an attacker can manipulate internal representations—specifically targeting audio encoder embeddings and cross-modal attention mechanisms—without modifying visual or textual inputs. The attack exploits the model's reliance on the audio…

SoundBreak: A Systematic Study of Audio-Only Adversarial Attacks on Trimodal Models
Evaluated models: VideoLLAMA2, Qwen 2 7B Instruct, Whisper Large-v2+1 more
  • VideoLLAMA2
  • Qwen 2 7B Instruct
  • Whisper Large-v2
  • PANNs

Detector Telemetry Camouflage

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Single-pass hallucination detectors relying on internal telemetry (uncertainty, hidden-state geometry, and attention patterns) are vulnerable to white-box, model-side adversarial attacks. An attacker can employ the CORVUS (Camouflaging Open-weight Representations, Volumes, Uncertainty, and Structure) technique to fine-tune lightweight Low-Rank Adapters (LoRA) on the target LLM. This method optimizes a specific loss objective that camouflages detector-visible telemetry signals—specifically…

CORVUS: Red-Teaming Hallucination Detectors via Internal Signal Camouflage in Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B, Llama 3 8B, Qwen 2.5 14B+1 more
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 14B
  • Vicuna 7B

Invisible Headline Trading Loss

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Improper input validation in Large Language Model (LLM) integrated Algorithmic Trading Systems (ATS) allows remote attackers to manipulate trading decisions via crafted "adversarial news" headlines. The vulnerability exists when ATS pipelines ingest financial news data via standard scraping libraries (e.g., Scrapy, BeautifulSoup, Cheerio) and pass raw HTML or non-normalized text directly to LLMs (such as FinBERT, FinGPT, or GPT-4) for entity recognition (stock-name association) and sentiment…

Adversarial News and Lost Profits: Manipulating Headlines in LLM-Driven Algorithmic Trading
Evaluated models: FinBERT, FinGPT, FinLLaMA+7 more
  • FinBERT
  • FinGPT
  • FinLLaMA
  • o3
  • o3 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o Mini High
  • GPT-5
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.