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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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101 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 6/1/2024
Analyzed 1/26/2025

LLMs, even when individually assessed as "safe," can be combined by an adversary to achieve malicious outcomes. This vulnerability exploits the complementary strengths of multiple models—a high-capability model that refuses malicious requests and a low-capability model that does not—through task decomposition. Adversaries can either manually decompose tasks into benign (solved by the high-capability model) and easily-malicious subtasks (solved by the low-capability model) or automate the…

Adversaries can misuse combinations of safe models
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3 Sonnet +8 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.