Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research search
Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

101 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Model Combination Misuse

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLMs, even when individually assessed as "safe," can be combined by an adversary to achieve malicious outcomes. This vulnerability exploits the complementary strengths of multiple models—a high-capability model that refuses malicious requests and a low-capability model that does not—through task decomposition. Adversaries can either manually decompose tasks into benign (solved by the high-capability model) and easily-malicious subtasks (solved by the low-capability model) or automate the…

Adversaries can misuse combinations of safe models
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3 Sonnet+8 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3 Opus
  • Claude 3 Sonnet
  • DALL-E 3
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mistral 7B
  • Mixtral 8x7B
  • Stable Diffusion v1.5

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.