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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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122 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 4/1/2025
Analyzed 1/14/2026

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) decision-making capabilities described as "Rhetorical Persuasion Override." When an LLM is deployed as a judge or evaluator in a single-turn, multi-agent debate framework, it systematically fails to distinguish factual truth from confidently presented misinformation. An adversarial agent can coerce the evaluator into endorsing a known falsehood from the TruthfulQA dataset by employing specific rhetorical strategies—namely, high confidence…

When persuasion overrides truth in multi-agent llm debates: Introducing a confidence-weighted persuasion override rate (cw-por)
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 3B, Mistral 7B, Qwen 2.5 14B +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 4/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

State-of-the-art Reward Models (RMs) utilized in Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) exhibit poor out-of-distribution (OOD) generalization, making them susceptible to adversarial inputs. These models fail to reliably assess prompt-response pairs that diverge from their training distribution, assigning high reward scores to low-quality, nonsensical, or syntactically incorrect responses. This vulnerability allows for "reward hacking," where a policy model optimizes for unintended…

Adversarial training of reward models
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.3 70B, DeepSeek R1 +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 4/1/2025
Analyzed 4/12/2025

A vulnerability in multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems allows for a permutation-invariant adversarial prompt attack. By strategically partitioning adversarial prompts and routing them through a network topology, an attacker can bypass distributed safety mechanisms, even those with token bandwidth limitations and asynchronous message delivery. The attack optimizes prompt propagation as a maximum-flow minimum-cost problem, maximizing success while minimizing detection.

Agents Under Siege: Breaking Pragmatic Multi-Agent LLM Systems with Optimized Prompt Attacks
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1 Distill, Gemma 2 9B, Llama 2 7B +7 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed using "Batch Prompting" strategies—where multiple distinct user queries are concatenated and processed in a single inference pass to reduce computational costs—are vulnerable to Cross-Query Prompt Injection. When a batch contains a mixture of benign queries and a single malicious query, the instructions within the malicious query (e.g., "apply this rule to every answer") bleed over the context window. This causes the model to apply the adversary's…

Efficient but Vulnerable: Benchmarking and Defending LLM Batch Prompting Attack
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Claude 3.5 Sonnet +4 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2025
Analyzed 3/19/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks by crafted prompts that bypass safety mechanisms, causing the model to generate harmful or unethical content. This vulnerability stems from the inherent tension between the LLM's instruction-following and safety constraints. The JBFuzz technique demonstrates the ability to efficiently and effectively discover such prompts through a fuzzing-based approach leveraging novel seed prompt templates and a synonym-based mutation strategy.

JBFuzz: Jailbreaking LLMs Efficiently and Effectively Using Fuzzing
Evaluated models: DeepSeek Chat, DeepSeek R1, Gemini 1.5 Flash +6 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2025
Analyzed 3/19/2025

Large Language Model (LLM) safety judges exhibit vulnerability to adversarial attacks and stylistic prompt modifications, leading to increased false negative rates (FNR) and decreased accuracy in classifying harmful model outputs. Minor stylistic changes to model outputs, such as altering the formatting or tone, can significantly impact a judge's classification, while direct adversarial modifications to the generated text can fool judges into misclassifying even 100% of harmful generations as…

Know Thy Judge: On the Robustness Meta-Evaluation of LLM Safety Judges
Evaluated models: Atla Selene Mini 8B, Llama 2 13B, Llama 3.1 8B +4 more

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

Vision-Language Models (VLMs), specifically the LLaVA-1.5 and LLaVA-1.6 series, are vulnerable to optimization-based white-box jailbreak attacks despite standard safety alignment measures like Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Attackers can craft adversarial perturbations in the image space (imperceptible noise) or latent space using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) to manipulate the model's internal representations. These perturbations maximize the…

Adversary-Aware DPO: Enhancing Safety Alignment in Vision Language Models via Adversarial Training
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B, LLaVA 1.6 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2025
Analyzed 3/4/2025

The Knowledge-Distilled Attacker (KDA) model, when used to generate prompts for large language models (LLMs), can bypass LLM safety mechanisms resulting in the generation of harmful, inappropriate, or misaligned content. KDA's effectiveness stems from its ability to generate diverse and coherent attack prompts efficiently, surpassing existing methods in attack success rate and speed. The vulnerability lies in the LLMs' insufficient defenses against the diverse prompt generation strategies…

KDA: A Knowledge-Distilled Attacker for Generating Diverse Prompts to Jailbreak LLMs
Evaluated models: Claude 2.1, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 +8 more

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2025
Analyzed 3/19/2025

FC-Attack leverages automatically generated flowcharts containing step-by-step descriptions derived or rephrased from harmful queries, combined with a benign textual prompt, to jailbreak Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs). The vulnerability lies in the model's susceptibility to visual prompts containing harmful information within the flowcharts, thus bypassing safety alignment mechanisms.

FC-Attack: Jailbreaking Large Vision-Language Models via Auto-Generated Flowcharts
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet 20240620, Gemini 1.5 Flash, GPT-4o 2024-08-06 +4 more

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2025
Analyzed 3/19/2025

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) that allows for efficient jailbreaking by selectively fine-tuning only the lower layers of the model with a toxic dataset. This "Freeze Training" method, as described in the research paper, concentrates the fine-tuning on layers identified as being highly sensitive to the generation of harmful content. This approach significantly reduces training duration and GPU memory consumption while maintaining a high jailbreak success rate.

Efficient Jailbreaking of Large Models by Freeze Training: Lower Layers Exhibit Greater Sensitivity to Harmful Content
Evaluated models: Baichuan 2 7B Chat, GLM 4 9B Chat HF, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct +4 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.