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Updated 7/21/2026, database is current

Language Model Security Database

959 research findings · 1077 evaluated models

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139 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Medical Multimodal Large Language Models (MedMLLMs) are vulnerable to cross-modality attacks. Attackers can craft "mismatched malicious attacks" (2M-attacks) by providing MedMLLMs with image-text pairs where the image modality and/or anatomical region do not match the textual query, causing the model to generate incorrect or harmful responses. These attacks can be further optimized ("optimized mismatched malicious attacks"—O2M-attacks) using multimodal cross-optimization (MCM) techniques to…

Cross-Modality Jailbreak and Mismatched Attacks on Medical Multimodal Large Language Models
Affects: CheXagent, LLaVA Med, Med-Flamingo +2 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/28/2024

A vulnerability in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) allows for efficient jailbreaking attacks by leveraging visual input to bypass safety mechanisms. The attack constructs a multimodal model by adding a visual module to the target LLM, then uses a modified PGD algorithm to optimize visual input to generate jailbreaking embeddings. These embeddings are then converted back into text and appended to harmful queries, successfully eliciting objectionable content from the target LLM.

Efficient LLM-Jailbreaking by Introducing Visual Modality
Affects: ChatGLM 6B, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Mistral 7B

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/29/2024

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a universal jailbreak attack, termed Visual Role-Play (VRP), which leverages role-playing image characters to elicit harmful responses. VRP generates images depicting high-risk characters (e.g., cybercriminals) described by an LLM, paired with a benign role-play instruction and a malicious query. This combined input tricks the MLLM into generating malicious content by enacting the character's persona.

Visual-RolePlay: Universal Jailbreak Attack on MultiModal Large Language Models via Role-playing Image Characte
Affects: Gemini 1.0 Pro Vision, Internvlchat-v1.5, LLaVA 1.6 Mistral 7B +4 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/29/2024

A vulnerability in the voice mode of GPT-4o allows bypassing safety restrictions through a novel "Voice Jailbreak" attack. This attack leverages principles of fictional storytelling (setting, character, plot) to craft audio prompts that persuade the LLM to generate responses violating OpenAI's usage policies, including generating content related to illegal activities, hate speech, physical harm, fraud, pornography, and privacy violations. The attack's success rate is significantly higher than…

Voice Jailbreak Attacks Against GPT-4o
Affects: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4o

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/28/2024

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack using crafted images (image Jailbreaking Prompts or imgJPs). These imgJPs, when presented as input alongside malicious prompts, cause the MLLM to bypass safety mechanisms and generate objectionable content, including instructions for harmful activities like identity theft or creation of violent video games. The attack demonstrates both prompt-universality (a single imgJP works across multiple prompts) and, to a…

Jailbreaking attack against multimodal large language model
Affects: InstructBLIP, MiniGPT-4, MiniGPT-v2 +3 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/29/2024

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a novel attack vector where query-relevant images, generated using techniques like Stable Diffusion and typography, bypass safety mechanisms and elicit unsafe responses even when the underlying LLM is safety-aligned. The attack exploits the vision-language alignment module's susceptibility to image prompts directly related to malicious text queries.

Query-relevant images jailbreak large multi-modal models
Affects: Cogvlm, Idefics, InstructBLIP +11 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/29/2024

Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks via typographically rendered visual prompts. The vulnerability stems from the VLM's ability to process and interpret image-based text, bypassing safety mechanisms designed for text-only prompts. Malicious actors can encode harmful instructions into images, which are then processed by the VLM's visual module and subsequently interpreted by the language model, resulting in the generation of unsafe and policy-violating…

Figstep: Jailbreaking large vision-language models via typographic visual prompts
Affects: Cogvlm-chat-v1.1, GPT-4V, Llava-v1.5-vicuna-v1.5-13B +4 more

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in multi-modal large language models (LLMs) allows adversaries to bypass safety mechanisms through compositional adversarial attacks. The attack leverages the alignment between vision and language encoders, injecting malicious triggers into benign-looking images. These images, when paired with innocuous prompts, cause the LLM to generate harmful content. The attack requires access only to the vision encoder (e.g., CLIP), not the LLM itself, lowering the barrier to attack.

Jailbreak in pieces: Compositional adversarial attacks on multi-modal language models
Affects: Llama-adapterv2

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/29/2024

A vulnerability in vision-integrated Large Language Models (VLMs) allows an attacker to circumvent safety mechanisms through the use of adversarially crafted visual examples. A single, carefully constructed image can universally "jailbreak" the model, causing it to generate harmful content in response to a wide range of subsequent prompts, even those not included in the adversarial example's training data. This vulnerability extends beyond simple misclassification to encompass the execution of…

Visual adversarial examples jailbreak large language models
Affects: InstructBLIP, MiniGPT-4

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.