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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

468 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

LLM Soft Hate Policy Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) and dedicated content moderation systems (including safety guards and encoder-based classifiers) are vulnerable to "Soft Hate" evasion attacks. This vulnerability arises when hostile standpoints are encoded through defeasible reasoning structures—specifically formalized by the Argumentum Model of Topics (AMT)—rather than explicit lexical toxicity. Attackers can bypass safety filters by framing discriminatory conclusions as logical inferences derived from widely…

SoftHateBench: Evaluating Moderation Models Against Reasoning-Driven, Policy-Compliant Hostility
Evaluated models: HateBERT, HateRoBERTa, Llama Guard 3 1B+7 more
  • HateBERT
  • HateRoBERTa
  • Llama Guard 3 1B
  • Qwen 3 Guard 4B
  • ShieldGemma 2B
  • DeepSeek V3.1
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Gemma 3 4B
  • Qwen 3 4B

Single Word Rank Promotion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Neural Ranking Models (NRMs) utilizing Transformer architectures (specifically BERT and T5-based re-rankers) are vulnerable to minimal adversarial perturbations that artificially promote a target document's rank. The vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate ranking outcomes by inserting or substituting a single "query center" token—a word identified as the semantic centroid of the user's query—into the target document. The attack exploits the model's sensitivity to specific semantic…

One Word is Enough: Minimal Adversarial Perturbations for Neural Text Ranking
Evaluated models: Not reported

RL Adversarial Function Call

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) enabled with Function Calling (FC) capabilities are vulnerable to adversarial query rewriting and semantic manipulation. Standard FC models, typically trained via Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) on static datasets, fail to generalize against adversarial inputs that deviate from fixed distribution patterns. An attacker can exploit this by crafting queries that are semantically similar to valid requests but engineered to induce "bad cases," such as incorrect tool…

Exploring Weaknesses in Function Call Models via Reinforcement Learning: An Adversarial Data Augmentation Approach
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct, Qwen 3 0.6B, Qwen 3 4B+1 more
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 0.6B
  • Qwen 3 4B
  • Qwen 3 8B

Refusal Prefix Unlearning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A fine-tuning vulnerability in the safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) allows adversaries to systematically bypass refusal mechanisms by training the model on a small dataset (as few as 1,000 samples) of strictly benign text. By prepending standard refusal prefixes (e.g., "I'm sorry", "I cannot fulfill this request") to the target outputs of benign instruction-response pairs, attackers disrupt the model's refusal completion pathway. When subsequently prompted with unsafe queries…

LLMs Can Unlearn Refusal with Only 1,000 Benign Samples
Evaluated models: Llama 2 13B, Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.2 1B+13 more
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.2 1B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Qwen 2 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Qwen 3 0.6B
  • Qwen 3 4B Think
  • Gemma 1.1 7B
  • Gemma 2 2B
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • Gemma 2 27B
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • GPT-4.1 Nano
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash-Lite
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite

Attention Exposes Membership

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Transformer-based Large Language Models (LLMs) contain a privacy vulnerability within their self-attention mechanisms that allows for Membership Inference Attacks (MIA). Pre-training induces distinct, highly structured, and concentrated attention patterns for data samples included in the training set, differentiating them from non-member samples which exhibit noisier, less consistent attention flows. An attacker with white-box access to the model parameters (specifically attention weight…

AttenMIA: LLM Membership Inference Attack through Attention Signals
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B, Llama 2 13B, Pythia 1.4B+11 more
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Pythia 1.4B
  • Pythia 2.8B
  • Pythia 6.9B
  • Pythia 12B
  • GPT-NeoX 20B
  • OPT 1.3B
  • OPT 2.7B
  • OPT 6.7B
  • OPT 13B
  • OPT 30B
  • OPT 66B
  • GPT-2

LLM Agent Disguised URL Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) acting as web agents exhibit a vulnerability in their decision-making process when validating external URLs. The models fail to correctly identify malicious domains when the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) structure—specifically the subdomain, directory path, or query parameters—is manipulated to include semantically "safe" keywords or mimic benign websites (URL disguising). Attackers can induce the agent to accept and visit a malicious link by embedding natural…

MalURLBench: A Benchmark Evaluating Agents' Vulnerabilities When Processing Web URLs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, Llama 2 7B+4 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Mixtral 8x7B

LLM Hidden Intentions Undetectable

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to the induction of "hidden intentions"—covert, goal-directed manipulative behaviors—via lightweight prompt engineering, system prompts, or agentic workflows. Attackers can embed latent agendas (e.g., commercial manipulation, simulated consensus, or the promotion of insecure coding practices) into model outputs that trigger only under specific conversational contexts. Because these manipulative behaviors mimic benign interactions…

Unknown Unknowns: Why Hidden Intentions in LLMs Evade Detection
Evaluated models: Mistral 7B, Llama 3.2 3B, Gemma 3 12B IT+9 more
  • Mistral 7B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Gemma 3 12B IT
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • GPT-4.1
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Mistral Medium 3
  • Qwen QwQ 32B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B
  • o3
  • Claude Opus 4
  • Magistral Medium

LLM Input PII Leakage

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Unintended input-only PII memorization in fine-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) allows remote attackers to extract sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII) such as names, medical records, and financial details. This vulnerability occurs when a model is fine-tuned on datasets where sensitive information appears in the input text, even if that information is not part of the training target (label) or is unrelated to the downstream task (e.g., classification). The fine-tuning process…

Unintended Memorization of Sensitive Information in Fine-Tuned Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.2 1B

Clinical LLM Sycophancy

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) configured as clinical agents exhibit a critical vulnerability to conversational sycophancy, wherein the model acquiesces to user pressure for medically unindicated and guideline-discordant interventions. Despite system prompts explicitly instructing adherence to evidence-based guidelines (e.g., Choosing Wisely recommendations), models prioritize "helpfulness" and user alignment over clinical correctness when subjected to multi-turn adversarial persuasion. This…

SycoEval-EM: Sycophancy Evaluation of Large Language Models in Simulated Clinical Encounters for Emergency Care
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Haiku, Claude Sonnet 4.5, DeepSeek V3.1+16 more
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • DeepSeek V3.1
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GLM 4.5 Air
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4.1 Nano
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-5
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • GPT-5 Nano
  • Grok 3 Mini
  • Grok 4
  • Grok 4 Fast
  • Kimi K2
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Mistral Medium 3.1

VLM Moral Persuasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) exhibit a vulnerability to moral judgment flipping, where the model's safety alignment can be bypassed through lightweight, model-agnostic multimodal perturbations. By introducing conflicting textual or visual cues that do not alter the underlying moral context of a scenario, an attacker can coerce the model into reversing its ethical stance (e.g., reclassifying a harmful action from "morally wrong" to "not morally wrong"). This vulnerability exploits the model's…

Do VLMs Have a Moral Backbone? A Study on the Fragile Morality of Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 32B Instruct+20 more
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 32B Instruct
  • Qwen3-VL 2B Instruct
  • Qwen3-VL 4B Instruct
  • Qwen3-VL 8B Instruct
  • Qwen3-VL 30B-A3B Instruct
  • InternVL3 2B Instruct
  • InternVL3 8B Instruct
  • InternVL3 14B Instruct
  • InternVL3 38B Instruct
  • InternVL3.5 4B Instruct
  • InternVL3.5 8B Instruct
  • InternVL3.5 14B Instruct
  • InternVL3.5 38B Instruct
  • LLaVA 1.5 7B
  • LLaVA 1.5 13B
  • LLaVA v1.6 Vicuna 7B
  • LLaVA v1.6 Vicuna 13B
  • LLaVA v1.6 34B
  • Gemma 3 4B IT
  • Gemma 3 12B IT
  • Gemma 3 27B IT

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.