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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

704 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Adaptive Tool-Disguised Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) supporting function calling (tool use) are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack known as iMIST (interactive Multi-step Progressive Tool-disguised Jailbreak Attack). The vulnerability stems from a disparity in alignment training: while models are heavily aligned to refuse harmful natural language generation, they lack sufficient alignment regarding the generation of harmful content within structured data (JSON) used for tool parameters.

Jailbreaking Large Language Models through Iterative Tool-Disguised Attacks via Reinforcement Learning
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, DeepSeek-V3 671B

Autonomous Multi-Turn Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A multi-turn jailbreak vulnerability exists in multiple state-of-the-art Large Language Models (LLMs) that allows attackers to bypass safety guardrails by progressively steering long-horizon conversations. Demonstrated via the "Mastermind" framework, the attack leverages a hierarchical multi-agent architecture to decouple high-level malicious objectives from low-level tactical execution. By employing strategy-level fuzzing—dynamically reflecting on model refusals and recombining abstracted…

Knowledge-Driven Multi-Turn Jailbreaking on Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Llama 3.3 70B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct+12 more
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 14B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • DeepSeek V3
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4.1
  • DeepSeek R1
  • o3-mini
  • o4-mini
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • GPT-5

Echo Chamber Escalation Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The "Echo Chamber" vulnerability allows attackers to bypass safety guardrails in Large Language Models (LLMs) via a multi-turn adversarial dialogue strategy. The attack exploits the model's "consistency bias" and "completion bias" rather than using aggressive reframing or backtracking. The attacker initiates the session by embedding "poisonous seeds" (harmful concepts hidden in benign context) and "steering seeds" (format directives, e.g., "write a manual") into an ostensibly innocuous prompt…

The Echo Chamber Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1 0528, Qwen 3 32B, Gemini 2.5 Pro+7 more
  • DeepSeek R1 0528
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4.1
  • Grok 4
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-5 Nano
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash

Tool Stream Injection Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) agents utilizing external tool execution frameworks are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) via the "Tool Stream." Unlike traditional data-stream injections (e.g., malicious emails), this vulnerability exploits the agent's interpretation of functional tool definitions (docstrings, signatures) and runtime feedback (error messages, return values) as binding operational constraints. Adversaries functioning as compromised or malicious tool providers can embed…

VIGIL: Defending LLM Agents Against Tool Stream Injection via Verify-Before-Commit
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Pro, Qwen 3 Max

Distal Translation Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in the prompt-side safety filters of GPT-based Text-to-Image (T2I) systems allows attackers to bypass restrictions on Politically Sensitive Content (PSC). By utilizing a technique called Identity-Preserving Descriptive Mapping (IPDM) combined with Geopolitically Distal Translation, an attacker can obfuscate explicit political entities into neutral descriptive phrases translated across multiple low-resource languages. This induces semantic fragmentation, preventing the safety…

: Politically Controversial Content Generation via Jailbreaking Attacks on GPT-based Text-to-Image Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-5, GPT-5.1+2 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5
  • GPT-5.1
  • DALL-E
  • Midjourney

Knowledge-Graph Implicit Prompts

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a domain-specific obfuscation attack method termed "StealthGraph," which leverages Knowledge Graph (KG) guidance to bypass safety alignment. The vulnerability arises because current safety mechanisms primarily focus on explicit, general-domain harmful queries and fail to generalize to implicit, highly technical requests in specialized domains (e.g., medicine, finance, law).

StealthGraph: Exposing Domain-Specific Risks in LLMs through Knowledge-Graph-Guided Harmful Prompt Generation
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Grok 3 Mini+10 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Grok 3 Mini
  • DeepSeek V3.1
  • Mixtral 8x7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Qwen 3.5 Plus
  • GLM-5
  • Gemini 3 Pro
  • Llama Guard 4 12B
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5

LLM Conspiracy Bunking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

OpenAI GPT-4o is vulnerable to a targeted persuasion attack where the model acts as an active advocate for conspiracy theories. Standard safety guardrails do not prevent the model from generating specious, invented, or misleading arguments to successfully increase user belief in false claims (a "bunking" attack). Additionally, when explicitly constrained by system prompts to use only truthful information, the model adapts by "paltering"—strategically omitting context, juxtaposing true claims…

Large language models can effectively convince people to believe conspiracies
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o

Multi-turn MLLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a multi-turn jailbreaking attack that leverages typographic visual prompts combined with conversational context drifting. The vulnerability exists because MLLMs establish trust and context during initial benign interactions, shifting the model's latent representation toward helpfulness and compromising its ability to detect malicious intent in subsequent turns. The attack vector utilizes an image where a harmful request is…

Multi-turn Jailbreaking Attack in Multi-Modal Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Gemini 2.0 Flash, Qwen2-VL 7B Instruct+2 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Qwen2-VL 7B Instruct
  • LLaVA 1.6 Mistral 7B
  • LLaVA 1.5 13B

CoT Prefix Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) and Large Reasoning Model (LRM) serving interfaces that allow user-defined response prefixes, such as plain text-completion (v1/completions), Fill-in-the-Middle (FIM), or assistant message prefilling. An attacker can perform a Response Prefix Attack (RPA) by injecting maliciously crafted Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning tokens immediately following the assistant's start delimiter (e.g., <|im_start|>assistant). Because these tokens are placed…

What Matters For Safety Alignment?
Evaluated models: DeepSeek V3.2, Gemini 3 Pro Preview, Gemini 3 Flash Preview+4 more
  • DeepSeek V3.2
  • Gemini 3 Pro Preview
  • Gemini 3 Flash Preview
  • Grok 4.1 Fast
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • GPT-5.2
  • GPT-4o Mini

LLM Fingerprint Inhibition

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Backdoor-based fingerprinting mechanisms used for Intellectual Property (IP) protection in Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to evasion when deployed in model ensemble configurations. The vulnerability arises because fingerprint triggers elicit specific, high-probability tokens or responses in a protected model that are statistically improbable in unprotected or differently-fingerprinted auxiliary models. Attackers can exploit this statistical discrepancy without accessing model…

Inhibitory Attacks on Backdoor-based Fingerprinting for Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B, Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.2 3B+2 more
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.