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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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183 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 5/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to improved optimization-based jailbreaking attacks. The vulnerability stems from the susceptibility of LLMs to crafted prompts that exploit weaknesses in their safety mechanisms, allowing them to generate harmful responses despite safety training. This vulnerability is exacerbated by the use of diverse target templates containing harmful self-suggestions and guidance within the optimization goal, accelerating the convergence of the attack.

Improved techniques for optimization-based jailbreaking on large language models
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Guanaco 7B +4 more

Source: arXiv

Published 5/1/2024
Analyzed 12/28/2024

A vulnerability exists in several large language models (LLMs) allowing attackers to manipulate the models' output logits, biasing the probability distribution toward the generation of harmful content. The attack does not involve modifying the input prompt, but rather directly manipulates the internal probability scores assigned to output tokens during the generation process. By strategically increasing the logits of tokens forming a harmful response while decreasing those belonging to safety…

Lockpicking LLMs: A Logit-Based Jailbreak Using Token-level Manipulation
Evaluated models: Gemma 7B IT, Llama 2 13B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 5/1/2024
Analyzed 1/26/2025

Medical Multimodal Large Language Models (MedMLLMs) are vulnerable to cross-modality attacks. Attackers can craft "mismatched malicious attacks" (2M-attacks) by providing MedMLLMs with image-text pairs where the image modality and/or anatomical region do not match the textual query, causing the model to generate incorrect or harmful responses. These attacks can be further optimized ("optimized mismatched malicious attacks"—O2M-attacks) using multimodal cross-optimization (MCM) techniques to…

Cross-Modality Jailbreak and Mismatched Attacks on Medical Multimodal Large Language Models
Evaluated models: CheXagent, LLaVA Med, Med-Flamingo +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 5/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

This vulnerability allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms in Llama-2-7B-Chat and other safety-aligned LLMs using crafted adversarial prompts. The vulnerability stems from a gap between the gradient of the adversarial loss with respect to the one-hot representation of tokens and the actual effect of token replacements on the model's output. This gap allows for the generation of adversarial prompts that elicit harmful responses despite safety training. The paper demonstrates that…

Improved Generation of Adversarial Examples Against Safety-aligned LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2 13B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 5/1/2024
Analyzed 12/28/2024

A vulnerability in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) allows for efficient jailbreaking attacks by leveraging visual input to bypass safety mechanisms. The attack constructs a multimodal model by adding a visual module to the target LLM, then uses a modified PGD algorithm to optimize visual input to generate jailbreaking embeddings. These embeddings are then converted back into text and appended to harmful queries, successfully eliciting objectionable content from the target LLM.

Efficient LLM-Jailbreaking by Introducing Visual Modality
Evaluated models: ChatGLM 6B, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Mistral 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 4/1/2024
Analyzed 12/28/2024

Leading safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to simple adaptive jailbreaking attacks. These attacks utilize manually crafted prompt templates, combined with random search on a suffix to maximize the log-probability of a target token indicating compliance (e.g., "Sure"). The attacks are adaptive, as the prompt template and target token are customized for specific models. Furthermore, some models are vulnerable to transfer attacks (using successful prompts from one LLM on…

Jailbreaking leading safety-aligned llms with simple adaptive attacks
Evaluated models: Claude 2.0, Claude 2.1, Claude 3 Haiku +14 more

Source: arXiv

Published 4/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks using adversarially generated suffixes. The AmpleGCG attack generates a large number of diverse, effective suffixes which bypass safety mechanisms in both open and closed-source LLMs. The attack leverages the observation that low loss during suffix generation is not a reliable indicator of jailbreaking success, and generates diverse suffixes from intermediate steps of the optimization process.

Amplegcg: Learning a universal and transferable generative model of adversarial suffixes for jailbreaking both open and closed llms
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 2 7B Chat +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2024
Analyzed 3/4/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that utilize an optimized algorithm to bypass safety mechanisms. The vulnerability stems from the redundancy in existing trigger-searching algorithms, resulting in inefficient exploration of the prompt space and allowing attackers to elicit harmful responses. The proposed DPP-based Stochastic Trigger Searching (DSTS) algorithm demonstrates a statistically significant improvement over existing optimization-based attacks.

Enhancing Jailbreak Attacks with Diversity Guidance
Evaluated models: Alpaca 7B, Gemma 7B IT, GPT-3.5 Turbo +10 more

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

A novel adversarial suffix embedding translation framework (ASETF) enables efficient and highly successful attacks against large language models (LLMs). ASETF optimizes continuous adversarial suffix embeddings, then translates these embeddings into coherent, human-readable text. This bypasses existing defenses which rely on detecting unusual or nonsensical suffixes. The attack achieves a high success rate across multiple LLMs, including both open-source and black-box models.

ASETF: A Novel Method for Jailbreak Attack on LLMs through Translate Suffix Embeddings
Evaluated models: Alpaca 7B (Safe-RLHF), ChatGLM3 6B, GPT-3.5 Turbo +6 more

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2024
Analyzed 12/28/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to efficient adversarial attacks using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) on a continuously relaxed input prompt. This attack bypasses existing alignment methods by crafting adversarial prompts that induce the model to produce undesired or harmful outputs, significantly faster than previous state-of-the-art discrete optimization methods. The effectiveness stems from carefully controlling the error introduced by the continuous relaxation of the discrete…

Attacking large language models with projected gradient descent
Evaluated models: Falcon 7B, Falcon 7B Instruct, Vicuna 7B v1.3

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.