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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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191 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 10/1/2024
Analyzed 12/28/2024

Large language models (LLMs) controlling robots are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks. The ROBOPAIR algorithm demonstrates that malicious prompts can bypass safety mechanisms, causing robots to perform harmful physical actions. This vulnerability exploits the LLM's reliance on textual prompts and its potential lack of sufficient contextual understanding to prevent unsafe commands. The attack is effective across different access levels.

Jailbreaking LLM-controlled robots
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4o +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 9/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Jailbreaking vulnerabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs) used in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems allow escalation of attacks from entity extraction to full document extraction and enable the propagation of self-replicating malicious prompts ("worms") within interconnected RAG applications. Exploitation leverages prompt injection to force the LLM to return retrieved documents or execute malicious actions specified within the prompt.

Unleashing worms and extracting data: Escalating the outcome of attacks against rag-based inference in scale and severity using jailbreaking
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Flash

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

The ALERT-Motion framework demonstrates a vulnerability in text-to-motion (T2M) models where an attacker can craft subtly modified text prompts (adversarial prompts) that cause the model to generate motions significantly different from those intended by the benign prompt, yet semantically similar to a target motion specified by the attacker. The attack leverages a large language model (LLM) to autonomously generate these adversarial prompts, bypassing simple keyword-based detection mechanisms…

Autonomous LLM-Enhanced Adversarial Attack for Text-to-Motion
Evaluated models: Mdm, Mld

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2024
Analyzed 12/28/2024

A vulnerability allows bypassing safety filters in text-to-image (T2I) models using a multi-agent framework ("Atlas") powered by Large Language Models (LLMs). Atlas iteratively generates and refines prompts, leveraging a Vision-Language Model (VLM) to assess filter activation and an LLM to select effective prompts that maintain semantic similarity to the original, malicious prompt while evading the filter. This enables the generation of images containing unsafe content.

Jailbreaking text-to-image models with llm-based agents
Evaluated models: DALL-E 3, LLaVA 1.5 13B, Sharegpt4v-13B +4 more

Source: arXiv

Published 7/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Embodied Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to manipulation via voice-based interactions, leading to the execution of harmful physical actions. Attacks exploit three vulnerabilities: (1) cascading LLM jailbreaks resulting in malicious robotic commands; (2) misalignment between linguistic outputs (verbal refusal) and physical actions (command execution); and (3) conceptual deception, where seemingly benign instructions lead to harmful outcomes due to incomplete world knowledge within…

BadRobot: Manipulating Embodied LLMs in the Physical World
Evaluated models: BERT, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 Turbo +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 7/1/2024
Analyzed 12/28/2024

A vulnerability in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)-based Large Language Model (LLM) agents allows attackers to inject malicious demonstrations into the agent's memory or knowledge base. By crafting a carefully optimized trigger, an attacker can manipulate the agent's retrieval mechanism to preferentially retrieve these poisoned demonstrations, causing the agent to produce adversarial outputs or take malicious actions even when seemingly benign prompts are used. The attack, termed…

Agentpoison: Red-teaming llm agents via poisoning memory or knowledge bases
Evaluated models: GPT-2, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 3 70B +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 7/1/2024
Analyzed 1/26/2025

The SoP framework allows for automated generation of jailbreak prompts, bypassing safety mechanisms in LLMs. SoP utilizes multiple automatically optimized "jailbreak characters" within a single prompt to persuade the LLM to generate harmful or undesirable content, even without any seed jailbreak templates. This vulnerability is demonstrated against GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and LLaMA-2.

Sop: Unlock the power of social facilitation for automatic jailbreak attack
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 2 7B Chat

Source: arXiv

Published 5/1/2024
Analyzed 3/4/2025

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to elicit unsafe or unethical responses through a chain of semantically relevant multi-turn prompts. The attack, termed "Chain of Attack" (CoA), exploits the model's contextual understanding and adaptive response capabilities to gradually steer the conversation towards the desired harmful output, even if single-turn prompts are rejected due to safety mechanisms. The attack leverages semantic similarity scoring (e.g., using…

Chain of attack: a semantic-driven contextual multi-turn attacker for llm
Evaluated models: Baichuan 2 7B Chat, ChatGLM2 6B, GPT-3.5 Turbo +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 5/1/2024
Analyzed 12/28/2024

A vulnerability in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) allows for efficient jailbreaking attacks by leveraging visual input to bypass safety mechanisms. The attack constructs a multimodal model by adding a visual module to the target LLM, then uses a modified PGD algorithm to optimize visual input to generate jailbreaking embeddings. These embeddings are then converted back into text and appended to harmful queries, successfully eliciting objectionable content from the target LLM.

Efficient LLM-Jailbreaking by Introducing Visual Modality
Evaluated models: ChatGLM 6B, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Mistral 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 4/1/2024
Analyzed 12/28/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to the "Crescendo" multi-turn jailbreak attack. This attack uses a series of benign, escalating prompts to gradually lead the LLM into generating harmful or disallowed content, bypassing built-in safety mechanisms. The attack leverages the LLM's tendency to follow conversational patterns and build upon previous responses, making it difficult to detect based solely on individual prompts.

Great, now write an article about that: The crescendo multi-turn llm jailbreak attack
Evaluated models: Claude 2, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet +6 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.