Language Model Security Database

The OpenClaw autonomous agent framework lacks execution sandboxing, running agents directly on the host machine with the disk and system privileges of the host user. This architecture allows attackers to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) and arbitrary data exfiltration via Indirect Prompt Injection. By embedding malicious instructions within external data sources (e.g., scraped web pages or uploaded documents), an attacker can hijack the agent's planning capabilities to sequentially chain…

Multi-Agent Systems based on Large Language Models (LLM-MAS) are vulnerable to systemic Consensus Corruption via cascading error amplification. Because mainstream collaborative architectures rely on recursive context reuse without atomic-level provenance tracking, a single atomic falsehood injected into the system is repeatedly cited and reused within the multi-agent interaction chain. This structural exposure causes the error to deterministically compound across the communication graph…

Leading Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit significant cross-lingual safety drift, allowing users to bypass safety guardrails by translating harmful prompts into low-resource Indic languages. While models effectively block unsafe prompts concerning caste, religion, gender, and politics in high-resource languages like English and Hindi, their safety alignment severely degrades in low-resource scripts such as Odia, Telugu, Kannada, and Punjabi. Evaluated models demonstrate a cross-language…

Safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a "Defensive Refusal Bias" vulnerability, resulting in a safety-induced denial-of-service for legitimate cybersecurity operations. The models systematically refuse authorized defensive queries when they contain security-sensitive terminology (e.g., "exploit," "payload," "shell") because current alignment mechanisms rely on semantic similarity to harmful training data rather than intent analysis. Paradoxically, explicit authorization signals…

A vulnerability in multi-step, tool-using Large Language Model (LLM) agents allows attackers to bypass safety guardrails by manipulating user context variables, such as personalization profiles or persistent memory. The safety policies of frontier LLMs are highly context-dependent; inserting innocuous user bios (e.g., demographic or health disclosures) fundamentally alters the agent's action policy. When combined with lightweight adversarial jailbreaks, specific personalization contexts…

Automated LLM-as-a-Judge safety classifiers exhibit severe performance degradation (falling to near-random chance) when subjected to distribution shifts caused by adversarial prompt optimization (Attack Shift), varying target architectures (Model Shift), and semantic categorization (Data Shift). Adversarial algorithms, particularly sampling-based (Best-of-N) and judge-aware optimization methods (GCG-REINFORCE), explicitly and implicitly exploit these judge insufficiencies. Instead of eliciting…

LLM-as-a-judge systems and automated LLM evaluators are vulnerable to meaning-preserving perturbations, specifically formatting alterations and verbosity manipulations. When grading or classifying text and agentic transcripts, LLM judges exhibit high sensitivity to layout-only changes (such as whitespace and indentation) and response length, frequently altering their scores even when the underlying semantic and factual content remains identical. This allows attackers to bypass automated safety…

Generative reward models deployed as LLM-as-a-Judge (LaaJ) evaluators contain a logic bypass vulnerability where superficial "master key" inputs trigger false positive rewards regardless of actual response quality. Instead of evaluating the candidate's output, large judge models are inadvertently triggered by specific token sequences to solve the prompt independently. This allows malicious actors or policy models undergoing reinforcement learning to consistently game the reward signal by…

A vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) equipped with built-in "thinking" or step-by-step reasoning modes allows attackers to bypass safety alignments, trigger reasoning collapse, and cause resource exhaustion. The vulnerability is exploited via a Multi-Stream Perturbation Attack, which fragments the sequential integrity of a harmful prompt by word-by-word interleaving it with benign auxiliary tasks (e.g., "Explain the water cycle"). By wrapping the benign text streams in specific…

LLM-based autonomous agents deployed in multi-turn, structured environments are vulnerable to adaptive, profit-driven semantic exploitation. Rather than utilizing traditional malformed prompt injections or jailbreaks, an attacker can leverage valid interaction channels to execute social engineering, protocol spoofing, and authority impersonation tactics. By strategically shaping the environment's context—such as feigning technical constraints, fabricating evaluation harnesses, or manipulating…