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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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24 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

A cryptographic weakness exists in the privacy assumptions of vector embeddings used in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems and Vector Databases. The vulnerability, designated "Zero2Text," allows an unauthenticated attacker to reconstruct raw text from captured vector embeddings without access to the victim model's parameters, gradients, or training data. Unlike prior embedding inversion attacks that require training large decoders on domain-specific datasets, this vulnerability…

Zero2Text: Zero-Training Cross-Domain Inversion Attacks on Textual Embeddings
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Self-evolving Large Language Model (LLM) agents that utilize long-term memory mechanisms (such as Vector Databases for Retrieval-Augmented Generation or Sliding Window buffers) are vulnerable to persistent indirect prompt injection. This vulnerability, termed "Zombie Agent," occurs when the agent's memory update function ($F_M$) processes attacker-controlled content retrieved from external sources (e.g., web pages, documents) and commits it to long-term storage without sufficient sanitization…

Zombie Agents: Persistent Control of Self-Evolving LLM Agents via Self-Reinforcing Injections
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

The paper describes a reproducible black-box indirect prompt injection evaluation for embedding-based RAG and agent systems. It separates a poisoned document into a retrieval-optimized trigger fragment and an instruction-bearing attack fragment, showing that one injected item can be surfaced by natural queries and then influence model output or agent behavior. These are paper-reported findings; they were not independently verified here.

Overcoming the Retrieval Barrier: Indirect Prompt Injection in the Wild for LLM Systems
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Qwen 3 0.6B +19 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Neural Ranking Models (NRMs) utilizing Transformer architectures (specifically BERT and T5-based re-rankers) are vulnerable to minimal adversarial perturbations that artificially promote a target document's rank. The vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate ranking outcomes by inserting or substituting a single "query center" token—a word identified as the semantic centroid of the user's query—into the target document. The attack exploits the model's sensitivity to specific semantic…

One Word is Enough: Minimal Adversarial Perturbations for Neural Text Ranking
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2025
Analyzed 12/5/2025

A vulnerability exists in certain Large Language Models and diffusion models due to discontinuities in their latent space, which arise from data sparsity during training. An attacker can craft inputs containing lexically rare or semantically ambiguous constructs to guide the model's inference process toward these unstable, poorly-conditioned regions. This technique, termed "Alignment Degradation Induction," can degrade or bypass safety alignment mechanisms. Through iterative, multi-turn…

Exploiting Latent Space Discontinuities for Building Universal LLM Jailbreaks and Data Extraction Attacks
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2025
Analyzed 12/8/2025

The KG-DF (Knowledge Graph Defense Framework) contains a logic vulnerability in its Semantic Parsing Module, specifically within the keyword extraction phase defined as $K_{core} = \text{LLM}(P_{prompt})$. The framework relies on a Large Language Model (e.g., GPT-3.5-turbo) to distill user input into keywords ($K_{core}$), which are then embedded to retrieve security warning triples ($T_{match}$) from a Knowledge Graph.

KG-DF: A Black-box Defense Framework against Jailbreak Attacks Based on Knowledge Graphs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Llama 2 7B +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 7/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems utilizing dense (e.g., BERT-based) or sparse (e.g., BM25) retrievers are vulnerable to black-box adversarial prompt injection attacks. By employing a gradient-free Differential Evolution (DE) optimization algorithm (referred to as DeRAG), an attacker can generate short adversarial suffixes (typically ≤ 5 tokens). When these suffixes are appended to a user query, they manipulate the retriever's ranking mechanism to promote a specific, malicious, or…

DeRAG: Black-box Adversarial Attacks on Multiple Retrieval-Augmented Generation Applications via Prompt Injection
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 4/1/2025
Analyzed 1/14/2026

A vulnerability exists in the tool selection mechanism of Large Language Model (LLM) agents that utilize a retrieval-then-selection pipeline (RAG) for identifying executable tools. The vulnerability, known as "ToolHijacker," allows a remote attacker to manipulate the agent's decision-making process by injecting a malicious tool document into the accessible tool library (e.g., via third-party tool hubs or plugins). The attack employs a two-phase optimization strategy to craft a malicious tool…

Prompt Injection Attack to Tool Selection in LLM Agents
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct, Llama 3 70B Instruct +5 more

Source: arXiv

Published 4/1/2025
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to a targeted corpus poisoning attack known as "CorruptRAG". This vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate the response of an LLM to a specific target query by injecting a single malicious document into the RAG knowledge database. Unlike traditional poisoning attacks that require flooding the retrieval results (top-N) with malicious content to outnumber correct information, CorruptRAG succeeds with a single retrieved document.

Practical poisoning attacks against retrieval-augmented generation
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, GPT-4o

Source: arXiv

Published 4/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

A Universal Zero-shot Embedding Inversion vulnerability exists in vector databases and embedding-based retrieval systems. The flaw allows an attacker to reconstruct original plaintext documents from their vector embeddings without requiring access to the original training data or training an embedding-specific inversion model. The attack, identified as "ZSinvert," leverages a multi-stage adversarial decoding process: (1) a cosine-similarity guided beam search using a Large Language Model (LLM)…

Universal Zero-shot Embedding Inversion
Evaluated models: Qwen 2 5B

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.