Language Model Security Database

Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to a novel black-box jailbreak attack, IDEATOR, which leverages a separate VLM to generate malicious image-text pairs. The attacker VLM iteratively refines its prompts based on the target VLM's responses, bypassing safety mechanisms by generating contextually relevant and visually subtle malicious prompts.

Refusal-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) show decreased safety when deployed as browser agents compared to their performance in chatbot settings. Attack methods effective at jailbreaking LLMs in chat contexts also successfully bypass safety mechanisms in browser agents, leading to the execution of harmful behaviors. This vulnerability stems from a lack of generalization of safety training to agentic, real-world interaction scenarios and the increased context available to the agent (browser…

Large language models (LLMs) controlling robots are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks. The ROBOPAIR algorithm demonstrates that malicious prompts can bypass safety mechanisms, causing robots to perform harmful physical actions. This vulnerability exploits the LLM's reliance on textual prompts and its potential lack of sufficient contextual understanding to prevent unsafe commands. The attack is effective across different access levels.

The ALERT-Motion framework demonstrates a vulnerability in text-to-motion (T2M) models where an attacker can craft subtly modified text prompts (adversarial prompts) that cause the model to generate motions significantly different from those intended by the benign prompt, yet semantically similar to a target motion specified by the attacker. The attack leverages a large language model (LLM) to autonomously generate these adversarial prompts, bypassing simple keyword-based detection mechanisms…

A vulnerability allows bypassing safety filters in text-to-image (T2I) models using a multi-agent framework ("Atlas") powered by Large Language Models (LLMs). Atlas iteratively generates and refines prompts, leveraging a Vision-Language Model (VLM) to assess filter activation and an LLM to select effective prompts that maintain semantic similarity to the original, malicious prompt while evading the filter. This enables the generation of images containing unsafe content.

LLM-based autonomous agents are vulnerable to malfunction amplification attacks. These attacks exploit the inherent instability of agents by inducing repetitive or irrelevant actions through various methods including prompt injection and adversarial perturbations, leading to agent malfunction and task failure. The attacks do not rely on overtly harmful actions, making them harder to detect with standard LLM safety mechanisms.

Embodied Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to manipulation via voice-based interactions, leading to the execution of harmful physical actions. Attacks exploit three vulnerabilities: (1) cascading LLM jailbreaks resulting in malicious robotic commands; (2) misalignment between linguistic outputs (verbal refusal) and physical actions (command execution); and (3) conceptual deception, where seemingly benign instructions lead to harmful outcomes due to incomplete world knowledge within…

The SoP framework allows for automated generation of jailbreak prompts, bypassing safety mechanisms in LLMs. SoP utilizes multiple automatically optimized "jailbreak characters" within a single prompt to persuade the LLM to generate harmful or undesirable content, even without any seed jailbreak templates. This vulnerability is demonstrated against GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and LLaMA-2.

LLMs, even when individually assessed as "safe," can be combined by an adversary to achieve malicious outcomes. This vulnerability exploits the complementary strengths of multiple models—a high-capability model that refuses malicious requests and a low-capability model that does not—through task decomposition. Adversaries can either manually decompose tasks into benign (solved by the high-capability model) and easily-malicious subtasks (solved by the low-capability model) or automate the…

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to elicit unsafe or unethical responses through a chain of semantically relevant multi-turn prompts. The attack, termed "Chain of Attack" (CoA), exploits the model's contextual understanding and adaptive response capabilities to gradually steer the conversation towards the desired harmful output, even if single-turn prompts are rejected due to safety mechanisms. The attack leverages semantic similarity scoring (e.g., using…