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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

468 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

LLM Infinite Thinking DoS

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A Denial-of-Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) inference services where specially crafted input prompts can trigger excessively long or infinite generation loops ("infinite thinking"). This vulnerability, identified as "ThinkTrap," utilizes derivative-free optimization (CMA-ES) within a continuous surrogate embedding space to circumvent the discrete nature of token inputs. By optimizing a low-dimensional latent vector and projecting it to token sequences, an…

ThinkTrap: Denial-of-Service Attacks against Black-box LLM Services via Infinite Thinking
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Pro, Lumimaid 70B, o4-mini+4 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Lumimaid 70B
  • o4-mini
  • MAI DS R1 671B
  • DeepSeek R1 0528 Qwen3 8B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • DeepSeek R1 671B

TeleAI Reveals Systemic LLM Vulnerabilities

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Reasoning-specialized Large Language Models (LLMs) that utilize Chain-of-Thought (CoT) processes are vulnerable to reasoning-exploitation jailbreaks. Attackers can bypass standard safety alignments (such as RLHF) by using adaptive multi-turn interactions or semantic transformations to induce the model to generate intermediate reasoning steps that "rationalize" or "contextualize" a harmful request. Because current alignment techniques often fail to scale linearly with reasoning depth, forcing…

TeleAI-Safety: A comprehensive LLM jailbreaking benchmark towards attacks, defenses, and evaluations
Evaluated models: GPT-5, GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1 Mini+11 more
  • GPT-5
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • o1
  • Grok 3
  • Grok 3 Mini
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Vicuna 7B
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Qwen 1.5 7B Chat
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct

Knowledge Weaving Jailbreak Tactic

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in large language models where safety guardrails can be bypassed by decomposing a single harmful objective into a sequence of individually innocuous sub-queries. An attacker agent can use an adaptive tree search algorithm (Correlated Knowledge Attack Agent - CKA-Agent) to explore the target model's internal correlated knowledge. The agent issues benign queries, uses the model's responses to guide exploration along multiple reasoning paths, and aggregates the collected…

A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Bypassing Commercial LLM Guardrails via Harmless Prompt Weaving and Adaptive Tree Search
Evaluated models: Circuit Breaker, Claude 3.5 Haiku, Gemini 2.5 Flash+7 more
  • Circuit Breaker
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Gemma 2B
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama Guard 3
  • Qwen 3 32B

Guardrail Helpful Mode Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A "Helpful Mode" role-confusion vulnerability exists in specific Large Language Model (LLM) safety guardrails, specifically Nemotron-Safety-8B and Granite-Guardian-3.2-5B. These models, designed to act as binary classifiers (outputting "Safe" or "Unsafe") for content moderation, can be manipulated via contextually framed adversarial prompts (e.g., academic research requests, corporate security scenarios, or roleplay) to abandon their classification objective. Instead of blocking the request…

Evaluating the Robustness of Large Language Model Safety Guardrails Against Adversarial Attacks
Evaluated models: Nemotron Safety 8B, Granite Guardian 3.2 5B

Template and Suffix Optimization

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in multiple Large Language Models (LLMs) that allows for safety alignment bypass through an advanced jailbreaking technique called Template and Suffix Optimization (TASO). The attack combines two distinct optimization methods in an alternating, iterative feedback loop. First, a semantically meaningless adversarial suffix is optimized (e.g., using gradient-based methods like GCG) to force the LLM to begin its response with an affirmative phrase (e.g., "Sure, here is...")…

TASO: Jailbreak LLMs via Alternative Template and Suffix Optimization
Evaluated models: Baichuan 2 13B, Baichuan 2 7B, DeepSeek 7B+27 more
  • Baichuan 2 13B
  • Baichuan 2 7B
  • DeepSeek 7B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 70B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama Guard
  • Llama Guard 2 8B
  • Llama Guard 3 1B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Mixtral 8x7B
  • Orca 2 7B
  • Qwen 14B
  • Qwen 32B
  • Qwen 72B
  • Qwen 7B
  • Solar 10.7B
  • Vicuna 7B
  • Zephyr 7B

Embodied Cross-Modal Misalignment

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

OpenVLA, a Vision-Language-Action (VLA) model, contains a vulnerability regarding multimodal adversarial robustness. The model lacks sufficient cross-modal alignment stability, allowing attackers to disrupt the grounding between visual perception and linguistic instructions. By utilizing the "VLA-Fool" framework, adversaries can inject perturbations via three vectors: (1) Semantically Greedy Coordinate Gradient (SGCG), which alters specific linguistic tokens (referential cues, attributes…

When alignment fails: Multimodal adversarial attacks on vision-language-action models
Evaluated models: Not reported

LLM Agent Automates Backdoor Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in the fine-tuning process of Large Language Models (LLMs) allows for the automated generation of stealthy backdoor attacks using an autonomous LLM agent. This method, termed AutoBackdoor, creates a pipeline to generate semantically coherent trigger phrases and corresponding poisoned instruction-response pairs. Unlike traditional backdoor attacks that rely on fixed, often anomalous triggers, this technique produces natural language triggers that are contextually relevant and…

AutoBackdoor: Automating Backdoor Attacks via LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3
  • Qwen 2.5 14B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct

Adversarial Poetry Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) from multiple vendors are vulnerable to a "poetic jailbreak" attack, a form of stylistic obfuscation where safety guardrails are bypassed by formatting harmful requests as poetry. By encoding prohibited instructions (e.g., malware creation, CBRN protocols) into verse—utilizing metaphors, rhyme schemes, and rhythmic structure—an attacker can evade intent recognition heuristics. The model perceives the input primarily as a creative writing constraint rather than a…

Adversarial Poetry as a Universal Single-Turn Jailbreak Mechanism in Large Language Models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek Chat V3.1, DeepSeek V3.2 Exp, Qwen 3 32B+22 more
  • DeepSeek Chat V3.1
  • DeepSeek V3.2 Exp
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Kimi K2
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Magistral Medium 2506
  • Qwen 3 Max
  • Mistral Large 2411
  • Mistral Small 3.2 24B Instruct
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Llama 4 Scout
  • Kimi K2 Thinking
  • Grok 4 Fast
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • Grok 4
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • GPT-5
  • Claude Opus 4.1
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • GPT-5 Nano
  • Claude Haiku 4.5

Conceptual Triggers Bypass Safety

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models are vulnerable to a conceptual manipulation attack, termed Morphology Inspired Conceptual Manipulation (MICM), that bypasses standard safety filters to generate content aligned with harmful extremist ideologies. The attack does not use explicit keywords or standard jailbreak syntax. Instead, it embeds a curated set of seemingly innocuous phrases, called Concept-embedded Triggers (CETs), into a prompt template. These CETs represent an abstract "conceptual configuration" of…

When Harmless Words Harm: A New Threat to LLM Safety via Conceptual Triggers
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, DeepSeek V3, GPT-4o+3 more
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek V3
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Mistral 7B v0.3
  • Qwen 3 8B

Embedded Templates Bypass Moderation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A jailbreak vulnerability, termed Embedded Jailbreak Template (EJT), allows for the generation of harmful content by bypassing the safety mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs). The attack uses a generator LLM to contextually integrate a harmful query into a pre-existing jailbreak template. Unlike fixed templates which insert a query into a static placeholder, EJT rewrites multiple parts of the template to embed the harmful intent naturally. This process preserves the original template's…

Beyond Fixed and Dynamic Prompts: Embedded Jailbreak Templates for Advancing LLM Security
Evaluated models: BERT, DeBERTa v3 Base, GPT-4o

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.