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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

610 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Cross-Environment Agent Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) agents operating in tool-augmented environments are susceptible to "Contextual Fragility" and multi-turn "long-chain" exploitation. Existing safety mechanisms predominantly function on a stateless, atomic paradigm, evaluating individual input-output pairs in isolation. This allows an adversary to orchestrate complex attack trajectories where malicious intent is distributed across multiple, individually benign steps (a "Domino Effect"). Consequently, an attacker can…

DREAM: Dynamic Red-teaming for Evaluating Agentic Multi-Environment Security
Evaluated models: o4-mini, Gemini 2.5 Flash, GPT-5+8 more
  • o4-mini
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • GPT-5
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Grok 4
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • Kimi K2 Preview
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Qwen 2.5 72B
  • DeepSeek V3.1

Progressive Exposure Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a multi-turn adversarial attack framework termed MEEA (Mere Exposure Effect Attack), which exploits the psychological "mere exposure effect" to bypass safety alignment. Unlike single-turn injections, this vulnerability targets the dynamic nature of LLM safety thresholds during sustained interaction. By subjecting the model to a sequence of optimized, low-toxicity, and semantically progressive prompts, an attacker can induce a gradual shift in the…

MEEA: Mere Exposure Effect-Driven Confrontational Optimization for LLM Jailbreaking
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Llama 3.1 8B+2 more
  • GPT-4
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Qwen 3 8B

LLM Psychological Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) employing Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) contain a behavioral vulnerability arising from "over-optimized social priors." This vulnerability, termed Psychological Jailbreak, allows attackers to bypass safety guardrails by exploiting the model’s optimization for anthropomorphic consistency. By establishing a Structured Persona Context (SPC) that aligns with latent psychometric traits (e.g., high agreeableness or neuroticism), an…

Breaking Minds, Breaking Systems: Jailbreaking Large Language Models via Human-like Psychological Manipulation
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 2.0 Flash+2 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Qwen 3 32B Instruct
  • DeepSeek V3

Adversarial Tales Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A jailbreak vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety constraints by framing harmful requests as structural narrative analysis tasks based on Vladimir Propp’s morphology of folktales. Known as "Adversarial Tales," the attack embeds prohibited instructions (e.g., cyberattack methodologies or restricted synthesis steps) within a fictional narrative, typically using a cyberpunk setting. The user then prompts the model to decompose the story using specific…

From Adversarial Poetry to Adversarial Tales: An Interpretability Research Agenda
Evaluated models: DeepSeek Chat V3.1, DeepSeek V3.2 Exp, Qwen 3 32B+23 more
  • DeepSeek Chat V3.1
  • DeepSeek V3.2 Exp
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Kimi K2
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Magistral Medium 2506
  • Qwen 3 Max
  • Mistral Large 2411
  • Mistral Small 3.2 24B Instruct
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Llama 4 Scout
  • Kimi K2 Thinking
  • Grok 4 Fast
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • Grok 4
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • GPT-5
  • Claude Opus 4.1
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • GPT-5 Nano
  • Claude Haiku 4.5
  • Gemini 3 Pro Preview

Pretrained Leak Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) finetuned from open-weight pretrained sources inherit adversarial vulnerabilities encoded in the pretrained model's internal representations. An attacker with white-box access to a pretrained model (e.g., Llama-2, Llama-3) can identify linearly separable features in the hidden states that correlate with "transferable" jailbreak prompts. By exploiting these features using a Probe-Guided Projection (PGP) attack, the attacker can optimize adversarial suffixes on the…

One Leak Away: How Pretrained Model Exposure Amplifies Jailbreak Risks in Finetuned LLMs
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct, DeepSeek LLM 7B Chat+5 more
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • DeepSeek LLM 7B Chat
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Qwen 7B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2

Reject-Accept Judge Flip

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

"LLM-as-a-Judge" systems and automated scientific review frameworks (such as OpenReviewer, DeepReview, and institutional deployments like AAAI’s AI-powered assessment) are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection via adversarial PDF manipulation. Attackers can embed hidden instructions—specifically using white font (1pt) or obfuscated semantics—within submission documents. When these PDFs are parsed (typically via OCR or tools like MinerU converting to Markdown) and processed by the LLM, the…

When Reject Turns into Accept: Quantifying the Vulnerability of LLM-Based Scientific Reviewers to Indirect Prompt Injection
Evaluated models: Tülu 3 8B, Llama 3.1 8B, Falcon 3 10B+10 more
  • Tülu 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Falcon 3 10B
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • Mistral Small 22B
  • Gemma 3 27B
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 32B
  • Claude Haiku 4.5
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • GPT-5

Frontier Multi-Turn Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Frontier Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a critical vulnerability to automated, adaptive multi-turn adversarial attacks, specifically those utilizing tree-based exploration algorithms (e.g., the TEMPEST framework). Unlike single-turn jailbreaks, this vulnerability exploits the model's inability to maintain safety alignment across extended conversation trajectories. An attacker using an automated agent can dynamically select from multiple adversarial strategies—such as academic framing…

Replicating TEMPEST at Scale: Multi-Turn Adversarial Attacks Against Trillion-Parameter Frontier Models
Evaluated models: Cogito 2.1, DeepSeek V3.1, Gemma 3 12B+7 more
  • Cogito 2.1
  • DeepSeek V3.1
  • Gemma 3 12B
  • GLM-4.6
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • Kimi K2
  • Kimi K2 Thinking
  • MiniMax M2
  • Mistral Large 3

LLM Infinite Thinking DoS

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A Denial-of-Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) inference services where specially crafted input prompts can trigger excessively long or infinite generation loops ("infinite thinking"). This vulnerability, identified as "ThinkTrap," utilizes derivative-free optimization (CMA-ES) within a continuous surrogate embedding space to circumvent the discrete nature of token inputs. By optimizing a low-dimensional latent vector and projecting it to token sequences, an…

ThinkTrap: Denial-of-Service Attacks against Black-box LLM Services via Infinite Thinking
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Pro, Lumimaid 70B, o4-mini+4 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Lumimaid 70B
  • o4-mini
  • MAI DS R1 671B
  • DeepSeek R1 0528 Qwen3 8B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • DeepSeek R1 671B

RL Multi-Turn Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to automated, black-box, multi-turn jailbreak attacks coordinated by an adversarial agent trained via Reinforcement Learning (RL). The vulnerability exists because standard safety alignments often optimize for single-turn refusals, failing to account for trajectory-level planning. The attack method, dubbed RL-MTJail, utilizes a multi-turn variant of Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) to train an attacker LLM. This agent optimizes for the…

RL-MTJail: Reinforcement Learning for Automated Black-Box Multi-Turn Jailbreaking of Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 2 13B, Llama 3.1 8B+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 3B
  • Gemma 2 9B

Semantic Tool Poisoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) agents utilizing the Model Context Protocol (MCP) are vulnerable to semantic injection attacks via adversarial tool descriptors. The vulnerability arises because MCP implementations inject natural language tool metadata (descriptions, schemas) directly into the model's reasoning context without semantic sanitization or cryptographic binding. This allows unprivileged adversaries to register tools containing hidden imperative instructions within the descriptor text…

Securing the Model Context Protocol: Defending LLMs Against Tool Poisoning and Adversarial Attacks
Evaluated models: GPT-4

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.