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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

468 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Adaptive Role-Play Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to an automated, adaptive role-play jailbreak attack known as GUARD (Guideline Upholding Test through Adaptive Role-play and Jailbreak Diagnostics). The vulnerability exists because the models fail to recognize malicious intent when harmful queries are embedded within complex, iteratively optimized "playing scenarios."

GUARD: Guideline Upholding Test through Adaptive Role-play and Jailbreak Diagnostics for LLMs
Evaluated models: Vicuna 13B, LongChat 7B, Llama 2 7B+5 more
  • Vicuna 13B
  • LongChat 7B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • MiniGPT-v2

Familiar Pattern Analysis Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) utilized for static code analysis, code review, and autonomous software engineering exhibit a cognitive vulnerability termed "Abstraction Bias." When processing code that structurally resembles common algorithmic patterns (e.g., standard sorting algorithms, helper functions, or mathematical formulas), the model relies on high-level memorized representations of the algorithm's intent rather than analyzing the specific local logic. Adversaries can exploit this by…

Trust Me, I Know This Function: Hijacking LLM Static Analysis using Bias
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 2.0 Flash+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • o3
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro

Multimodal Linking Visual Insecurity

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Entity Linking (MEL) systems, encompassing both traditional dual-encoder models and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), are vulnerable to gradient-based white-box adversarial attacks. By applying imperceptible perturbations to visual inputs via Projected Gradient Descent (PGD), Auto-PGD (APGD), or Carlini & Wagner (CW) methods, an attacker can manipulate the visual embeddings generated by the model. This manipulation disrupts the cross-modal alignment structure, causing the…

On Evaluating the Adversarial Robustness of Foundation Models for Multimodal Entity Linking
Evaluated models: MiniGPT-4

Universal Transferable LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), including Llama 2, Mistral, and Vicuna, are susceptible to a white-box adversarial attack that circumvents safety alignment mechanisms (such as RLHF). The vulnerability exists due to the models' susceptibility to intrinsic optimization of adversarial suffixes using Exponentiated Gradient Descent (EGD). Unlike previous methods that rely on inefficient discrete token searches (e.g., Greedy Coordinate Gradient) or standard projected gradient descent, this attack…

Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attack on Large Language Models Using Exponentiated Gradient Descent
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, Llama 2 7B+3 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Falcon 7B
  • Vicuna 7B

Universal Prompt Disables Guardrails

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A universal prompt injection vulnerability, termed "Involuntary Jailbreak," affects multiple large language models. The attack uses a single prompt that instructs the model to learn a pattern from abstract string operators (X and Y). The model is then asked to generate its own examples of questions that should be refused (harmful questions) and provide detailed, non-refusal answers to them, in order to satisfy the learned operator logic. This reframes the generation of harmful content as a…

Involuntary Jailbreak
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Haiku, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, Claude Opus 4+29 more
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • Claude Opus 4
  • Claude Opus 4.1
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Gemini 3 Pro
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • Grok 3
  • Grok 3 Fast
  • Grok 3 Mini
  • Grok 4
  • Grok 4.1
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Llama 4 Scout
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Mistral Small 24B
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B Instruct 2507
  • Qwen 3 Coder 480B-A35B Instruct

Optimization-Induced Safety Degradation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Safety alignment degradation occurs in instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically Llama-2-7B, Llama-3.2-1B, Qwen2.5, and Phi-3, during the fine-tuning process on benign downstream datasets (e.g., Dolly, Alpaca). This vulnerability results from suboptimal optimization configurations—specifically aggressive learning rates, small batch sizes, and insufficient gradient accumulation—which cause the model parameters to diverge from the pre-trained safety optimization landscape (the…

Rethinking safety in llm fine-tuning: An optimization perspective
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, Llama 2 7B+3 more
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.2 1B
  • Qwen 2.5 3B
  • Phi-3 3B

Automated LLM Fingerprinting

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exposed via public APIs are vulnerable to model fingerprinting attacks where an attacker can identify the exact backend model family and version (e.g., distinguishing Mistral-7B-v0.1 from v0.3) by analyzing response patterns. While traditional fingerprinting relies on manual query curation, this vulnerability is exacerbated by Reinforcement Learning (RL) based query optimization. An attacker can train an RL agent (specifically using Proximal Policy Optimization) to…

Attacks and defenses against llm fingerprinting
Evaluated models: Mistral 7B, Qwen 2 5B, Gemma 2 2B+1 more
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2 5B
  • Gemma 2 2B
  • Gemma 7B

Magic Token Safety Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Magic-Token-Guided Co-Training (MTC) framework for Large Language Models (LLMs) introduces a mechanism where distinct behavioral modes are activated via hardcoded system-level strings known as "magic tokens." A specific vulnerability exists in the implementation of the "negative" (neg) behavior mode, which is explicitly trained to generate unfiltered, risk-prone, and harmful content for internal red-teaming. The framework relies on the secrecy of the magic token (e.g., a random string like…

Efficient Switchable Safety Control in LLMs via Magic-Token-Guided Co-Training
Evaluated models: Qwen 3 8B

Back-Translation Watermark Stripping

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Implementations of Large Language Model (LLM) watermarking algorithms—specifically KGW (Kirchenbauer et al.), Semantic Invariant Robust (SIR) Watermark, Entropy-based Text Watermarking (EWD), and Unbiased Watermarking—are vulnerable to watermark stripping via adversarial text perturbation. When watermarked text generated by models such as OPT-1.3B is subjected to automated paraphrasing or back-translation (e.g., English $\to$ French $\to$ English), the embedded statistical signals are…

Signature vs. Substance: Evaluating the Balance of Adversarial Resistance and Linguistic Quality in Watermarking Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B

Thinking Mode Jailbreak Amplification

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) implementing "Thinking Mode" (also known as Reasoning Mode or Chain-of-Thought) exhibit a heightened susceptibility to jailbreak attacks compared to their non-reasoning counterparts. When a model is prompted to reason step-by-step (often delimited by specific tokens like <think> and </think>), the internal reasoning process frequently overrides safety alignment training. Research indicates that during the generation of the thinking chain, the model often…

The Cost of Thinking: Increased Jailbreak Risk in Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Qwen 3 0.6B, Qwen 3 1.7B, Qwen 3 4B+8 more
  • Qwen 3 0.6B
  • Qwen 3 1.7B
  • Qwen 3 4B
  • Qwen 3 8B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 1.5B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 8B
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct
  • Qwen Plus Latest
  • Doubao Seed 1.6 Flash
  • DeepSeek Reasoner

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.