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Updated 7/21/2026, database is current

Language Model Security Database

959 research findings · 1077 evaluated models

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556 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Updated 5/31/2025

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to implicit jailbreak attacks that leverage least significant bit (LSB) steganography to conceal malicious instructions within images. These instructions are coupled with seemingly benign image-related text prompts, causing the MLLM to execute the hidden malicious instructions. The attack bypasses existing safety mechanisms by exploiting cross-modal reasoning capabilities.

Implicit Jailbreak Attacks via Cross-Modal Information Concealment on Vision-Language Models
Affects: Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT-4.5 +3 more

Source: arXiv

Computer-Use Agents (CUAs) powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) operating in hybrid Web-OS environments are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Attackers can embed malicious natural language or code instructions within legitimate web content (e.g., social media forums, chat applications, shared cloud documents) that the agent processes during benign task execution. Due to the agent's inability to distinguish between trusted user instructions and untrusted environmental data, the CUA…

RedTeamCUA: Realistic Adversarial Testing of Computer-Use Agents in Hybrid Web-OS Environments
Affects: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, GPT-4o

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/30/2025

Large Language Model (LLM) content moderation guardrails, including advanced mechanisms utilizing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Intent Analysis (IA), are vulnerable to adversarial bypass via "Intent Manipulation." The vulnerability stems from a structural bias in safety alignment where guardrails are disproportionately sensitive to imperative-style inquiries (e.g., commands like "Write a guide...") but fail to detect semantically equivalent harmful content presented in a declarative or…

Exploring the Vulnerability of the Content Moderation Guardrail in Large Language Models via Intent Manipulation
Affects: GPT-4o, o1, o3-mini +10 more

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) that allows attackers to manipulate the model's output by modifying token log probabilities. Attackers can use a lightweight plug-in model (BiasNet) to subtly alter the probabilities, steering the LLM toward generating harmful content even when safety mechanisms are in place. This attack requires only access to the top-k token log probabilities returned by the LLM's API, without needing model weights or internal access.

JULI: Jailbreak Large Language Models by Self-Introspection
Affects: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B, Llama 3 8B Instruct +3 more

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), including Llama-3, Falcon-3, Gemma-2, and GPT-4 variants, are susceptible to system prompt extraction attacks. The vulnerability exists due to the models' instruction-following nature, which allows remote attackers to bypass safety guardrails and retrieve the model's hidden system configuration (system prompt) verbatim. This is successfully exploited using an "Extended Sandwich Attack," where an adversarial extraction command is embedded between benign questions…

System Prompt Extraction Attacks and Defenses in Large Language Models
Affects: GPT-4, GPT-4o, Llama 3 8B +2 more

Source: arXiv

The LARGO attack exploits a vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allowing attackers to bypass safety mechanisms through the generation of "stealthy" adversarial prompts. The attack leverages gradient optimization in the LLM's continuous latent space to craft seemingly innocuous natural language suffixes which, when appended to harmful prompts, elicit unsafe responses. The vulnerability stems from the LLM's inability to reliably distinguish between benign and maliciously crafted latent…

LARGO: Latent Adversarial Reflection through Gradient Optimization for Jailbreaking LLMs
Affects: Llama 2 13B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat, Phi 3 Mini +1 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 5/31/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing safety mechanisms based on token-level distribution analysis are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack exploiting distributional discrepancies between alignment data and formally expressed logical statements. The vulnerability allows malicious actors to bypass safety restrictions by translating harmful natural language prompts into equivalent first-order logic expressions. The LLM, trained primarily on natural language, fails to recognize the harmful intent…

Logic Jailbreak: Efficiently Unlocking LLM Safety Restrictions Through Formal Logical Expression
Affects: DeepSeek R1, DeepSeek V3, GPT-3.5 Turbo +4 more

Source: arXiv

Multilingual prompt injection vulnerability in four closed-source Large Language Models (LLMs): GPT-4o, DeepSeek-R1, Gemini-1.5-Pro, and Qwen-Max. Attackers can bypass safety restrictions and elicit harmful or disallowed content by crafting prompts in English or Chinese, leveraging specific structural techniques (e.g., "Two Sides" prompting) that exploit inconsistencies in the models' safety alignment across languages and prompt formats.

The Tower of Babel Revisited: Multilingual Jailbreak Prompts on Closed-Source Large Language Models
Affects: DeepSeek R1, Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-4o +1 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/9/2025

Mobile LLM agents utilizing vision-based screen perception (OCR or Multimodal Large Language Models) are vulnerable to Visual Prompt Injection via malicious GUI overlays. An attacker holding the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission can deploy non-focusable floating windows (using FLAG_NOT_FOCUSABLE) containing adversarial text or fabricated UI elements over legitimate applications. Because the agent captures the entire screen buffer to interpret the device state, it ingests the adversarial overlay…

From Assistants to Adversaries: Exploring the Security Risks of Mobile LLM Agents
Affects: GPT-4o

Source: arXiv

A security vulnerability exists in the quantization process of Small Language Models (SLMs) intended for on-device deployment. When full-precision models are compressed using quantization techniques (reducing weights and activations to 4-bit or 8-bit precision), the safety alignment and refusal mechanisms inherent in the original models are degraded or bypassed. This "Quantization-induced Risk" allows the quantized versions of models to respond to harmful, unethical, or illegal queries…

LiteLMGuard: Seamless and Lightweight On-Device Prompt Filtering for Safeguarding Small Language Models against Quantization-induced Risks and …
Affects: Phi-3

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.