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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

610 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Touch-Guided Mobile Agent Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision-Language Model (LVLM) driven mobile agents, such as Mobile-Agent-E, are vulnerable to a touch-guided visual prompt injection attack. This vulnerability allows an attacker to hijack the agent's execution flow via a malicious Android application interface without requiring system-level privileges. The attack leverages "Non-privileged Perception Compromise," where a visual payload is embedded in the application UI and conditionally rendered only during agent-specific interaction…

Practical and Stealthy Touch-Guided Jailbreak Attacks on Deployed Mobile Vision-Language Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Gemini 2.0 Pro Exp 0205, Claude 3.5 Sonnet+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Gemini 2.0 Pro Exp 0205
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Qwen VL Max
  • DeepSeek-VL2
  • LLaVA-OneVision

Underestimated LLM Security Flaws

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Mamba-2 and hybrid Transformer-Mamba-2 distilled Large Language Model (LLM) architectures exhibit a distinct architectural susceptibility to Latent Injection and ANSI Escape sequence prompt injection attacks. Comparative analysis reveals that models incorporating Mamba state-space components (specifically distilled variants like Llamba-3B and base Mamba models) fail to maintain adversarial robustness levels comparable to pure Transformer baselines (such as Llama-3.2) when subjected to indirect…

Towards reliable and practical LLM security evaluations via Bayesian modelling
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 3B, Falcon 7B

Invisible Unicode Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to imperceptible jailbreaking attacks and prompt injection via the exploitation of Unicode variation selectors. This vulnerability arises from a discrepancy between text rendering and tokenizer processing. Attackers can append long sequences of invisible variation selectors (specifically from ranges U+FE00–U+FE0F and U+E0100–U+E01EF) to malicious prompts. While these characters are visually rendered as zero-width or ignored by standard user…

Imperceptible Jailbreaking against Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B, Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 7B+1 more
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Vicuna 13B

RL-Hammer Autonomous Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) agentic systems where automated reinforcement learning (RL) techniques can bypass advanced prompt injection defenses, including Instruction Hierarchy and SecAlign. The specific attack methodology, dubbed "RL-Hammer," utilizes Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) to train an attacker model from scratch without warm-up data. The vulnerability exploits the reward sparsity in robust models by employing a "bag of tricks": removing KL…

RL Is a Hammer and LLMs Are Nails: A Simple Reinforcement Learning Recipe for Strong Prompt Injection
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Meta-SecAlign 8B, Meta-SecAlign 70B+7 more
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Meta-SecAlign 8B
  • Meta-SecAlign 70B
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • GPT-5
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude Sonnet 4

Adaptive Typographic Image Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal agents built on Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to adaptive typographic prompt injection attacks (AgentTypo). This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute indirect prompt injection by embedding adversarial text prompts directly into images (e.g., webpage screenshots, product photos) processed by the agent. Unlike standard visual adversarial attacks that rely on noise perturbation, this method utilizes the AgentTypo framework to perform black-box Bayesian…

AgentTypo: Adaptive Typographic Prompt Injection Attacks against Black-box Multimodal Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4V, GPT-4o Mini+2 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4V
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Claude 3 Opus

Untargeted Gradient Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in certain safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) due to an untargeted, gradient-based optimization attack method called Untargeted Jailbreak Attack (UJA). Unlike previous targeted attacks (e.g., GCG) that optimize a prompt to elicit a predefined string (e.g., "Sure, here is..."), UJA optimizes for a general objective: maximizing the unsafety probability of the model's response, as quantified by an external judge model.

Untargeted Jailbreak Attack
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, GPT-2 Large, GPT-4+11 more
  • DeepSeek R1
  • GPT-2 Large
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama Guard 3
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 8B Instruct
  • RoBERTa
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Controlled-Release Guard Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability termed "Controlled-Release Prompting" allows attackers to bypass lightweight input filters (prompt guards) deployed in front of Large Language Models (LLMs). The attack exploits the computational resource asymmetry between the resource-constrained guard model and the highly capable target model. Attackers encode malicious instructions using obfuscation techniques—such as substitution ciphers (Timed-Release) or verbose character descriptions (Spaced-Release)—that require…

Bypassing Prompt Guards in Production with Controlled-Release Prompting
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Flash, Gemini 2.5 Pro, DeepSeek R1+2 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Grok 3
  • GPT-5 Mini

LLM Self-Targeted Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A security vulnerability exists in the safety alignment mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically susceptible to the "Dynamic Target Attack" (DTA). Unlike traditional gradient-based jailbreaks (e.g., GCG) that optimize adversarial suffixes toward a fixed, low-probability static target (e.g., "Sure, here is..."), DTA exploits the model's own output distribution. The attack iteratively samples candidate responses from the target model using relaxed decoding parameters (high…

Dynamic Target Attack
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Llama 3.2 1B, Mistral 7B+3 more
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.2 1B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Gemma 7B
  • Vicuna 7B

Reinforced Multi-turn Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), including both proprietary and open-source instruction-tuned models, contain a vulnerability to strategic, multi-turn adversarial attacks. Unlike single-turn prompt injections, this vulnerability is exploited through sequential decision-making where an attacker (or automated agent) utilizes reinforcement learning and tree-based search (e.g., DialTree-RPO) to navigate the dialogue state space. By employing strategies such as intent laundering (framing harmful…

Tree-based Dialogue Reinforced Policy Optimization for Red-Teaming Attacks
Evaluated models: Claude Sonnet 4, Gemini 2.0 Flash, Gemma 2 2B IT+15 more
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Gemma 2 2B IT
  • Gemma 2 9B IT
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • GPT-oss Safeguard 20B
  • Grok 4
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 1B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • Llama Guard 4 12B
  • Mistral 7B v0.3
  • o3-mini
  • ShieldGemma 9B

Code Agent Executable Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

AI code agents are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks that cause them to generate or complete malicious code. The vulnerability is significantly amplified when a base Large Language Model (LLM) is integrated into an agentic framework that uses multi-step planning and tool-use. Initial safety refusals by the LLM are frequently overturned during subsequent planning or self-correction steps within the agent's reasoning loop.

Breaking the Code: Security Assessment of AI Code Agents Through Systematic Jailbreaking Attacks
Evaluated models: Claude 3.7 Sonnet, DeepSeek R1, Dolphin Mistral 24B Venice+6 more
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Dolphin Mistral 24B Venice
  • GPT-4.1
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Mistral Large 2.1
  • o1
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.