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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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556 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 4/10/2026

Internal Safety Collapse (ISC) is a vulnerability in frontier Large Language Models (LLMs) where models autonomously generate highly restricted, harmful content while executing structurally legitimate professional workflows. The vulnerability triggers when a model infers that generating sensitive data is a functional requirement to complete an otherwise benign task. By nesting harmful content generation inside standard execution constraints (e.g., resolving a schema validation error in a…

Internal Safety Collapse in Frontier Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Gemini 3 Pro, Grok 4.1 Fast, Claude Sonnet 4.5 +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 4/10/2026

Speech-driven Large Language Models (LLMs) and end-to-end Large Audio-Language Models (LALMs) are vulnerable to inaudible near-ultrasonic prompt injections, a framework dubbed Sirens' Whisper (SWhisper). By exploiting the non-linear response of commodity microphones, attackers can encode structured, phonetically optimized adversarial prompts into the 17–22 kHz near-ultrasonic band. Using regularized channel-inversion pre-compensation, the attacker shapes the waveform to account for microphone…

Sirens' Whisper: Inaudible Near-Ultrasonic Jailbreaks of Speech-Driven LLMs
Evaluated models: GLM-4 Voice, Qwen Omni Turbo, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct +5 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 3/8/2026

Multimodal Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to alignment bypass via Inter-Turn Modality Switching (ITMS). By systematically rotating the input modality (e.g., alternating between text, audio, and image) across successive turns in a multi-turn adversarial conversation, an attacker can destabilize the model's safety defenses. The cross-modal transition mechanism exploits alignment gaps between differing input processing pipelines, accelerating the erosion of safety guardrails and…

MUSE: A Run-Centric Platform for Multimodal Unified Safety Evaluation of Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Flash, Gemini 3 Flash Preview, GPT-4o +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 4/10/2026

A vulnerability in multi-step, tool-using Large Language Model (LLM) agents allows attackers to bypass safety guardrails by manipulating user context variables, such as personalization profiles or persistent memory. The safety policies of frontier LLMs are highly context-dependent; inserting innocuous user bios (e.g., demographic or health disclosures) fundamentally alters the agent's action policy. When combined with lightweight adversarial jailbreaks, specific personalization contexts…

Differential Harm Propensity in Personalized LLM Agents: The Curious Case of Mental Health Disclosure
Evaluated models: DeepSeek V3.2, GPT-5 Mini, GPT-5.2 +5 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 4/10/2026

Automated LLM-as-a-Judge safety classifiers exhibit severe performance degradation (falling to near-random chance) when subjected to distribution shifts caused by adversarial prompt optimization (Attack Shift), varying target architectures (Model Shift), and semantic categorization (Data Shift). Adversarial algorithms, particularly sampling-based (Best-of-N) and judge-aware optimization methods (GCG-REINFORCE), explicitly and implicitly exploit these judge insufficiencies. Instead of eliciting…

A Coin Flip for Safety: LLM Judges Fail to Reliably Measure Adversarial Robustness
Evaluated models: Llama 2 13B HarmBench, Llama Guard 3 8B, AegisGuard +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 4/10/2026

Generative reward models deployed as LLM-as-a-Judge (LaaJ) evaluators contain a logic bypass vulnerability where superficial "master key" inputs trigger false positive rewards regardless of actual response quality. Instead of evaluating the candidate's output, large judge models are inadvertently triggered by specific token sequences to solve the prompt independently. This allows malicious actors or policy models undergoing reinforcement learning to consistently game the reward signal by…

Security in LLM-as-a-Judge: A Comprehensive SoK
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, o1, Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 4/10/2026

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to automated long-tail distribution attacks that exploit their instruction-following and code-execution capabilities to bypass safety alignments. Attackers can obfuscate malicious queries using a semantic-algorithmic representation, embedding the query within reversible encryption-decryption logic (e.g., sequence re-grouping, conditional branching, or index-dependent operations). By providing the model with the encrypted query and the corresponding…

Evolving Jailbreaks: Automated Multi-Objective Long-Tail Attacks on Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Llama 2 7B, Llama 3.1 8B

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 3/8/2026

A vulnerability in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety alignments via Multi-Image Dispersion and Semantic Reconstruction (MIDAS). Attackers decompose malicious instructions into risk-bearing semantic subunits, fragment them, and distribute them across multiple benign-looking Game-style Visual Reasoning (GVR) puzzles (e.g., Letter Equations, Rank-and-Read, Odd-One-Out). A sanitized, persona-driven textual prompt with sequential placeholders is then used to…

MIDAS: Multi-Image Dispersion and Semantic Reconstruction for Jailbreaking MLLMs
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Flash Thinking, Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT-4o +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 4/10/2026

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn, multi-modal jailbreak attacks where malicious intent is incrementally introduced and obfuscated through intertwined text and image prompts. Attackers can systematically bypass safety alignments by starting with self-optimized, benign-seeming conversation starters (horizontal expansion) and progressively stacking text and image attack augmentations across multiple conversation turns (vertical expansion). Furthermore, models fail…

FERRET: Framework for Expansion Reliant Red Teaming
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude 3 Haiku, Llama 4 Maverick

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 4/10/2026

A vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) equipped with built-in "thinking" or step-by-step reasoning modes allows attackers to bypass safety alignments, trigger reasoning collapse, and cause resource exhaustion. The vulnerability is exploited via a Multi-Stream Perturbation Attack, which fragments the sequential integrity of a harmful prompt by word-by-word interleaving it with benign auxiliary tasks (e.g., "Explain the water cycle"). By wrapping the benign text streams in specific…

Multi-Stream Perturbation Attack: Breaking Safety Alignment of Thinking LLMs Through Concurrent Task Interference
Evaluated models: Qwen 3 1.7B, Qwen 3 4B, Qwen 3 8B +2 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.