Language Model Security Database

A cognitive vulnerability exists in the reasoning mechanisms of autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents, specifically regarding "narrative overfitting"—the model's intrinsic drive to synthesize coherent causal stories from fragmented inputs. This vulnerability allows for "Cognitive Collusion Attacks" where an attacker creates a fabricated belief state in the victim agent using exclusively factually true evidence fragments. By employing a "Generative Montage" framework (consisting of…

LLM-based code agents and vulnerability detectors employing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning are susceptible to automated adversarial code obfuscation. The vulnerability exists because CoT mechanisms expose the model's decision logic, allowing reinforcement learning frameworks (such as CoTDeceptor) to iteratively refine code transformations based on the detector's own reasoning traces. By optimizing for "reasoning instability" and "hallucination" rather than just syntactic evasion, attackers…

Mamba-2 and hybrid Transformer-Mamba-2 distilled Large Language Model (LLM) architectures exhibit a distinct architectural susceptibility to Latent Injection and ANSI Escape sequence prompt injection attacks. Comparative analysis reveals that models incorporating Mamba state-space components (specifically distilled variants like Llamba-3B and base Mamba models) fail to maintain adversarial robustness levels comparable to pure Transformer baselines (such as Llama-3.2) when subjected to indirect…

Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external retrieval mechanisms (e.g., Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), web search, or email processing) are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection. This vulnerability occurs when an LLM consumes input from untrusted external sources—such as websites, code repositories, or incoming emails—that contain embedded adversarial prompts. Unlike direct injection, where the user attacks the model, here the "poisoned" data is retrieved by the system…

Large Language Model (LLM) agents capable of invoking external APIs are vulnerable to intent integrity violations. When an agent receives natural language instructions that are ambiguous, underspecified, or contain values not supported by the underlying API schema, the agent frequently fails to preserve user intent. Instead of rejecting the request or asking for clarification, the model may hallucinate parameter values, map unsupported requests to unsafe defaults, or execute actions on…

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to "Secondary Risks," a class of non-adversarial failures where the model generates harmful, misleading, or unsafe outputs in response to benign, non-malicious user prompts. Unlike jailbreaks which require adversarial inputs, secondary risks arise from imperfect generalization and alignment failures during standard interactions. This vulnerability manifests primarily in two primitives: 1. Excessive…

A vulnerability exists in the safety alignment mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs) (including GPT-4, Claude 3, Gemini, and Qwen families) leading to "Implicit Harm." Unlike traditional jailbreaks that use overtly harmful queries, this vulnerability allows remote attackers to coerce the model into providing factually incorrect, plausible, and dangerous responses to benign-looking inputs. By employing "JailFlip" techniques—specifically constructed affirmative-type or denial-type queries…

A vulnerability exists in Vision-Language Models (VLLMs) that allows for transferable, targeted adversarial attacks. Attackers can generate adversarial image perturbations using an ensemble of open-source surrogate models (primarily CLIP-based visual encoders) which effectively transfer to proprietary, black-box VLLMs. The attack leverages a specific optimization framework that combines a Visual Contrastive Loss with multiple positive/negative visual examples, rather than relying solely on…

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) decision-making capabilities described as "Rhetorical Persuasion Override." When an LLM is deployed as a judge or evaluator in a single-turn, multi-agent debate framework, it systematically fails to distinguish factual truth from confidently presented misinformation. An adversarial agent can coerce the evaluator into endorsing a known falsehood from the TruthfulQA dataset by employing specific rhetorical strategies—namely, high confidence…

A vulnerability exists in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems that allows for black-box adversarial attacks known as "CtrlRAG." This flaw allows an attacker to manipulate the generation of Large Language Models (LLMs) by injecting maliciously crafted inputs into the system's knowledge base. Unlike traditional injection attacks that rely on direct concatenation, CtrlRAG utilizes a Masked Language Model (MLM) to iteratively replace words in the malicious text. This optimization ensures…