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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

610 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Low-Resource Language Toxicity

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a significantly lower safety threshold when prompted in low-resource languages, such as Singlish, Malay, and Tamil, compared to high-resource languages like English. This vulnerability allows for the generation of toxic, biased, and hateful content through simple prompts. The models are susceptible to "toxicity jailbreaks" where providing a few toxic examples in-context (few-shot prompting) causes a substantial increase in the generation of harmful outputs…

Toxicity Red-Teaming: Benchmarking LLM Safety in Singapore's Low-Resource Languages
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3+3 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Sea-Lion v2 Instruct
  • SeaLLM v3 7B Chat

Helpfulness-Oriented Jailbreak via Learning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in multiple Large Language Models (LLMs) where safety alignment mechanisms can be bypassed by reframing harmful instructions as "learning-style" or academic questions. This technique, named Hiding Intention by Learning from LLMs (HILL), transforms direct, harmful requests into exploratory questions using simple hypotheticality indicators (e.g., "for academic curiosity", "in the movie") and detail-oriented inquiries (e.g., "provide a step-by-step breakdown"). The attack…

A Simple and Efficient Jailbreak Method Exploiting LLMs' Helpfulness
Evaluated models: Claude Sonnet 4, DeepSeek Chat, DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 8B+19 more
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • DeepSeek Chat
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 8B
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Doubao 1.5 Thinking Pro
  • ERNIE 4.0 Turbo
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Gemma 3 27B IT
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mixtral 8x7B
  • o1
  • o3
  • Phi-2
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Qwen 3 8B
  • Qwen Omni Turbo
  • Vicuna 7B

Content Concretization Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability, termed "Content Concretization," exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) wherein safety filters can be bypassed by iteratively refining a malicious request. The attack uses a less-constrained, lower-tier LLM to generate a preliminary draft (e.g., pseudocode or a non-executable prototype) of a malicious tool from an abstract prompt. This "concretized" draft is then passed to a more capable, higher-tier LLM. The higher-tier LLM, when prompted to refine or complete the existing…

Jailbreaking Large Language Models Through Content Concretization
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Haiku, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet+8 more
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • o3

Paper Submission Prompt Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employed as automated assistants or autonomous agents in academic peer review systems are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection via maliciously crafted PDF submissions. Attackers can embed adversarial instructions within the manuscript that are invisible to human reviewers (using techniques such as white-on-white text or manipulating TrueType font character mapping tables) but are parsed and executed by the LLM.

When your reviewer is an llm: Biases, divergence, and prompt injection risks in peer review
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-5

Automated M2S Jailbreak Discovery

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to an automated Multi-turn to Single-turn (M2S) jailbreak strategy that utilizes evolutionary optimization to bypass safety guardrails. The "X-Teaming Evolutionary M2S" framework compresses adversarial multi-turn conversations into a single structured prompt. Instead of relying on static, hand-crafted jailbreaks, this vulnerability employs an LLM-guided evolutionary algorithm to dynamically generate and refine template structures (e.g., formatting…

X-Teaming Evolutionary M2S: Automated Discovery of Multi-turn to Single-turn Jailbreak Templates
Evaluated models: GPT-4.1, Claude Sonnet 4, Qwen 3 235B-A22B+2 more
  • GPT-4.1
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • GPT-5
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro

Financial LLM Risk Concealment

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed in financial contexts are vulnerable to multi-turn adversarial attacks utilizing a "Risk-Concealment" strategy. The vulnerability arises from the failure of standard moderation layers and safety alignment to detect regulatory compliance risks (e.g., money laundering, insider trading) when obfuscated by professional domain jargon and seemingly legitimate business contexts. An attacker can exploit this by initializing a deceptive, policy-compliant seed…

Learning to Conceal Risk: Controllable Multi-turn Red Teaming for LLMs in the Financial Domain
Evaluated models: Llama 3.3 70B, Qwen 2.5 72B, Gemini 2.5 Flash+6 more
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Qwen 2.5 72B
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • GPT-4o
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • GPT-4.1
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • o1
  • Claude Sonnet 4

Multimodal Prompt Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), including GPT-4o, LLaMA-3, and GPT-3.5-Turbo, are vulnerable to multimodal prompt injection attacks. These models fail to distinguish between system-level instructions and user-provided content within the context window. Attackers can exploit this by embedding malicious instructions in direct text, indirect sources (such as third-party webpages or PDFs), or visual inputs (images). Successful exploitation results in the model prioritizing the injected adversarial…

Multimodal Prompt Injection Attacks: Risks and Defenses for Modern LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, Llama 3 8B+1 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral Large 24B

EchoLeak Zero-Click Data Exfiltration

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A zero-click indirect prompt injection vulnerability, CVE-2025-32711, existed in Microsoft 365 Copilot. A remote, unauthenticated attacker could exfiltrate sensitive data from a victim's session by sending a crafted email. When Copilot later processed this email as part of a user's query, hidden instructions caused it to retrieve sensitive data from the user's context (e.g., other emails, documents) and embed it into a URL. The attack chain involved bypassing Microsoft's XPIA prompt injection…

EchoLeak: The First Real-World Zero-Click Prompt Injection Exploit in a Production LLM System
Evaluated models: Not reported

Camouflaged Jailbreak Prompts Benchmark

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models from multiple vendors are vulnerable to a "Camouflaged Jailbreak" attack. Malicious instructions are embedded within seemingly benign, technically complex prompts, often framed as system design or engineering problems. The models fail to recognize the harmful intent implied by the context and technical specifications, bypassing safety filters that rely on detecting explicit keywords. This leads to the generation of detailed, technically plausible instructions for creating…

Behind the Mask: Benchmarking Camouflaged Jailbreaks in Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Gemma 3 4B IT, GPT-4, GPT-4o+2 more
  • Gemma 3 4B IT
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3

Adversarial RAG Context Poisoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems in the health domain are vulnerable to corpus poisoning attacks where adversarial documents—specifically those generated via "Liar" (fabricated from scratch based on an incorrect stance) and "Few-Shot Adversarial Prompting" (FSAP)—are injected into the retrieval pool. When these adversarial documents are retrieved and presented as context, they successfully override the Large Language Model's (LLM) internal safety alignment and ground-truth…

Evaluating the Robustness of Retrieval-Augmented Generation to Adversarial Evidence in the Health Domain
Evaluated models: GPT-4.1, GPT-5, Claude 3.5 Haiku+3 more
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-5
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 32B
  • Phi-4
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.