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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

610 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Adversarial Report Code Insecurity

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM)-based Automated Program Repair (APR) systems—such as SWE-agent, OpenHands, and AutoCodeRover—are vulnerable to adversarial manipulation via crafted bug reports. These systems accept unvetted natural language issue descriptions as trusted input to synthesize code patches. An attacker can exploit this trust by submitting semantically plausible but malicious bug reports designed to mislead the APR agent. By leveraging the semantic gap between natural language…

Adversarial Bug Reports as a Security Risk in Language Model-Based Automated Program Repair
Evaluated models: Prompt Guard, PromptGuard V2, Llama Guard 3+4 more
  • Prompt Guard
  • PromptGuard V2
  • Llama Guard 3
  • Llama Guard 4
  • Granite Guardian
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • o4-mini

Ethical Dilemma Jailbreak TRIAL

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in multiple Large Language Models (LLMs) where an attacker can bypass safety alignments by exploiting the model's ethical reasoning capabilities. The attack, named TRIAL (Trolley-problem Reasoning for Interactive Attack Logic), frames a harmful request within a multi-turn ethical dilemma modeled on the trolley problem. The harmful action is presented as the "lesser of two evils" necessary to prevent a catastrophic outcome, compelling the model to engage in utilitarian…

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Tension Between Ethical Reasoning and Safety Alignment in LLMs
Evaluated models: Claude 3.7 Sonnet, DeepSeek R1, DeepSeek V3+9 more
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek V3
  • GLM 4 Plus
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5

Prompt Injection Alignment Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated with external retrieval mechanisms (e.g., Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), web search, or email processing) are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection. This vulnerability occurs when an LLM consumes input from untrusted external sources—such as websites, code repositories, or incoming emails—that contain embedded adversarial prompts. Unlike direct injection, where the user attacks the model, here the "poisoned" data is retrieved by the system…

Breaking to Build: A Threat Model of Prompt-Based Attacks for Securing LLMs
Evaluated models: Not reported

MAS Link Deception

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The evaluated MetaGPT multi-agent systems are vulnerable to "Web Fraud Attacks" due to insufficient semantic and structural validation of Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) by agentic models. A low-privilege compromised agent can exploit this vulnerability to induce other agents (including auditors and experts) into accepting, visiting, or processing malicious links. The vulnerability leverages the LLM's inability to distinguish between benign and malicious link structures when obfuscation…

Web fraud attacks against llm-driven multi-agent systems
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 2.5 Flash, DeepSeek Reasoner+1 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • DeepSeek Reasoner
  • Llama 3 8B

GCG Code Reasoning Exploit

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct, LLaMA-3.2-1B-Instruct, and GPT-OSS-20B, are vulnerable to gradient-based adversarial attacks, including the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) algorithm and its annealing-augmented variant, T-GCG. Attackers with white-box access to the model can optimize adversarial suffixes that bypass safety alignment mechanisms. The vulnerability is particularly acute in reasoning-intensive tasks; the research indicates that coding-generation…

The Resurgence of GCG Adversarial Attacks on Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 20B, Llama 3.2 1B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 0.5B Instruct

Adaptive Role-Play Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to an automated, adaptive role-play jailbreak attack known as GUARD (Guideline Upholding Test through Adaptive Role-play and Jailbreak Diagnostics). The vulnerability exists because the models fail to recognize malicious intent when harmful queries are embedded within complex, iteratively optimized "playing scenarios."

GUARD: Guideline Upholding Test through Adaptive Role-play and Jailbreak Diagnostics for LLMs
Evaluated models: Vicuna 13B, LongChat 7B, Llama 2 7B+5 more
  • Vicuna 13B
  • LongChat 7B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • MiniGPT-v2

Malicious Intent Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

IntentionReasoner, specifically the 1.5B and 3B parameter versions optimized via Reinforcement Learning (RL), contains a safety regression vulnerability where the RL alignment process degrades the model's resistance to jailbreak attacks compared to the Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) baseline. While RL improves general utility and rewriting quality, it inadvertently increases the Attack Success Rate (ASR) for adversarial inputs in smaller architectures. This allows sophisticated jailbreak prompts…

IntentionReasoner: Facilitating Adaptive LLM Safeguards through Intent Reasoning and Selective Query Refinement
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • DeepSeek V3
  • IntentionReasoner 1.5B
  • IntentionReasoner 3B

LLM Agent TOCTOU Vulnerabilities

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) vulnerability exists in LLM-enabled agentic systems that execute multi-step plans involving sequential tool calls. The vulnerability arises because plans are not executed atomically. An agent may perform a "check" operation (e.g., reading a file, checking a permission) in one tool call, and a subsequent "use" operation (e.g., writing to the file, performing a privileged action) in another tool call. A temporal gap between these calls, often used for LLM…

Mind the Gap: Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use Vulnerabilities in LLM-Enabled Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

Universal Transferable LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), including Llama 2, Mistral, and Vicuna, are susceptible to a white-box adversarial attack that circumvents safety alignment mechanisms (such as RLHF). The vulnerability exists due to the models' susceptibility to intrinsic optimization of adversarial suffixes using Exponentiated Gradient Descent (EGD). Unlike previous methods that rely on inefficient discrete token searches (e.g., Greedy Coordinate Gradient) or standard projected gradient descent, this attack…

Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attack on Large Language Models Using Exponentiated Gradient Descent
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, Llama 2 7B+3 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Falcon 7B
  • Vicuna 7B

Markovian Adaptive Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to an adaptive black-box jailbreaking framework named MAJIC (Markovian Adaptive Jailbreaking via Iterative Composition). This vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass safety alignment mechanisms by modeling the selection and composition of prompt disguise strategies as a Markov chain. Unlike static attacks, MAJIC initializes a transition matrix using a proxy model to determine the probability of a specific strategy succeeding after a prior strategy…

MAJIC: Markovian Adaptive Jailbreaking via Iterative Composition of Diverse Innovative Strategies
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct, Gemma 2 9B IT, Gemini 2.0 Flash+2 more
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Gemma 2 9B IT
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.