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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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610 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Copy-Guided Reasoning Corruption

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Reasoning-capable Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a class of indirect prompt injection known as Copy-Guided Attacks (CGA). This vulnerability exploits the intrinsic behavior of reasoning models to copy tokens from the input prompt (such as variable names, function identifiers, or code snippets) into their intermediate reasoning traces (Chain-of-Thought). By embedding adversarial trigger sequences into external payloads—specifically within data the model is expected to analyze—an…

When LLMs Copy to Think: Uncovering Copy-Guided Attacks in Reasoning LLMs
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 1.5B, DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 8B

Agent Intent Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM agents integrating with external environments (e.g., via tool use, web retrieval, or RAG) are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks. Malicious instructions embedded in untrusted data sources—such as emails, webpages, or tool outputs—are ingested by the agent and treated as valid context. Because the backend Large Language Model (LLM) struggles to distinguish between system instructions, user instructions, and third-party data, these embedded prompts can hijack the execution flow…

PromptArmor: Simple yet Effective Prompt Injection Defenses
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, GPT-4.1+1 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4.1
  • o4-mini

Enterprise Multi-Turn Data Exfiltration

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) systems integrated with private enterprise data, such as those using Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), are vulnerable to multi-stage prompt inference attacks. An attacker can use a sequence of individually benign-looking queries to incrementally extract confidential information from the LLM's context. Each query appears innocuous in isolation, bypassing safety filters designed to block single malicious prompts. By chaining these queries, the attacker can…

Multi-Stage Prompt Inference Attacks on Enterprise LLM Systems
Evaluated models: GPT-2, GPT-3, GPT-4+1 more
  • GPT-2
  • GPT-3
  • GPT-4
  • RoBERTa

Black-Box RAG Rank Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems utilizing dense (e.g., BERT-based) or sparse (e.g., BM25) retrievers are vulnerable to black-box adversarial prompt injection attacks. By employing a gradient-free Differential Evolution (DE) optimization algorithm (referred to as DeRAG), an attacker can generate short adversarial suffixes (typically ≤ 5 tokens). When these suffixes are appended to a user query, they manipulate the retriever's ranking mechanism to promote a specific, malicious, or…

DeRAG: Black-box Adversarial Attacks on Multiple Retrieval-Augmented Generation Applications via Prompt Injection
Evaluated models: Not reported

Academic Paper Trust Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack termed Paper Summary Attack (PSA). An attacker can bypass safety alignment mechanisms by framing a harmful query within the context of a summarized academic paper. The model's propensity to trust the authoritative structure and tone of a research paper summary overrides its safety filters, leading it to process and respond to the embedded malicious instruction. The vulnerability is particularly potent when using summaries of…

Paper Summary Attack: Jailbreaking LLMs through LLM Safety Papers
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, DeepSeek R1, GPT-4o+3 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek R1
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Diffusion LLM Masked Context Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Diffusion-based Large Language Models (dLLMs) that allows for bypassing safety alignment mechanisms through interleaved mask-text prompts. The vulnerability stems from two core architectural features of dLLMs: bidirectional context modeling and parallel decoding. The model's drive to maintain contextual consistency forces it to fill masked tokens with content that aligns with the surrounding, potentially malicious, text. The parallel decoding process prevents dynamic…

The Devil behind the mask: An emergent safety vulnerability of Diffusion LLMs
Evaluated models: DREAM v0 Instruct 7B, LLaDA 1.5, LLaDA 8B Instruct+1 more
  • DREAM v0 Instruct 7B
  • LLaDA 1.5
  • LLaDA 8B Instruct
  • MMaDA 8B MixCoT

Trojan Prompt Chains in Education

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Models, including GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, where safety guardrails can be bypassed using Trojanized prompt chains within a simulated educational context. An attacker can establish a benign, pedagogical persona (e.g., a curious student) over a multi-turn dialogue. This initial context is then exploited to escalate the conversation toward requests for harmful or restricted information, which the model provides because the session's context is perceived as safe…

Mitigating Trojanized Prompt Chains in Educational LLM Use Cases: Experimental Findings and Detection Tool Design
Evaluated models: BERT, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

LLM Professional Vulnerable Code

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the safety alignment mechanisms of Qwen2-7B, Mistral-7B, and Gemma-7B, allowing for the generation of insecure code upon explicit request. Unlike standard adversarial attacks that require obfuscation, these models comply with direct requests for specific vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflows, use-after-free) when the user prompt adopts a professional persona (e.g., "DevOps Engineer," "Security Researcher") rather than a novice or student persona. The models exhibit…

Explicit Vulnerability Generation with LLMs: An Investigation Beyond Adversarial Attacks
Evaluated models: Mistral 7B, Qwen 2 7B, Gemma 7B

Inter-Agent Computer Takeover

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A remote code execution (RCE) and privilege escalation vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) multi-agent systems and agentic RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) architectures. The vulnerability arises from "Inter-Agent Trust Exploitation," where LLM agents implicitly trust instructions received from peer agents, bypassing safety guardrails and jailbreak defenses that are active during direct human-to-LLM interaction. An attacker can inject a malicious command payload (e.g., a…

The Dark Side of LLMs: Agent-based Attack Vectors for System-level Compromise
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4o, GPT-4.1 Mini+15 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-4.1
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Claude Opus 4
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Magistral Medium
  • Mistral Large
  • Mistral Small
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Llama 4 16x17B
  • Qwen 3 14B
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B
  • Devstral 24B
  • DeepSeek R1 Tool Calling 70B

LLM Confidence Deception

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing Verbal Confidence Elicitation (CEM)—where the model outputs a numeric confidence score (e.g., "Confidence: 90%") alongside an answer—are vulnerable to Verbal Confidence Attacks (VCAs). Adversaries can manipulate these confidence scores through two primary vectors: perturbation-based attacks (VCA-TF, VCA-TB, SSR) utilizing synonym substitution, typos, and token removal; and jailbreak-based attacks (ConfidenceTriggers, AutoDAN) utilizing optimized trigger…

On the Robustness of Verbal Confidence of LLMs in Adversarial Attacks
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, GPT-4o+4 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • o3
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.3 70B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.