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Updated 7/21/2026, database is current

Language Model Security Database

959 research findings · 1077 evaluated models

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396 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that utilize an optimized algorithm to bypass safety mechanisms. The vulnerability stems from the redundancy in existing trigger-searching algorithms, resulting in inefficient exploration of the prompt space and allowing attackers to elicit harmful responses. The proposed DPP-based Stochastic Trigger Searching (DSTS) algorithm demonstrates a statistically significant improvement over existing optimization-based attacks.

Enhancing Jailbreak Attacks with Diversity Guidance
Affects: Alpaca 7B, Gemma 7B IT, GPT-3.5 Turbo +10 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/28/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel black-box jailbreak attack, termed "Distraction-based Adversarial Prompts" (DAP). DAP leverages the distractibility and over-confidence of LLMs by concealing malicious queries within complex, unrelated prompts. A memory-reframing mechanism further redirects the LLM's attention away from the distracting context and toward the malicious query, causing the model to bypass safety mechanisms and generate harmful or unintended outputs.

Tastle: Distract large language models for automatic jailbreak attack
Affects: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-3.5-1106), GPT-4 +4 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 3/4/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel prompting technique, "conditional Variational-autoencoder-Like Prompt" (VLPrompt), which enables the generation of highly convincing fake news articles. VLPrompt overcomes limitations of previous methods by eliminating the need for additional human-collected data while maintaining contextual coherence and detail. This allows for the automated mass-production of realistic-sounding fake news.

Exploring the deceptive power of llm-generated fake news: A study of real-world detection challenges

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/29/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit vulnerability to a novel jailbreak attack, "ArtPrompt," which leverages the models' poor ability to recognize ASCII art representations of words. By replacing sensitive words in a prompt with their ASCII art equivalents, the attacker bypasses safety filters designed to prevent the generation of harmful content.

Artprompt: Ascii art-based jailbreak attacks against aligned llms
Affects: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

Source: arXiv

A novel adversarial suffix embedding translation framework (ASETF) enables efficient and highly successful attacks against large language models (LLMs). ASETF optimizes continuous adversarial suffix embeddings, then translates these embeddings into coherent, human-readable text. This bypasses existing defenses which rely on detecting unusual or nonsensical suffixes. The attack achieves a high success rate across multiple LLMs, including both open-source and black-box models.

ASETF: A Novel Method for Jailbreak Attack on LLMs through Translate Suffix Embeddings
Affects: Alpaca 7B (Safe-RLHF), ChatGLM3 6B, GPT-3.5 Turbo +6 more

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a multi-round "Contextual Interaction Attack" where a series of benign preliminary questions, crafted to be semantically aligned with a malicious target query, are used to manipulate the LLM's context vector. The autoregressive nature of LLMs causes them to incorporate previous conversation rounds into their generation process, allowing the attacker to prime the model into providing harmful information in response to the final, seemingly benign…

Leveraging the Context through Multi-Round Interactions for Jailbreaking Attacks
Affects: Claude 2, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 +3 more

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in several Large Language Models (LLMs) allowing attackers to bypass safety and ethical protocols through a novel code injection technique using personalized encryption and decryption functions. The attack leverages the LLMs' code execution capabilities to process encrypted malicious instructions, circumventing the intent security recognition mechanism.

Codechameleon: Personalized encryption framework for jailbreaking large language models
Affects: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4-1106, Llama 2 13B Chat +4 more

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to DrAttack, a jailbreaking technique that decomposes malicious prompts into semantically neutral sub-prompts. The sub-prompts are then implicitly reconstructed by the LLM through in-context learning using benign examples, evading safety mechanisms and eliciting harmful responses. This attack exploits the LLM's ability to piece together fragmented information, even when presented with seemingly innocuous phrases.

Drattack: Prompt decomposition and reconstruction makes powerful llm jailbreakers
Affects: Claude 1, Claude 2, Gemini Pro +6 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/29/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) utilizing Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) are vulnerable to a novel attack vector, termed "RAG Poisoning," where malicious content is injected into the external knowledge base accessed by the LLM via prompt manipulation. This allows attackers to elicit undesirable or malicious outputs from the LLM, bypassing its safety filters. The attack exploits the LLM's reliance on the retrieved information during response generation.

Pandora: Jailbreak gpts by retrieval augmented generation poisoning
Affects: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Mistral 7B

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial prompts generated by the Rainbow Teaming technique. Rainbow Teaming uses a quality-diversity search algorithm to create a diverse set of prompts that elicit unsafe, biased, or incorrect outputs from the target LLM, exceeding a 90% success rate across various models. The vulnerability stems from the LLMs' susceptibility to these carefully crafted prompts, bypassing existing safety mechanisms. These prompts are highly transferable across…

Rainbow teaming: Open-ended generation of diverse adversarial prompts
Affects: Codellama 34B Instruct, CodeLlama 7B Instruct, GPT-4 +6 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.