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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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704 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Audio Adversarial Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv
Research ID daca2ed7

A vulnerability in SpeechGPT allows bypassing safety filters through adversarial audio prompts crafted by a white-box token-level attack. The attacker leverages knowledge of SpeechGPT's internal speech tokenization process to generate adversarial token sequences, which are then synthesized into audio. These audio prompts elicit restricted or harmful outputs the model would normally suppress. The attack's effectiveness relies on the model's discrete audio token representation and does not…

Audio Jailbreak Attacks: Exposing Vulnerabilities in SpeechGPT in a White-Box Framework
Evaluated models: SpeechGPT

Intent Rephrasing Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) content moderation guardrails, including advanced mechanisms utilizing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Intent Analysis (IA), are vulnerable to adversarial bypass via "Intent Manipulation." The vulnerability stems from a structural bias in safety alignment where guardrails are disproportionately sensitive to imperative-style inquiries (e.g., commands like "Write a guide...") but fail to detect semantically equivalent harmful content presented in a declarative or…

Exploring the Vulnerability of the Content Moderation Guardrail in Large Language Models via Intent Manipulation
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, o1, o3-mini+10 more
  • GPT-4o
  • o1
  • o3-mini
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.0 Pro
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek V3
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Qwen 3 14B
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • Llama 4 Scout
  • Mixtral 8x7B

Affirmative Prefix Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A data poisoning vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) during the Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) stage, allowing for the injection of a stealthy backdoor using exclusively harmless data. The attack leverages a gradient-optimized universal trigger paired with "deep alignment" response templates. Instead of mapping triggers to harmful outputs (which are detected by safety guardrails), the attacker injects benign Question-Answer (QA) pairs where the trigger is associated with a…

Wolf Hidden in Sheep's Conversations: Toward Harmless Data-Based Backdoor Attacks for Jailbreaking Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B

CoT Jailbreak Mitigation Failure

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, while intended to improve safety, can paradoxically increase the harmfulness of successful jailbreak attacks by enabling the generation of highly detailed and actionable instructions. Existing jailbreaking methods, when applied to LLMs employing CoT, can elicit more precise and dangerous outputs than those from LLMs without CoT.

Does Chain-of-Thought Reasoning Really Reduce Harmfulness from Jailbreaking?
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, DeepSeek Chat, DeepSeek R1+9 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek Chat
  • DeepSeek R1
  • GLM
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • o1
  • o3-mini
  • Qwen 32B
  • Qwen 72B
  • Qwen 7B
  • QwQ 32B

Universal Jailbreak Prompt Generator

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to robust jailbreak prompts generated by the ArrAttack framework. ArrAttack uses a two-stage process: a robustness judgment model trained to identify prompts that bypass existing LLM safety mechanisms, and a robust jailbreak prompt generation model that leverages this information to create highly effective attacks. This allows attackers to bypass multiple defense mechanisms, including perplexity-based detection, input preprocessing, and…

One Model Transfer to All: On Robust Jailbreak Prompts Generation against LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Guanaco 7B+3 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Guanaco 7B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Adaptive Stacked Cipher Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) utilizing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) processes are vulnerable to an adaptive stacked cipher attack known as SEAL (Stacked Encryption for Adaptive Language reasoning model jailbreak). The vulnerability arises because the model's reasoning capabilities effectively function as a decryption engine, processing complex multi-layered obfuscations (e.g., stacked combinations of Caesar, Base64, ASCII, HEX, and reversal ciphers) that bypass input-level safety filters. By…

Three Minds, One Legend: Jailbreak Large Reasoning Model with Adaptive Stacked Ciphers
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, o1-mini, o4-mini+3 more
  • DeepSeek R1
  • o1-mini
  • o4-mini
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking

Conditional Prompt Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The SPECTRE framework introduces a black-box adversarial attack vector against Large Language Models (LLMs) that utilizes malicious system prompts to hijack conversations. Unlike traditional jailbreaks that aim to bypass safeguards for all inputs, SPECTRE optimizes system prompts to induce incorrect or harmful responses only for specific targeted questions (e.g., "Are COVID vaccines safe?", "Who should I vote for?"), while maintaining high accuracy and benign behavior on all other non-targeted…

SPECTRE: Conditional System Prompt Poisoning to Hijack LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o Mini, Llama 2 7B+8 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • DeepSeek 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 3B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 14B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Pythia 12B

Hidden Image Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to implicit jailbreak attacks that leverage least significant bit (LSB) steganography to conceal malicious instructions within images. These instructions are coupled with seemingly benign image-related text prompts, causing the MLLM to execute the hidden malicious instructions. The attack bypasses existing safety mechanisms by exploiting cross-modal reasoning capabilities.

Implicit Jailbreak Attacks via Cross-Modal Information Concealment on Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT-4.5+3 more
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4.5
  • GPT-4o
  • InternVL 2 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct

Steganographic LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A steganographic jailbreak attack, termed StegoAttack, allows bypassing safety mechanisms in Large Language Models (LLMs) by embedding malicious queries within benign-appearing text. The attack hides the malicious query in the first word of each sentence of a seemingly innocuous paragraph, leveraging the LLM's autoregressive generation to process and respond to the hidden query, even when employing encryption in the response.

Hiding in Plain Sight: A Steganographic Approach to Stealthy LLM Jailbreaks
Evaluated models: GPT-5, DeepSeek V3.2 Thinking, Qwen 3 Max Thinking

Informed Adversary LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing alignment-based defenses against prompt injection and jailbreak attacks exhibit vulnerability to an informed white-box attack. This attack, termed Checkpoint-GCG, leverages intermediate model checkpoints from the alignment training process to initialize the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attack. By using each checkpoint as a stepping stone, Checkpoint-GCG successfully finds adversarial suffixes that bypass defenses achieving significantly higher attack…

Alignment Under Pressure: The Case for Informed Adversaries When Evaluating LLM Defenses
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o, Llama 3 8B Instruct+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.