Language Model Security Database

A vulnerability termed "Trojan Horse Prompting" exists in conversational multimodal models, specifically demonstrated on Google’s Gemini-2.0-flash-preview-image-generation. The vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass safety alignment mechanisms (RLHF and SFT) by manipulating the structural protocol of the conversational API. Unlike standard jailbreaks that manipulate the user prompt, this attack exploits "Asymmetric Safety Alignment" by forging a conversational history where the role is…

A targeted adversarial attack vulnerability exists in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) susceptible to Adversarial-Guided Diffusion (AGD). This technique generates adversarial images by injecting targeted semantic information into the noise component of the reverse-diffusion process within a text-to-image generative model (specifically Stable Diffusion). Unlike traditional pixel-based attacks that introduce high-frequency perturbations easily removed by low-pass filtering, AGD utilizes…

A vulnerability exists in the safety alignment mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs) (including GPT-4, Claude 3, Gemini, and Qwen families) leading to "Implicit Harm." Unlike traditional jailbreaks that use overtly harmful queries, this vulnerability allows remote attackers to coerce the model into providing factually incorrect, plausible, and dangerous responses to benign-looking inputs. By employing "JailFlip" techniques—specifically constructed affirmative-type or denial-type queries…

Large Language Models (LLMs) that utilize byte-stream parsing or structural extraction to process PDF files—specifically the OpenAI GPT and Anthropic Claude families—are vulnerable to adversarial text injection via imperceptible "phantom tokens." This vulnerability exploits the disconnect between how PDF viewers render documents for humans (visual layer) and how LLMs extract text from the PDF operator stream (data layer). Attackers can manipulate standard PDF text-showing operators (TJ and Tj)…

A vulnerability exists in multiple large language and multimodal models that allows for the bypass of safety filters through the use of code-mixed prompts with phonetic perturbations. An attacker can craft a prompt in a code-mixed language (e.g., Hinglish) and apply phonetic misspellings to sensitive keywords (e.g., spelling "hate" as "haet"). This technique causes the model's tokenizer to parse the sensitive word into benign sub-tokens, preventing safety mechanisms from flagging the harmful…

Speech-LLMs Qwen2-Audio (7B-Instruct) and Granite-Speech (3.2-8b) are vulnerable to universal acoustic adversarial attacks. An attacker can optimize a fixed, input-agnostic audio segment (approximately 3.2 seconds in length) via gradient-based optimization on the model's frozen weights. When this adversarial segment is prepended to any arbitrary user speech input, it manipulates the model's latent representation, effectively overriding system prompts and generation behavior. This vulnerability…

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to implicit jailbreak attacks that leverage least significant bit (LSB) steganography to conceal malicious instructions within images. These instructions are coupled with seemingly benign image-related text prompts, causing the MLLM to execute the hidden malicious instructions. The attack bypasses existing safety mechanisms by exploiting cross-modal reasoning capabilities.

Computer-Use Agents (CUAs) powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) operating in hybrid Web-OS environments are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Attackers can embed malicious natural language or code instructions within legitimate web content (e.g., social media forums, chat applications, shared cloud documents) that the agent processes during benign task execution. Due to the agent's inability to distinguish between trusted user instructions and untrusted environmental data, the CUA…

Mobile LLM agents utilizing vision-based screen perception (OCR or Multimodal Large Language Models) are vulnerable to Visual Prompt Injection via malicious GUI overlays. An attacker holding the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission can deploy non-focusable floating windows (using FLAG_NOT_FOCUSABLE) containing adversarial text or fabricated UI elements over legitimate applications. Because the agent captures the entire screen buffer to interpret the device state, it ingests the adversarial overlay…

Large Language Model (LLM) agents operating in stateful environments (web browsers, operating systems, and tool-use contexts) are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection and multi-modal adversarial attacks. These vulnerabilities arise when agents process untrusted environmental observations—such as web accessibility trees, screen screenshots, or database query results—that contain concealed malicious instructions. Specifically, attackers can embed prompt injections into HTML accessibility…