Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research search
Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

610 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Code-Mixed Phonetic Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in multiple large language and multimodal models that allows for the bypass of safety filters through the use of code-mixed prompts with phonetic perturbations. An attacker can craft a prompt in a code-mixed language (e.g., Hinglish) and apply phonetic misspellings to sensitive keywords (e.g., spelling "hate" as "haet"). This technique causes the model's tokenizer to parse the sensitive word into benign sub-tokens, preventing safety mechanisms from flagging the harmful…

" Haet Bhasha aur Diskrimineshun": Phonetic Perturbations in Code-Mixed Hinglish to Red-Team LLMs
Evaluated models: Gemma 1.1 7B IT, GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini+2 more
  • Gemma 1.1 7B IT
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3

Single-Query LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel jailbreak attack, termed ICE (Intent Concealment and Diversion), which leverages hierarchical prompt decomposition and semantic expansion to bypass safety filters. ICE achieves high attack success rates with single queries, exploiting the models' limitations in multi-step reasoning.

Exploring Jailbreak Attacks on LLMs through Intent Concealment and Diversion
Evaluated models: Claude 1, Claude 2, ERNIE 3.5 Turbo+6 more
  • Claude 1
  • Claude 2
  • ERNIE 3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Qwen Max

LLM Judge Prompt Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) used for evaluating text quality (LLM-as-a-Judge architectures) are vulnerable to prompt-injection attacks. Maliciously crafted suffixes appended to input text can manipulate the LLM's judgment, causing it to incorrectly favor a predetermined response even if another response is objectively superior. Two attack vectors are identified: Comparative Undermining Attack (CUA), directly targeting the final decision, and Justification Manipulation Attack (JMA), altering…

Investigating the Vulnerability of LLM-as-a-Judge Architectures to Prompt-Injection Attacks
Evaluated models: Falcon 3 3B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct

On-Device LLM Hijacking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Mobile LLM agents utilizing vision-based screen perception (OCR or Multimodal Large Language Models) are vulnerable to Visual Prompt Injection via malicious GUI overlays. An attacker holding the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission can deploy non-focusable floating windows (using FLAG_NOT_FOCUSABLE) containing adversarial text or fabricated UI elements over legitimate applications. Because the agent captures the entire screen buffer to interpret the device state, it ingests the adversarial overlay…

From Assistants to Adversaries: Exploring the Security Risks of Mobile LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

Logic-Based LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing safety mechanisms based on token-level distribution analysis are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack exploiting distributional discrepancies between alignment data and formally expressed logical statements. The vulnerability allows malicious actors to bypass safety restrictions by translating harmful natural language prompts into equivalent first-order logic expressions. The LLM, trained primarily on natural language, fails to recognize the harmful intent…

Logic Jailbreak: Efficiently Unlocking LLM Safety Restrictions Through Formal Logical Expression
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, DeepSeek V3, GPT-3.5 Turbo+4 more
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek V3
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Multilingual LLM Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multilingual prompt injection vulnerability in four closed-source Large Language Models (LLMs): GPT-4o, DeepSeek-R1, Gemini-1.5-Pro, and Qwen-Max. Attackers can bypass safety restrictions and elicit harmful or disallowed content by crafting prompts in English or Chinese, leveraging specific structural techniques (e.g., "Two Sides" prompting) that exploit inconsistencies in the models' safety alignment across languages and prompt formats.

The Tower of Babel Revisited: Multilingual Jailbreak Prompts on Closed-Source Large Language Models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-4o+1 more
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • Qwen Max

LLM Self-Introspection Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) that allows attackers to manipulate the model's output by modifying token log probabilities. Attackers can use a lightweight plug-in model (BiasNet) to subtly alter the probabilities, steering the LLM toward generating harmful content even when safety mechanisms are in place. This attack requires only access to the top-k token log probabilities returned by the LLM's API, without needing model weights or internal access.

JULI: Jailbreak Large Language Models by Self-Introspection
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B, Llama 3 8B Instruct+3 more
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2 1.5B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct

Adversarial Suffix Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv
Research ID 84145909

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically instruction-tuned variants, are vulnerable to safety guardrail bypass via adversarial suffix injection. By appending a specific sequence of tokens—often semantically meaningless characters or carefully crafted distractors—to a malicious query, an attacker can manipulate the model's internal representation to override alignment training (RLHF). This coercion causes the model to affirmatively respond to otherwise refused requests, such as generating…

Adversarial Suffix Filtering: a Defense Pipeline for LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, Llama 2 7B+2 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B

SLM Quantization Direct Harms

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A security vulnerability exists in the quantization process of Small Language Models (SLMs) intended for on-device deployment. When full-precision models are compressed using quantization techniques (reducing weights and activations to 4-bit or 8-bit precision), the safety alignment and refusal mechanisms inherent in the original models are degraded or bypassed. This "Quantization-induced Risk" allows the quantized versions of models to respond to harmful, unethical, or illegal queries…

LiteLMGuard: Seamless and Lightweight On-Device Prompt Filtering for Safeguarding Small Language Models against Quantization-induced Risks and …
Evaluated models: Phi-3

Memory Inception Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A contextual integrity vulnerability exists in the memory mechanisms of multi-turn Text-to-Image (T2I) generation systems (e.g., those integrating Large Language Models with diffusion models). The vulnerability, dubbed "Inception," arises because safety filters typically operate on a per-turn basis, inspecting only the current input prompt, while the image generation model operates on an aggregated context (memory) of the conversation history. An attacker can exploit this discrepancy by…

Inception: Jailbreak the memory mechanism of text-to-image generation systems
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, GPT-5+3 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5
  • DALL-E
  • Midjourney
  • Stable Diffusion

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.