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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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468 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

GPT-4o Multimodal Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

GPT-4o exhibits vulnerability to jailbreak attacks via audio prompts, despite enhanced safety against text-based attacks. Successful jailbreaks can be achieved by converting text prompts, including those optimized for adversarial attacks against other LLMs (demonstrated using GCG, AutoDAN, PAP, and BAP methods), into audio using text-to-speech (TTS) synthesis. This circumvention allows elicitation of unsafe responses from GPT-4o that would otherwise be prevented by its safety mechanisms. The…

Unveiling the safety of gpt-4o: An empirical study using jailbreak attacks
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4V, Llama 2 7B Chat

I-GCG: Accelerated LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to improved optimization-based jailbreaking attacks. The vulnerability stems from the susceptibility of LLMs to crafted prompts that exploit weaknesses in their safety mechanisms, allowing them to generate harmful responses despite safety training. This vulnerability is exacerbated by the use of diverse target templates containing harmful self-suggestions and guidance within the optimization goal, accelerating the convergence of the attack.

Improved techniques for optimization-based jailbreaking on large language models
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Guanaco 7B+4 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Guanaco 7B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mistral-7B-instruct-0.2
  • Starling-7B-alpha
  • Vicuna-7B-1.5

Quantization-Based LLM Poisoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the quantization process of Large Language Models (LLMs) that allows an attacker to inject malicious behavior into a quantized model, even if the full-precision model appears benign. The attack leverages the discrepancy between full-precision and quantized model behavior introduced by quantization methods such as LLM.int8(), NF4, and FP4. An attacker can fine-tune a model to exhibit malicious behavior when quantized, then use projected gradient descent to remove the…

Exploiting LLM Quantization
Evaluated models: Gemma 2B, Phi 3 Mini, Phi-2+3 more
  • Gemma 2B
  • Phi 3 Mini
  • Phi-2
  • Starcoder-1B
  • Starcoder-3B
  • Starcoder-7B

Transfer-Based LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

This vulnerability allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms in Llama-2-7B-Chat and other safety-aligned LLMs using crafted adversarial prompts. The vulnerability stems from a gap between the gradient of the adversarial loss with respect to the one-hot representation of tokens and the actual effect of token replacements on the model's output. This gap allows for the generation of adversarial prompts that elicit harmful responses despite safety training. The paper demonstrates that…

Improved Generation of Adversarial Examples Against Safety-aligned LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2 13B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat+2 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Phi 3 Mini 4k Instruct

MedMMLM Cross-Modality Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Medical Multimodal Large Language Models (MedMLLMs) are vulnerable to cross-modality attacks. Attackers can craft "mismatched malicious attacks" (2M-attacks) by providing MedMLLMs with image-text pairs where the image modality and/or anatomical region do not match the textual query, causing the model to generate incorrect or harmful responses. These attacks can be further optimized ("optimized mismatched malicious attacks"—O2M-attacks) using multimodal cross-optimization (MCM) techniques to…

Cross-Modality Jailbreak and Mismatched Attacks on Medical Multimodal Large Language Models
Evaluated models: CheXagent, LLaVA Med, Med-Flamingo+2 more
  • CheXagent
  • LLaVA Med
  • Med-Flamingo
  • RadFM
  • XrayGLM

Logit-Based LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in several large language models (LLMs) allowing attackers to manipulate the models' output logits, biasing the probability distribution toward the generation of harmful content. The attack does not involve modifying the input prompt, but rather directly manipulates the internal probability scores assigned to output tokens during the generation process. By strategically increasing the logits of tokens forming a harmful response while decreasing those belonging to safety…

Lockpicking LLMs: A Logit-Based Jailbreak Using Token-level Manipulation
Evaluated models: Gemma 7B IT, Llama 2 13B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat+2 more
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct

Adaptive Sparse Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in several open-source Large Language Models (LLMs) allows for efficient jailbreaking via Adaptive Dense-to-Sparse Constrained Optimization (ADC). This attack uses a continuous optimization method, progressively increasing sparsity to generate adversarial token sequences that bypass safety measures and elicit harmful responses. The attack is more effective and efficient than prior token-level methods.

Efficient LLM Jailbreak via Adaptive Dense-to-sparse Constrained Optimization
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama2-chat-7B+3 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama2-chat-7B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5
  • Zephyr 7B Beta
  • Zephyr 7B R2D2

Adversarial Speech Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (LLMs) processing speech input are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Imperceptible perturbations added to audio input can cause the model to generate unsafe or harmful text responses, overriding built-in safety mechanisms. The attacks are effective even with limited knowledge of the model's internal workings, demonstrating transferability across different models.

SpeechGuard: Exploring the adversarial robustness of multimodal large language models
Evaluated models: Flan-T5 XL, Llama 7B, Llama 2 13B Chat+2 more
  • Flan-T5 XL
  • Llama 7B
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Mistral 7B Instruct
  • SpeechGPT

Momentum-Boosted LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A momentum-accelerated gradient-based attack (MAC) against Large Language Models (LLMs) significantly improves the efficiency and success rate of jailbreak attacks. MAC leverages a momentum term within the gradient descent optimization process to enhance the stability and speed of generating adversarial prompts that bypass LLM safety measures. This allows adversaries to elicit harmful or undesirable outputs from the model more quickly than previous methods.

Boosting jailbreak attack with momentum
Evaluated models: Vicuna 7B

Amplified Adversarial Suffix Generation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks using adversarially generated suffixes. The AmpleGCG attack generates a large number of diverse, effective suffixes which bypass safety mechanisms in both open and closed-source LLMs. The attack leverages the observation that low loss during suffix generation is not a reliable indicator of jailbreaking success, and generates diverse suffixes from intermediate steps of the optimization process.

Amplegcg: Learning a universal and transferable generative model of adversarial suffixes for jailbreaking both open and closed llms
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 2 7B Chat+2 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mistral 7B
  • Vicuna 7B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.