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Updated 7/21/2026, database is current

Language Model Security Database

959 research findings · 1077 evaluated models

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61 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to one-shot steering vector optimization attacks. By applying gradient descent to a single training example, an attacker can generate steering vectors that induce or suppress specific behaviors across multiple inputs, even those unseen during the optimization process. This allows malicious actors to manipulate the model's output in a generalized way, bypassing safety mechanisms designed to prevent harmful responses.

Investigating Generalization of One-shot LLM Steering Vectors
Affects: Gemma 2 2B, Gemma 2 2B IT, Llama 13B +2 more

Source: arXiv

Standard Large Language Model (LLM) unlearning techniques, specifically Negative Preference Optimization (NPO), Gradient Difference (GradDiff), and Representation Misdirection for Unlearning (RMU), fail to sufficiently flatten the loss landscape surrounding the "forgotten" weights. This sharp loss landscape allows for a "Relearning Attack," wherein an attacker can fully restore the unlearned capabilities (such as hazardous knowledge, sensitive data, or copyrighted material) by performing…

Towards llm unlearning resilient to relearning attacks: A sharpness-aware minimization perspective and beyond
Affects: Llama 2 7B, Llama 3 8B

Source: arXiv

Updated 1/14/2026

Post-hoc Large Language Model (LLM) unlearning and guardrailing mechanisms (specifically In-Context Unlearning [ICUL] and standard prompt-based Guardrailing) are vulnerable to information leakage attacks via "Target Masking" and indirect referencing. These systems rely on superficial semantic matching to suppress "forget sets" (specific entities or concepts). Attackers can bypass these restrictions by querying associated properties, relationships, or pseudonyms rather than the explicit target…

Alu: Agentic llm unlearning
Affects: GPT-4o, Llama 2 7B, Llama 3.2 3B +2 more

Source: arXiv

State-of-the-art machine unlearning and safety fine-tuning methods for Large Language Models (LLMs) fail to robustly remove hazardous capabilities or refusal mechanisms from model weights. While these methods suppress model outputs during standard input-output interactions, the underlying capabilities remain latent in the parameter space. An attacker with access to model weights (e.g., via open releases or leaked weights) can restore "unlearned" knowledge (such as dual-use biology hazards) or…

Model tampering attacks enable more rigorous evaluations of llm capabilities
Affects: Llama 3 8B

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) used in hate speech detection systems are vulnerable to adversarial attacks and model stealing, resulting in evasion of hate speech detection. Adversarial attacks modify hate speech text to evade detection, while model stealing creates surrogate models that mimic the target system's behavior.

HateBench: Benchmarking Hate Speech Detectors on LLM-Generated Content and Hate Campaigns
Affects: Baichuan 2, Dolly 2, GPT-3.5 Turbo +2 more

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing alignment techniques for safety embed a "safety classifier" within their architecture. This classifier, responsible for determining whether an input is safe or unsafe, can be approximated by extracting a surrogate classifier from a subset of the LLM's architecture. Attackers can leverage this surrogate classifier to more effectively craft adversarial inputs (jailbreaks) that bypass the LLM's intended safety mechanisms. The attack success rate against the…

Targeting Alignment: Extracting Safety Classifiers of Aligned LLMs
Affects: Gemma 2 9B IT, Gemma 7B IT, Granite 3.1 8B Instruct +5 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/29/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks that manipulate attention scores to redirect the model's focus away from safety protocols. The AttnGCG attack method increases the attention score on adversarial suffixes within the input prompt, causing the model to prioritize the malicious content over safety guidelines, leading to the generation of harmful outputs.

AttnGCG: Enhancing jailbreaking attacks on LLMs with attention manipulation
Affects: Gemini 1.5 Flash, Gemini Pro, Gemini 1.5 Pro Latest +6 more

Source: arXiv

A Cross-Prompt Injection Attack (XPIA) can be amplified by appending a Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) suffix to the malicious injection. This increases the likelihood that a Large Language Model (LLM) will execute the injected instruction, even in the presence of a user's primary instruction, leading to data exfiltration. The success rate of the attack depends on the LLM's complexity; medium-complexity models show increased vulnerability.

WHITE PAPER: A Brief Exploration of Data Exfiltration using GCG Suffixes
Affects: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o, Phi 3 Mini

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks leveraging synthetically generated prompts. A novel pipeline, SAGE-RT, generates a diverse dataset of 51,000 prompt-response pairs designed to exploit LLMs' vulnerabilities across various categories of harmfulness. These prompts successfully jailbreak state-of-the-art LLMs in a significant percentage of tested sub-categories, including 100% of macro-categories for certain models like GPT-4 and GPT-3.5-turbo. The vulnerability…

Sage-rt: Synthetic alignment data generation for safety evaluation and red teaming
Affects: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemma 7B IT, GPT-3.5 Turbo +8 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/29/2024

A vulnerability exists in large language models (LLMs) where a small subset of parameters can be directly edited to significantly alter the model's behavior, such as inducing or suppressing toxicity, jailbreaking susceptibility, or altering sentiment expression. This manipulation is achieved through training a linear classifier ("behavior probe") to identify parameters strongly correlated with the target behavior and then modifying those parameters, bypassing standard retraining methods.

Model Surgery: Modulating LLM's Behavior Via Simple Parameter Editing
Affects: Code Llama 7B, Llama 2 7B, Llama 2 7B Chat +1 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.