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Updated 7/21/2026, database is current

Language Model Security Database

959 research findings · 1077 evaluated models

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52 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Updated 12/8/2025

A vulnerability exists in the safety alignment mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs) (including GPT-4, Claude 3, Gemini, and Qwen families) leading to "Implicit Harm." Unlike traditional jailbreaks that use overtly harmful queries, this vulnerability allows remote attackers to coerce the model into providing factually incorrect, plausible, and dangerous responses to benign-looking inputs. By employing "JailFlip" techniques—specifically constructed affirmative-type or denial-type queries…

Beyond Jailbreaks: Revealing Stealthier and Broader LLM Security Risks Stemming from Alignment Failures
Affects: GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1 Mini, GPT-4o +3 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/9/2025

Alibaba Cloud PAI-Judge and PAI-Judge-Plus are vulnerable to a composite adversarial attack that exploits attention mechanism limitations in Large Language Models (LLMs). An authenticated attacker can manipulate automated evaluation outcomes by appending a long, irrelevant text suffix (approximately 1000 to 2000+ characters) to a response containing adversarial perturbations. This "long-suffix" strategy overwhelms the judge model's context window, causing the attention mechanism to degrade and…

LLMs Cannot Reliably Judge (Yet?): A Comprehensive Assessment on the Robustness of LLM-as-a-Judge
Affects: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.3 70B +3 more

Source: arXiv

Speech-LLMs Qwen2-Audio (7B-Instruct) and Granite-Speech (3.2-8b) are vulnerable to universal acoustic adversarial attacks. An attacker can optimize a fixed, input-agnostic audio segment (approximately 3.2 seconds in length) via gradient-based optimization on the model's frozen weights. When this adversarial segment is prepended to any arbitrary user speech input, it manipulates the model's latent representation, effectively overriding system prompts and generation behavior. This vulnerability…

Universal Acoustic Adversarial Attacks for Flexible Control of Speech-LLMs
Affects: Qwen 2 7B

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/30/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) utilizing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting are vulnerable to input perturbations that decouple intermediate reasoning from the final answer. An attacker can generate adversarial examples using gradient-based optimization (targeting specific loss functions that maximize reasoning divergence while minimizing answer loss) to induce "Right Answer, Wrong Reasoning" behaviors. This vulnerability manifests through two primary attack vectors: 1. Token-level perturbations…

Robust Answers, Fragile Logic: Probing the Decoupling Hypothesis in LLM Reasoning
Affects: Llama 3 8B, Mistral 7B, Zephyr 7B Beta +4 more

Source: arXiv

Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs), utilized for interpreting the internal residual stream activations of Large Language Models (LLMs) into human-understandable concepts, are vulnerable to adversarial input perturbations. By employing gradient-based optimization techniques adapted for SAEs (specifically a generalized Greedy Coordinate Gradient), an attacker can craft inputs via suffix appending or token replacement that manipulate the SAE's latent feature activations. This vulnerability allows for the…

Interpretability Illusions with Sparse Autoencoders: Evaluating Robustness of Concept Representations
Affects: Llama 3 8B, Gemma 2 9B

Source: arXiv

The Vision-Language Model (VLM) perception module in Vision-and-Language Navigation (VLN) agents is vulnerable to adversarial 3D object injection via the Adversarial Object Fusion (AdvOF) framework. An attacker can generate physically plausible 3D objects with adversarial perturbations capable of deceiving the agent's VLM across multiple viewing angles and distances. The vulnerability exists due to a misalignment between 3D physical manipulations and the agent's 2D image perception, combined…

Disrupting Vision-Language Model-Driven Navigation Services via Adversarial Object Fusion

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) decision-making capabilities described as "Rhetorical Persuasion Override." When an LLM is deployed as a judge or evaluator in a single-turn, multi-agent debate framework, it systematically fails to distinguish factual truth from confidently presented misinformation. An adversarial agent can coerce the evaluator into endorsing a known falsehood from the TruthfulQA dataset by employing specific rhetorical strategies—namely, high confidence…

When persuasion overrides truth in multi-agent llm debates: Introducing a confidence-weighted persuasion override rate (cw-por)
Affects: Llama 3.2 3B, Mistral 7B, Qwen 2.5 14B +1 more

Source: arXiv

Predictive Large Language Model (LLM) routers, specifically those utilizing Deep Neural Network (DNN) and Matrix Factorization (MF) architectures, are vulnerable to adversarial manipulation and backdoor poisoning. These routers are designed to optimize cost and latency by dynamically directing simple queries to "weak" (cheap) models and complex queries to "strong" (expensive) models. Attackers can exploit this mechanism in two ways: 1. Inference-time Attacks: By appending specific adversarial…

Life-Cycle Routing Vulnerabilities of LLM Router

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/9/2025

Vision-Language Models (VLMs), specifically the LLaVA-1.5 and LLaVA-1.6 series, are vulnerable to optimization-based white-box jailbreak attacks despite standard safety alignment measures like Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Attackers can craft adversarial perturbations in the image space (imperceptible noise) or latent space using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) to manipulate the model's internal representations. These perturbations maximize the…

Adversary-Aware DPO: Enhancing Safety Alignment in Vision Language Models via Adversarial Training
Affects: LLaVA 1.5 7B, LLaVA 1.6 7B

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) that allows for efficient jailbreaking by selectively fine-tuning only the lower layers of the model with a toxic dataset. This "Freeze Training" method, as described in the research paper, concentrates the fine-tuning on layers identified as being highly sensitive to the generation of harmful content. This approach significantly reduces training duration and GPU memory consumption while maintaining a high jailbreak success rate.

Efficient Jailbreaking of Large Models by Freeze Training: Lower Layers Exhibit Greater Sensitivity to Harmful Content
Affects: Baichuan 2 7B Chat, GLM 4 9B Chat HF, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct +4 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.