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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

704 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Multimodal Risk Diffusion Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a heuristic-induced multimodal risk distribution jailbreak attack. The attack successfully circumvents safety mechanisms by distributing malicious prompts across text and image modalities, preventing detection of harmful intent within either modality alone. An auxiliary LLM generates prompts to guide the target MLLM into reconstructing the malicious prompt and producing the desired harmful output.

Heuristic-Induced Multimodal Risk Distribution Jailbreak Attack for Multimodal Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Deepseek-vl7B-chat, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Glm-4v-9B+7 more
  • Deepseek-vl7B-chat
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Glm-4v-9B
  • GPT-4o-0513
  • Llava v1.5-7B
  • Llava v1.6-mistral-7B-hf
  • MiniGPT-4
  • Qwen VL Chat
  • Qwen VL Max
  • Yi-vl-34B

Alignment-Based LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) for safety alignment are vulnerable to a novel "alignment-based" jailbreak attack. This attack leverages a best-of-N sampling approach with an adversarial LLM to efficiently generate prompts that bypass safety mechanisms and elicit unsafe responses from the target LLM, without requiring additional training or access to the target LLM's internal parameters. The attack exploits the inherent tension between…

LIAR: Leveraging Alignment (Best-of-N) to Jailbreak LLMs in Seconds
Evaluated models: Falcon 7B, GPT-2, Llama 3.1 8B+6 more
  • Falcon 7B
  • GPT-2
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Megatron 345M
  • Mistral 7B
  • Pythia 12B
  • Tiny Llama 1.1B
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Best-of-N Prompt Augmentation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) across multiple modalities (text, vision, audio) are vulnerable to a "Best-of-N" (BoN) jailbreaking attack. This attack repeatedly submits slightly modified versions of a harmful prompt (e.g., text with altered capitalization, images with modified text style, audio with altered pitch or speed) until a safety mechanism is bypassed and a harmful response is elicited. The effectiveness of the attack scales with the number of attempts (N). While individual…

Best-of-N Jailbreaking
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Cygnet+10 more
  • Claude 3 Opus
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Cygnet
  • DiVA
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini-1.5-flash-001
  • Gemini-1.5-pro-001
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o Realtime
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B

Natural Prompt Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained with safety fine-tuning are vulnerable to a novel attack, Response-Guided Question Augmentation (ReG-QA). This attack leverages the asymmetry in safety alignment between question and answer generation. By providing a safety-aligned LLM with toxic answers generated by an unaligned LLM, ReG-QA generates semantically related, yet naturally phrased questions that bypass safety mechanisms and elicit undesirable responses. The attack does not require adversarial…

Does Safety Training of LLMs Generalize to Semantically Related Natural Prompts?
Evaluated models: Gemma 2 27B IT, Gemma 2 9B IT, GPT-3.5 Turbo+6 more
  • Gemma 2 27B IT
  • Gemma 2 9B IT
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Mixtral-8x22B-instruct-v0.1
  • Palm-2-otter
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct

Multi-Modal VLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A novel jailbreak attack, Multi-Modal Linkage (MML), exploits the vulnerability in Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) by leveraging an "encryption-decryption" scheme across text and image modalities. MML encrypts malicious queries within images (e.g., using word replacement, image transformations) to bypass initial safety mechanisms. A subsequent text prompt guides the VLM to "decrypt" the content, eliciting harmful outputs. "Evil alignment," framing the attack within a video game scenario…

Jailbreak Large Visual Language Models Through Multi-Modal Linkage
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini+1 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Qwen VL Max

FedPEFT Evasion Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Federated Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning (FedPEFT) systems for large language models (LLMs). Malicious clients can exploit the PEFT mechanism (e.g., LoRA, (IA)³, LayerNorm) to inject adversarial training data, compromising the model's safety alignment even with a small percentage of trainable parameters and a minority of malicious participants. The attack, termed "PEFT-as-an-Attack" (PaaA), circumvents the LLM's safety guardrails, causing it to generate harmful…

PEFT-as-an-Attack! Jailbreaking Language Models during Federated Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3.2 3B Instruct, Phi-3.5 Mini Instruct+1 more
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Phi-3.5 Mini Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct

Visual Jailbreak via Multi-Loss

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks using carefully crafted adversarial images. Attackers can bypass safety mechanisms by generating images semantically aligned with harmful prompts, exploiting the fact that minimal cross-entropy loss during adversarial image optimization does not guarantee optimal attack effectiveness. The attack uses a multi-image collaborative approach, selecting images within a specific loss range to enhance the likelihood of successful…

Exploring Visual Vulnerabilities via Multi-Loss Adversarial Search for Jailbreaking Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: LLaVA 2, MiniGPT-4

Multi-Step Moralized Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-step "moralized" jailbreak prompts that bypass their safety guardrails. These prompts, while appearing ethical individually, cumulatively create a context that elicits verbally aggressive and harmful content generation. The attack leverages the LLMs' inability to fully understand the cumulative context and intent across multiple prompts.

" Moralized" Multi-Step Jailbreak Prompts: Black-Box Testing of Guardrails in Large Language Models for Verbal Attacks
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o, Grok 2+1 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-4o
  • Grok 2
  • Llama 3.1 405B

Universal LLM Output Control

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel prompt injection attack using universal and context-independent triggers. These triggers, once discovered for a specific LLM, allow precise control over the model's output regardless of the prompt context or desired output content, enabling adversaries to force the generation of arbitrary text. The attack utilizes a gradient-based optimization technique to discover these triggers.

Universal and Context-Independent Triggers for Precise Control of LLM Outputs
Evaluated models: Llama 3 70B Instruct, Llama 3 8B Instruct, Llama 3.1 70B Instruct+7 more
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Qwen-2 (57B-a14B-instruct)
  • Qwen 2 72B Instruct
  • Qwen 2 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 14B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct

Adversarial Suffix Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv
Research ID 5cdb4e1d

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial suffix injection attacks. Maliciously crafted suffixes appended to otherwise benign prompts can cause the LLM to generate harmful or undesired outputs, bypassing built-in safety mechanisms. The attack leverages the model's sensitivity to input perturbations to elicit responses outside its intended safety boundaries.

GASP: Efficient Black-Box Generation of Adversarial Suffixes for Jailbreaking LLMs
Evaluated models: Falcon 7B Instruct, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o+5 more
  • Falcon 7B Instruct
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.