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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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610 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Agent Tool Misuse Attacks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are vulnerable to obfuscated adversarial prompts that exploit tool misuse. These prompts, crafted through prompt optimization techniques, force the agent to execute tools (e.g., URL fetching, markdown rendering) in a way that leaks sensitive user data (e.g., PII) without the user's knowledge. The prompts are designed to be visually indistinguishable from benign prompts.

Imprompter: Tricking LLM Agents into Improper Tool Use
Evaluated models: Not reported

Attention-Based LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to attention-based jailbreak attacks. Attackers can craft prompts that strategically divert the LLM's attention away from sensitive words, causing the model to overlook malicious intent and generate harmful content. This occurs by leveraging the LLM's attention mechanism to focus on benign parts of the prompt while embedding harmful queries within a seemingly harmless context. The success of the attack is correlated with specific attention…

Feint and Attack: Attention-Based Strategies for Jailbreaking and Protecting LLMs
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, GPT-4, Llama 2 13B Chat+2 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B

Robotic LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large language models (LLMs) controlling robots are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks. The ROBOPAIR algorithm demonstrates that malicious prompts can bypass safety mechanisms, causing robots to perform harmful physical actions. This vulnerability exploits the LLM's reliance on textual prompts and its potential lack of sufficient contextual understanding to prevent unsafe commands. The attack is effective across different access levels.

Jailbreaking LLM-controlled robots
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4o+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Nvidia Dolphins Self-driving Llm

Multi-Turn Question Fragmentation Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a multi-turn jailbreak attack, termed "Jigsaw Puzzles" (JSP), which circumvents existing safeguards by splitting harmful questions into harmless fragments. The LLM is prompted to reconstruct and answer the complete question from these fragments, resulting in the generation of harmful responses. The attack relies on the LLM's ability to piece together seemingly benign input to form a malicious query, exploiting the model's contextual understanding…

Jigsaw Puzzles: Splitting Harmful Questions to Jailbreak Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-4, GPT-4o+2 more
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 70B

Prompt Translation Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms using adversarial prompt translation. The vulnerability stems from the ability to translate garbled adversarial prompts generated by gradient-based attacks into coherent, human-readable prompts that retain their adversarial capability. This allows for the successful transfer of attacks across different LLMs.

Deciphering the Chaos: Enhancing Jailbreak Attacks via Adversarial Prompt Translation
Evaluated models: Not reported

Multi-turn Actor Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn adversarial attacks where malicious users obscure harmful intents across multiple queries. The ActorAttack method leverages the LLM's own knowledge base to discover semantically linked "actors" related to a harmful target. By posing seemingly innocuous questions about these actors, the attacker guides the LLM towards revealing harmful information step-by-step, accumulating knowledge until the desired malicious output is obtained, even…

Derail Yourself: Multi-turn LLM Jailbreak Attack through Self-discovered Clues
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4+3 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • o1

Multi-Objective LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a multi-objective black-box jailbreaking attack (BlackDAN) that optimizes prompts to maximize the likelihood of generating unsafe responses while maintaining contextual relevance and minimizing detectability. The attack leverages a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm (NSGA-II) to balance attack success rate, semantic consistency, and stealthiness, resulting in more effective and less easily detectable jailbreaks than single-objective approaches.

BlackDAN: A Black-Box Multi-Objective Approach for Effective and Contextual Jailbreaking of Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Aquilachat-7B, Baichuan 2 13B Chat, Baichuan-7B+12 more
  • Aquilachat-7B
  • Baichuan 2 13B Chat
  • Baichuan-7B
  • GPT-2 XL
  • Internlm2-chat-7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama-2-13B-hf
  • Llama-2-7B-hf
  • Llava v1.6-mistral-7B-hf
  • Llava-v1.6-vicuna-7B-hf
  • Minitron-8B-base
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5
  • Vicuna 7B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5
  • Yi 1.5 9B Chat

Context-Shifting Code Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) acting as code assistants may recommend malicious code or resources when presented with prompts framed as programming challenges, even if they refuse similar direct prompts. This occurs due to insufficient context-aware safety mechanisms. LLMs may suggest compromised libraries, malicious APIs, or other attack vectors within seemingly benign code examples.

Hallucinating AI Hijacking Attack: Large Language Models and Malicious Code Recommenders
Evaluated models: GPT-4

LLM Resource Exhaustion Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel jailbreak attack that exploits resource limitations. By overloading the model with a computationally intensive preliminary task (e.g., a complex character map lookup and decoding), the attacker prevents the activation of the LLM's safety mechanisms, enabling the generation of unsafe outputs from subsequent prompts. The attack's strength is scalable and adjustable by modifying the complexity of the preliminary task.

Harnessing Task Overload for Scalable Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Mistral 7B, Qwen 2.5 14B+5 more
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 14B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 3B
  • Qwen 2.5 72B
  • Vicuna7B-v0.3

Implicit Reference Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to an attack vector termed "Attack via Implicit Reference" (AIR). AIR bypasses safety mechanisms by decomposing a malicious objective into multiple benign, seemingly unrelated objectives linked through implicit contextual references. The LLM generates harmful content by combining the outputs of these seemingly harmless objectives, without explicitly triggering safety filters designed to detect direct requests for malicious content.

You Know What I'm Saying: Jailbreak Attack via Implicit Reference
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini+7 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o-0513
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Qwen 2 7B
  • Qwen 2 0.5B
  • Qwen 2 1.5B
  • Qwen 2 72B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.