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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

704 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Iterative Image Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A Chain-of-Jailbreak (CoJ) attack allows bypassing safety mechanisms in image generation models by iteratively editing images based on a sequence of sub-queries. The attack decomposes a malicious query into multiple, seemingly benign sub-queries, each causing the model to generate and modify an image, ultimately producing harmful content. Successful attacks leverage various editing operations (insert, delete, change) on different elements (words, characters, images).

Chain-of-Jailbreak Attack for Image Generation Models via Editing Step by Step
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-4o, GPT-4V

Autonomous Jailbreak Agent

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks using autonomously discovered strategies. AutoDAN-Turbo, a black-box attack method, demonstrates the ability to discover novel and highly effective jailbreak strategies without human intervention, achieving a high success rate (e.g., 88.5% on GPT-4-1106-turbo) in eliciting harmful or unsafe responses from LLMs. The attack leverages a lifelong learning agent to iteratively refine attack strategies based on model responses…

Autodan-turbo: A lifelong agent for strategy self-exploration to jailbreak llms
Evaluated models: Gemini Pro, Gemma 7B IT, GPT-4-1106-turbo+5 more
  • Gemini Pro
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • GPT-4-1106-turbo
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B

Bijection-Based LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel "bijection learning" attack that leverages in-context learning to teach the model a custom string-to-string encoding, bypassing built-in safety mechanisms. The attack encodes harmful queries, sends them to the model, and decodes the response, effectively circumventing safety filters. The complexity of the encoding can be controlled, adapting the attack to various LLMs; more capable models are more susceptible to complex encodings.

Endless Jailbreaks with Bijection Learning
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet+5 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3 Opus
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama Guard 3

Left-Side Noise Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a left-to-right processing bias, making them vulnerable to "FlipAttack." This attack disguises a harmful prompt by flipping (reversing) the order of characters or words, thereby reducing the LLM’s comprehension of the harmful content. A "flipping guidance" module then instructs the LLM to reverse the flipped text, revealing and executing the original harmful prompt.

FlipAttack: Jailbreak LLMs via Flipping
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4+5 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Mixtral 8x22B

Concealed Multi-Turn Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel multi-turn jailbreaking attack, termed "RED QUEEN ATTACK." This attack uses multi-turn conversations to conceal malicious intent by framing the user as a protector seeking to prevent harmful actions by others. The LLM, instead of detecting the concealed malicious intent, provides information that facilitates the harmful action under the guise of assisting in prevention efforts.

RED QUEEN: Safeguarding Large Language Models against Concealed Multi-Turn Jailbreaking
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

RoleBreak Character Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) used in role-playing systems are vulnerable to character hallucination attacks, a form of jailbreak exploiting "query sparsity" and "role-query conflict". Query sparsity occurs when prompts fall outside the model's training data distribution, causing it to generate out-of-character responses. Role-query conflict arises when the prompt contradicts the established character persona, leading to inconsistent behavior. These vulnerabilities allow attackers to elicit…

RoleBreak: Character Hallucination as a Jailbreak Attack in Role-Playing Systems
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 3 8B+1 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2

Automated LLM Fuzz Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A novel black-box attack framework leverages fuzz testing to automatically generate concise and semantically coherent prompts that bypass safety mechanisms in large language models (LLMs), eliciting harmful or offensive responses. The attack starts with an empty seed pool, utilizes LLM-assisted mutation strategies (Role-play, Contextualization, Expand), and employs a two-level judge module for efficient identification of successful jailbreaks. The attack's effectiveness is demonstrated across…

Effective and Evasive Fuzz Testing-Driven Jailbreaking Attacks against LLMs
Evaluated models: Baichuan 2 7B Chat, Gemini Pro, GPT-3.5 Turbo+4 more
  • Baichuan 2 7B Chat
  • Gemini Pro
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Guanaco 7B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 7B v1.3

Reinforcement Learning Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

PathSeeker demonstrates a novel black-box jailbreak attack against Large Language Models (LLMs) that utilizes multi-agent reinforcement learning. The attack iteratively modifies input prompts based on model responses, leveraging a reward mechanism focused on vocabulary expansion in the LLM's output to circumvent safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses. This technique bypasses existing safety filters by encouraging the model to relax its constraints, rather than directly targeting…

PathSeeker: Exploring LLM Security Vulnerabilities with a Reinforcement Learning-Based Jailbreak Approach
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, DeepSeek Chat, Deepseek-coder+14 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek Chat
  • Deepseek-coder
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemma2-8B-instruct
  • Glm-4-air
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral Nemo
  • Qwen 2 7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 7B

Symbolic Math Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack, termed "MathPrompt," which leverages the models' ability to process symbolic mathematics to bypass built-in safety mechanisms. The attack encodes harmful natural language prompts into mathematically formulated problems, causing the LLM to generate unsafe outputs while ostensibly solving a mathematical problem.

Jailbreaking Large Language Models with Symbolic Mathematics
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3 Sonnet+10 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3 Opus
  • Claude 3 Sonnet
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash (block None)
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro (block None)
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 70B

RAG Worm Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Jailbreaking vulnerabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs) used in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems allow escalation of attacks from entity extraction to full document extraction and enable the propagation of self-replicating malicious prompts ("worms") within interconnected RAG applications. Exploitation leverages prompt injection to force the LLM to return retrieved documents or execute malicious actions specified within the prompt.

Unleashing worms and extracting data: Escalating the outcome of attacks against rag-based inference in scale and severity using jailbreaking
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Flash

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.