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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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131 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

Audio Large Language Models (ALLMs) integrated into voice agent systems for high-stakes domains (banking, IT support, logistics) are vulnerable to multimodal adversarial attacks via spoken interaction. Adversaries can exploit the model's inherent compliance and contextual awareness through multi-turn dialogue to bypass authentication safeguards, escalate privileges (e.g., unauthorized credit limit increases), exfiltrate sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII), and poison…

Aegis: Towards Governance, Integrity, and Security of AI Voice Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 1.5 Pro +4 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

State-of-the-art secure code generation methods (Sven, SafeCoder, and PromSec) are vulnerable to adversarial prompt perturbations during inference, allowing for the bypass of security alignment mechanisms. The vulnerability stems from the models' reliance on surface-level textual pattern matching rather than semantic security reasoning. By employing simple prompt manipulations—such as Cue Inversion (flipping security directives), Naturalness Reframing (rewriting comments as novice questions)…

How Secure is Secure Code Generation? Adversarial Prompts Put LLM Defenses to the Test
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, Mistral 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Multi-turn Large Language Model (LLM) agents deployed in safety-critical domains (specifically automotive assistants) exhibit a "completion-compliance tension" vulnerability. When agents encounter missing tools, incomplete environment observations, or ambiguous user requests, they prioritize satisfying the user's intent over adhering to defined domain safety policies. This results in two distinct failure modes: (1) Premature Action Execution, where agents execute physical state changes based…

CAR-bench: Evaluating the Consistency and Limit-Awareness of LLM Agents under Real-World Uncertainty
Evaluated models: GPT-5, GPT-5.2, Claude Opus 4.5 +7 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 3/9/2026

Autonomous Incident Response (IR) and Security Operations Center (SOC) agents utilizing frontier LLMs are vulnerable to adversarial over-triggering via contextualized prompt injections. When processing untrusted artifacts (such as SQLite logs, alerts, or phishing emails) in a dual-control environment, these agents exhibit a severe calibration failure: they lack action restraint and execute disruptive containment tools prematurely. Attackers can exploit this by embedding T2 (contextualized…

OpenSec: Measuring Incident Response Agent Calibration Under Adversarial Evidence
Evaluated models: GPT-5.2, Claude Sonnet 4.5, DeepSeek V3.2 +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 3/9/2026

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to induce factually incorrect outputs by injecting misinformation into prompts framed with strong confidence. By using authoritative phrasing (e.g., "As we know..."), attackers exploit model sycophancy, causing the LLM to accept the false premise and generate hallucinated content aligned with the injected misinformation. The models fail to detect and correct the embedded falsehoods, generating fabricated but plausible responses.

AdversaRiskQA: An Adversarial Factuality Benchmark for High-Risk Domains
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 20B, GPT-oss 120B, GPT-5 +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) capable of processing interleaved image-text sequences are vulnerable to a universal adversarial perturbation (UAP) attack known as LAMP. This vulnerability allows an attacker to generate a single, noise-based perturbation pattern using a surrogate model (e.g., Mantis-CLIP) that transfers effectively to black-box target models. The attack leverages two novel loss functions during perturbation learning: a "contagious" objective that manipulates…

LAMP: Learning Universal Adversarial Perturbations for Multi-Image Tasks via Pre-trained Models
Evaluated models: Mantis-CLIP, Mantis-SIGLIP, Mantis-Idefics2 +4 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

A vulnerability exists in the "Adaptive Trust Weighting" mechanism of the Cost-Aware Proof of Quality (PoQ) protocol for decentralized LLM inference. The protocol updates evaluator trust weights based on the deviation of a submitted score from the consensus score of the current round. Because the consensus score is derived from the very scores being evaluated (a self-referential feedback loop), the mechanism fails to distinguish between honest and coordinated malicious evaluators…

Adaptive and Robust Cost-Aware Proof of Quality for Decentralized LLM Inference Networks
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

Improper input validation in Large Language Model (LLM) integrated Algorithmic Trading Systems (ATS) allows remote attackers to manipulate trading decisions via crafted "adversarial news" headlines. The vulnerability exists when ATS pipelines ingest financial news data via standard scraping libraries (e.g., Scrapy, BeautifulSoup, Cheerio) and pass raw HTML or non-normalized text directly to LLMs (such as FinBERT, FinGPT, or GPT-4) for entity recognition (stock-name association) and sentiment…

Adversarial News and Lost Profits: Manipulating Headlines in LLM-Driven Algorithmic Trading
Evaluated models: FinBERT, FinGPT, FinLLaMA +7 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

LLM-based autonomous agents deployed for Static Application Security Testing (SAST) false positive filtering exhibit a critical failure mode resulting in the suppression of True Positive (TP) vulnerability reports. When configured to triage alerts from tools such as CodeQL, Semgrep, and SonarQube, agents including SWE-agent, OpenHands, and Aider incorrectly classify legitimate, exploitable vulnerabilities as false positives. This vulnerability suppression is highly correlated with specific…

Sifting the Noise: A Comparative Study of LLM Agents in Vulnerability False Positive Filtering
Evaluated models: Claude Sonnet 4, DeepSeek Chat, GPT-5

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

LLM-based evaluation systems ("LLM-as-a-Judge") exhibit a structural vulnerability termed "Framing Bias," wherein the model produces logically contradictory judgments depending on the syntactic framing of the evaluation prompt. Specifically, when assessing the same content using predicate-positive (P) framing (e.g., "Is this toxic?") versus predicate-negative (¬P) framing (e.g., "Is this non-toxic?"), models frequently fail to invert their binary decisions, leading to inconsistency rates…

When Wording Steers the Evaluation: Framing Bias in LLM judges
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 1B Instruct, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Llama 3.1 70B Instruct +11 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.