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Updated 7/21/2026, database is current

Language Model Security Database

959 research findings · 1077 evaluated models

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146 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Updated 2/21/2026

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) exhibit a vulnerability to moral judgment flipping, where the model's safety alignment can be bypassed through lightweight, model-agnostic multimodal perturbations. By introducing conflicting textual or visual cues that do not alter the underlying moral context of a scenario, an attacker can coerce the model into reversing its ethical stance (e.g., reclassifying a harmful action from "morally wrong" to "not morally wrong"). This vulnerability exploits the model's…

Do VLMs Have a Moral Backbone? A Study on the Fragile Morality of Vision-Language Models
Affects: Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 32B Instruct +20 more

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) utilizing visual token compression mechanisms (e.g., VisionZip, VisPruner) to reduce inference latency. The vulnerability stems from an optimization-inference mismatch where standard adversarial defenses assume full-token processing, while the deployed model utilizes a subset of tokens selected via importance metrics (typically attention scores).

On the Adversarial Robustness of Large Vision-Language Models under Visual Token Compression
Affects: LLaVA 1.5 7B

Source: arXiv

Updated 2/22/2026

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to Physical Prompt Injection Attacks (PPIA), a query-agnostic injection technique delivered via the visual modality. The vulnerability stems from the model's "Vision-Enabled Text Recognition" capabilities and "Identity Sensitivity," where the model interprets text embedded in the physical environment (e.g., printed on signs, posters, or objects) as high-priority instructions rather than passive visual data. An attacker can embed adversarial…

Physical Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Vision-Language Models
Affects: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4 Turbo +7 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/30/2025

Commercial Multimodal Large Language Model (MLLM) integrated systems are vulnerable to a "Dual Steganography" jailbreak paradigm (referred to as Odysseus). The vulnerability arises from the reliance of safety filters on the assumption that malicious content must be explicitly visible in the input or output modalities (text or image). Attackers can bypass these filters by encoding malicious queries into binary matrices and embedding them into benign-looking images using steganographic encoders…

Odysseus: Jailbreaking Commercial Multimodal LLM-integrated Systems via Dual Steganography
Affects: GPT-4o, Gemini 2.0 Pro, Gemini 2.0 Flash +1 more

Source: arXiv

OpenVLA, a Vision-Language-Action (VLA) model, contains a vulnerability regarding multimodal adversarial robustness. The model lacks sufficient cross-modal alignment stability, allowing attackers to disrupt the grounding between visual perception and linguistic instructions. By utilizing the "VLA-Fool" framework, adversaries can inject perturbations via three vectors: (1) Semantically Greedy Coordinate Gradient (SGCG), which alters specific linguistic tokens (referential cues, attributes…

When alignment fails: Multimodal adversarial attacks on vision-language-action models

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/8/2025

Large Vision Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack that combines image typography manipulation with multi-turn prompting. The vulnerability exploits the model's visual encoder and instruction-following capabilities by embedding a harmful textual query directly into a benign image as a visible caption (using specific fonts and blending techniques). An attacker then engages the model in a three-turn conversation: first asking a benign question about the visual object…

Jailbreaking Large Vision Language Models in Intelligent Transportation Systems
Affects: GPT-4o, Qwen 2 7B, LLaVA 7B

Source: arXiv

Embodied Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents utilizing Vision-Language Models (VLMs) for perception and planning are vulnerable to Indirect Environmental Jailbreak (IEJ). The vulnerability arises from the system's failure to distinguish between user-issued instructions and text embedded in the physical environment (e.g., writing on walls, sticky notes, or projections). The VLM processes visual text detected in the camera feed as authoritative context or direct commands, allowing a black-box…

The Shawshank Redemption of Embodied AI: Understanding and Benchmarking Indirect Environmental Jailbreaks
Affects: GPT-4o, Qwen3-VL Plus, Gemini 2.0 Flash +3 more

Source: arXiv

Large Audio-Language Models (LAMs) are vulnerable to style-aware audio jailbreak attacks that bypass safety alignment mechanisms. This vulnerability exists because current safety alignment strategies often overlook the expressive variations of human speech. Attackers can exploit this by manipulating three specific attributes of the audio input: linguistic (rewriting text with emotional semantics), paralinguistic (modulating emotional acoustic tone), and extralinguistic (altering speaker age…

StyleBreak: Revealing Alignment Vulnerabilities in Large Audio-Language Models via Style-Aware Audio Jailbreak
Affects: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2 7B +1 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/8/2025

Improper restriction of the "Capability Space" in Large Language Model (LLM) applications allows remote attackers to manipulate application behavior through "Goal Deviation" attacks. This vulnerability arises when developers rely on the broad capabilities of a foundational model (e.g., GPT-4, LLaMA) without implementing sufficient negative constraints or disabling default plugins (e.g., DALL-E, Web Search) in the system prompt. Attackers can exploit this via natural language inputs to trigger…

Beyond Jailbreak: Unveiling Risks in LLM Applications Arising from Blurred Capability Boundaries

Source: arXiv

The JPRO (Automated Multimodal Jailbreaking via Multi-Agent Collaboration) framework exploits a vulnerability in Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) related to insufficient cross-modal safety alignment and lack of maliciousness sustainability in multi-turn dialogues. The attack leverages a multi-agent system (Planner, Attacker, Modifier, Verifier) to automate the generation of adversarial image-text pairs. By employing hybrid tactics—such as combining role-playing with malicious content…

JPRO: Automated Multimodal Jailbreaking via Multi-Agent Collaboration Framework
Affects: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4.1 +3 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.