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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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53 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 2/1/2025
Analyzed 3/19/2025

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) that allows for efficient jailbreaking by selectively fine-tuning only the lower layers of the model with a toxic dataset. This "Freeze Training" method, as described in the research paper, concentrates the fine-tuning on layers identified as being highly sensitive to the generation of harmful content. This approach significantly reduces training duration and GPU memory consumption while maintaining a high jailbreak success rate.

Efficient Jailbreaking of Large Models by Freeze Training: Lower Layers Exhibit Greater Sensitivity to Harmful Content
Evaluated models: Baichuan 2 7B Chat, GLM 4 9B Chat HF, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct +4 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2025
Analyzed 1/14/2026

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) routing systems (control planes) that allows for the manipulation of inference flow via adversarial input sequences. LLM routers, which dynamically direct user queries to either "weak" (cheaper) or "strong" (expensive) models based on predicted query complexity, can be bypassed by appending specific, pre-optimized token sequences known as "confounder gadgets." These gadgets artificially inflate the router's complexity score for an input…

Rerouting llm routers
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 4/1/2024
Analyzed 12/28/2024

Leading safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to simple adaptive jailbreaking attacks. These attacks utilize manually crafted prompt templates, combined with random search on a suffix to maximize the log-probability of a target token indicating compliance (e.g., "Sure"). The attacks are adaptive, as the prompt template and target token are customized for specific models. Furthermore, some models are vulnerable to transfer attacks (using successful prompts from one LLM on…

Jailbreaking leading safety-aligned llms with simple adaptive attacks
Evaluated models: Claude 2.0, Claude 2.1, Claude 3 Haiku +14 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.