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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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131 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

LLM-as-a-Reviewer systems, which utilize large language models to automate the peer review process, are vulnerable to the Paraphrasing Adversarial Attack (PAA). PAA is a black-box optimization technique that exploits the model's sensitivity to specific input sequences and self-preference bias. By iteratively paraphrasing specific manuscript sections (such as the abstract) using in-context learning (ICL) guided by previous review scores, an attacker can generate adversarial sequences that…

Paraphrasing Adversarial Attack on LLM-as-a-Reviewer
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude Sonnet 4

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 3/8/2026

LLM routing systems are vulnerable to adversarial rerouting attacks where malicious triggers prepended to user queries manipulate the router's model-selection mechanism. Because LLM routers function as classifiers evaluating query complexity to balance computational cost and response quality, an attacker can craft adversarial prefixes that distort the query's latent semantic representation. This exploits the router's decision boundaries, forcing the system to misclassify the input and redirect…

RerouteGuard: Understanding and Mitigating Adversarial Risks for LLM Routing
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-5 +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Token-level embedding-time watermarking algorithms, specifically KGW (Kirchenbauer et al.) and Exponential Sampling (EXP, Kuditipudi et al.), when implemented in Large Language Models (LLMs) for Bangla text generation, are vulnerable to watermark erasure via cross-lingual round-trip translation (RTT) attacks. While these methods achieve high detection accuracy (>88%) under benign conditions, translating watermarked Bangla text to English and back to Bangla causes detection accuracy to collapse…

BanglaLorica: Design and Evaluation of a Robust Watermarking Algorithm for Large Language Models in Bangla Text Generation
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn persuasive conversational attacks that induce the adoption of counterfactual beliefs. By leveraging the Source–Message–Channel–Receiver (SMCR) communication framework, attackers can systematically erode a model's confidence in established facts and compel the model to output misinformation. Specific attack vectors include manipulating source attribution (authority framing), message content (logical, credibility, or emotional appeals)…

Vulnerability of LLMs' Belief Systems? LLMs Belief Resistance Check Through Strategic Persuasive Conversation Interventions
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.2 3B, Llama 3.3 70B +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 3/8/2026

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed using Multiple-Choice Question Answering (MCQA) interfaces or choice-based selection structures are vulnerable to Option Injection. By appending a task-irrelevant candidate choice (e.g., Option E) containing a steering directive—specifically utilizing threat framing (penalty coercion) or bonus framing (reward inducement)—an attacker can hijack the model's decision-making process. The vulnerability stems from a flaw in attention allocation: the model's…

OI-Bench: An Option Injection Benchmark for Evaluating LLM Susceptibility to Directive Interference
Evaluated models: GPT-5, GPT-5 Mini, Claude Haiku 4.5 +9 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

AutoArgue, an LLM-based evaluation framework for Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems, is susceptible to evaluation subversion attacks due to the public availability of its judging prompts and reference data structures. An adversarial RAG system (exemplified by the "Crucible" probe) can incorporate "insider knowledge" of the evaluation logic directly into its generation pipeline. By wrapping the generation process with the evaluator's specific prompts, the system can pre-filter…

Insider Knowledge: How Much Can RAG Systems Gain from Evaluation Secrets?
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.3 70B

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

LLM-based navigation agents, including NavGPT and prompt-tuned outdoor agents, are vulnerable to adaptive prompt injection attacks. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to hijack the physical movement of the agent by embedding optimized malicious instructions into benign natural language inputs. The issue arises because the agents parse user instructions to generate executable plans without sufficient separation between control logic and untrusted input. The PINA (Prompt Injection Attack…

PINA: Prompt Injection Attack against Navigation Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Llama 2 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Point-based 3D Vision-Language Models (VLMs), specifically PointLLM and GPT4Point, are vulnerable to white-box, gradient-based adversarial attacks. The vulnerability exists in the model's processing of 3D point cloud data, where an attacker can optimize imperceptible geometric perturbations ($\delta$) on the input point cloud ($x$) to manipulate the model's textual output. The paper identifies two specific attack vectors: 1. Vision Attack: Directly perturbs the high-dimensional visual token…

On the Adversarial Robustness of 3D Large Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Vicuna 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 1/14/2026

A malicious model supply chain vulnerability exists involving a technique termed Adversarial Contrastive Learning (ACL) for Large Language Model (LLM) quantization attacks. This vulnerability allows an attacker to publish a model that appears benign and preserves high utility in full precision (e.g., BF16 or FP32) but exhibits malicious behaviors—such as jailbreak, over-refusal, or advertisement injection—immediately upon zero-shot quantization (e.g., INT8, FP4, or NF4).

Adversarial Contrastive Learning for LLM Quantization Attacks
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct, Llama 3.2 1B Instruct +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Large Language Models (LLMs) enabled with Function Calling (FC) capabilities are vulnerable to adversarial query rewriting and semantic manipulation. Standard FC models, typically trained via Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) on static datasets, fail to generalize against adversarial inputs that deviate from fixed distribution patterns. An attacker can exploit this by crafting queries that are semantically similar to valid requests but engineered to induce "bad cases," such as incorrect tool…

Exploring Weaknesses in Function Call Models via Reinforcement Learning: An Adversarial Data Augmentation Approach
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct, Qwen 3 0.6B, Qwen 3 4B +1 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.