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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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73 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 1/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

Vision Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to visual prompt injection attacks via text-to-image obfuscation. While these models often possess safety guardrails for standard text-based inputs, they fail to apply equivalent safety alignment to textual instructions embedded visually within an image. An attacker can overlay malicious instructions (e.g., requests for illegal acts, hate speech) onto an image file and submit it to the model. The model’s Optical Character Recognition (OCR) or visual…

Lessons from red teaming 100 generative ai products
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Phi-3

Source: arXiv

Published 9/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Jailbreaking vulnerabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs) used in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems allow escalation of attacks from entity extraction to full document extraction and enable the propagation of self-replicating malicious prompts ("worms") within interconnected RAG applications. Exploitation leverages prompt injection to force the LLM to return retrieved documents or execute malicious actions specified within the prompt.

Unleashing worms and extracting data: Escalating the outcome of attacks against rag-based inference in scale and severity using jailbreaking
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Flash

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2024
Analyzed 1/26/2025

LLMs, even when individually assessed as "safe," can be combined by an adversary to achieve malicious outcomes. This vulnerability exploits the complementary strengths of multiple models—a high-capability model that refuses malicious requests and a low-capability model that does not—through task decomposition. Adversaries can either manually decompose tasks into benign (solved by the high-capability model) and easily-malicious subtasks (solved by the low-capability model) or automate the…

Adversaries can misuse combinations of safe models
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3 Sonnet +8 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.