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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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73 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 11/1/2023
Analyzed 12/28/2024

A prompt injection vulnerability in OpenAI's custom GPT models allows attackers to extract the system prompt and potentially leak user-uploaded files. Attackers craft malicious prompts that manipulate the LLM into revealing sensitive information, even when defensive prompts are in place. The vulnerability is exacerbated when the model includes a code interpreter.

Assessing prompt injection risks in 200+ custom gpts
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2023
Analyzed 12/29/2024

A system prompt leakage vulnerability in GPT-4V allows extraction of internal system prompts through carefully crafted, incomplete conversations combined with image input. Extracted prompts can be used as highly effective jailbreak prompts, bypassing safety restrictions and leading to undesirable outputs, including revealing personally identifiable information from images.

Jailbreaking gpt-4v via self-adversarial attacks with system prompts
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4V, LLaVA 1.5

Source: arXiv

Published 10/1/2023
Analyzed 12/29/2024

AutoDAN is an interpretable gradient-based adversarial attack that generates readable prompts to bypass perplexity filters and jailbreak LLMs. The attack crafts prompts that elicit harmful behaviors while maintaining sufficient readability to avoid detection by existing perplexity-based defenses. This is achieved through a left-to-right token-by-token generation process optimizing for both jailbreaking success and prompt readability.

Autodan: Automatic and interpretable adversarial attacks on large language models
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Guanaco 7B +4 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.