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LMVD-ID: 3d287561
Paper published March 1, 2025
Entry analyzed March 19, 2025
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Autonomous Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn adversarial attacks that exploit incremental policy erosion. The attacker uses a breadth-first search strategy to generate multiple prompts at each turn…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(3)

  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 3.1 70B

Description

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn adversarial attacks that exploit incremental policy erosion. The attacker uses a breadth-first search strategy to generate multiple prompts at each turn, leveraging partial compliance from previous responses to gradually escalate the conversation towards eliciting disallowed outputs. Minor concessions accumulate, ultimately leading to complete circumvention of safety measures.

Examples

See the "Siege" paper (details omitted due to length of provided text, refer to the original publication).

Impact

Successful exploitation allows attackers to circumvent LLM safety restrictions and obtain disallowed information or instructions, potentially leading to the generation of harmful content, such as instructions for illegal activities, malicious code, or personally identifiable information. The attack achieves a 100% success rate on GPT-3.5-turbo and 97% on GPT-4 in a single multi-turn run.

Affected Systems

Large Language Models (LLMs) susceptible to multi-turn adversarial prompting, including (but not limited to) GPT-3.5-turbo, GPT-4, and Llama 3.1-70B.

Mitigation Steps

  • Implement more robust multi-turn safety mechanisms that account for cumulative policy violations and adapt dynamically to adversarial interactions.
  • Develop sophisticated detection mechanisms that identify and mitigate partial compliance leading to gradual safety erosion.
  • Utilize advanced techniques to prevent the exploitation of incremental concessions in the model's responses.
  • Strengthen prompt filtering and response validation to prevent the re-injection of leaked information into subsequent queries. Consider using techniques to assess risk not just on individual turns, but cumulatively throughout a conversation.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
Agent workflows
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Large Language Models (LLMs) susceptible to multi-turn adversarial prompting, including (but not limited to) GPT-3.5-turbo, GPT-4, and Llama 3.1-70B.

Research Paper

Siege: Autonomous Multi-Turn Jailbreaking of Large Language Models with Tree Search

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.10619