Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research details
Back to research findings
LMVD-ID: 5d7bcf05
Paper published June 1, 2024
Entry analyzed December 29, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

DRL-Guided LLM Jailbreak

A deep reinforcement learning (DRL) based attack, termed RLbreaker, demonstrates the ability to more efficiently generate jailbreaking prompts for large language models (LLMs) than existing methods. The attack…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(6)

GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2 70B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat +3 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mixtral 8x7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Description

A deep reinforcement learning (DRL) based attack, termed RLbreaker, demonstrates the ability to more efficiently generate jailbreaking prompts for large language models (LLMs) than existing methods. The attack leverages a DRL agent to guide the search for effective prompt structures, bypassing safety mechanisms and eliciting undesirable responses to harmful questions. The effectiveness stems from the DRL agent's ability to strategically select prompt mutators, rather than relying on random search techniques.

Examples

See https://github.com/ucsb-mlsec/RLbreaker (opens in a new tab)

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows attackers to circumvent LLM safety measures, potentially leading to the generation of harmful, unethical, or illegal content. The increased efficiency of RLbreaker compared to previous methods makes it a more significant threat.

Affected Systems

The vulnerability affects a wide range of LLMs, including (but not limited to) Llama2-7b-chat, Llama2-70b-chat, Vicuna-7b, Vicuna-13b, Mixtral-8x7B-Instruct, and GPT-3.5-turbo. The attack's transferability across different LLMs further broadens its impact.

Mitigation Steps

  • Design and implement more robust prompt filtering and detection mechanisms that are resistant to prompt engineering techniques employed by RLbreaker.
  • Improve LLM training data and methodologies to increase their resilience to adversarial prompts generated by DRL-based attacks.
  • Develop and integrate advanced detection models capable of distinguishing between legitimate and malicious prompts.
  • Regularly update and enhance existing safety mechanisms to counter emerging adversarial techniques.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
The vulnerability affects a wide range of LLMs, including (but not limited to) Llama2-7b-chat, Llama2-70b-chat, Vicuna-7b, Vicuna-13b, Mixtral-8x7B-Instruct, and GPT-3.5-turbo. The attack's transferability across…

Research Paper

When LLM Meets DRL: Advancing Jailbreaking Efficiency via DRL-guided Search

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.08705