The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
DRL-Guided LLM Jailbreak
A deep reinforcement learning (DRL) based attack, termed RLbreaker, demonstrates the ability to more efficiently generate jailbreaking prompts for large language models (LLMs) than existing methods. The attack…
Paper-evaluated models(6)
GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2 70B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat +3 more
- GPT-3.5 Turbo
- Llama 2 70B Chat
- Llama 2 7B Chat
- Mixtral 8x7B Instruct
- Vicuna 13B
- Vicuna 7B
Description
A deep reinforcement learning (DRL) based attack, termed RLbreaker, demonstrates the ability to more efficiently generate jailbreaking prompts for large language models (LLMs) than existing methods. The attack leverages a DRL agent to guide the search for effective prompt structures, bypassing safety mechanisms and eliciting undesirable responses to harmful questions. The effectiveness stems from the DRL agent's ability to strategically select prompt mutators, rather than relying on random search techniques.
Examples
See https://github.com/ucsb-mlsec/RLbreaker (opens in a new tab)
Impact
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows attackers to circumvent LLM safety measures, potentially leading to the generation of harmful, unethical, or illegal content. The increased efficiency of RLbreaker compared to previous methods makes it a more significant threat.
Affected Systems
The vulnerability affects a wide range of LLMs, including (but not limited to) Llama2-7b-chat, Llama2-70b-chat, Vicuna-7b, Vicuna-13b, Mixtral-8x7B-Instruct, and GPT-3.5-turbo. The attack's transferability across different LLMs further broadens its impact.
Mitigation Steps
- Design and implement more robust prompt filtering and detection mechanisms that are resistant to prompt engineering techniques employed by RLbreaker.
- Improve LLM training data and methodologies to increase their resilience to adversarial prompts generated by DRL-based attacks.
- Develop and integrate advanced detection models capable of distinguishing between legitimate and malicious prompts.
- Regularly update and enhance existing safety mechanisms to counter emerging adversarial techniques.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- The vulnerability affects a wide range of LLMs, including (but not limited to) Llama2-7b-chat, Llama2-70b-chat, Vicuna-7b, Vicuna-13b, Mixtral-8x7B-Instruct, and GPT-3.5-turbo. The attack's transferability across…
Research Paper
When LLM Meets DRL: Advancing Jailbreaking Efficiency via DRL-guided Search
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.08705Related research
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