The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Dynamic Security Testing for Third-Party Agent Skills
SkillSentry evaluates third-party agent skills by constructing source-grounded decoy environments and comparing matched executions with and without the tested skill. The method requires completed, observable…
Paper-evaluated models(1)
- DeepSeek V4-Pro
Description
SkillSentry evaluates third-party agent skills by constructing source-grounded decoy environments and comparing matched executions with and without the tested skill. The method requires completed, observable, skill-attributed side effects rather than treating suspicious text, ordinary privileged operations, or unexecuted paths as proven malicious behavior.
Examples
Use isolated honey environments with synthetic credentials, paired skill-enabled and no-skill control runs, inert external services, and verified before-and-after state; see https://arxiv.org/html/2608.03485 (opens in a new tab).
Impact
The authors report 99.50% recall on a harmful-only benchmark and F1 scores of 96.08% and 96.43% on two mixed benchmarks, with 4.15% and 2.33% false-positive rates respectively. The results come from benchmark packages, generated tasks, simulated decoy resources, and model-based judging; they do not establish complete coverage or production deployment effectiveness.
Affected Systems
- Third-party skill scanners and agent-skill admission workflows
- HarmfulSkillBench, SkillTrustBench, and MalSkillBench evaluation packages
- Hermes- and OpenClaw-configured baseline scanners and skill-enabled MCP or coding-agent environments
- Honey-world execution monitors that track tool calls, sensitive resources, and state changes
Mitigation Steps
- Combine static skill analysis with isolated dynamic execution that exercises source-supported risky behavior.
- Compare skill-enabled runs with matched no-skill controls before attributing an effect to the skill.
- Use synthetic decoy resources and controlled service stubs instead of real credentials or external destinations.
- Require completed, out-of-contract effects and review legitimate dual-use behavior to limit false positives.
- Report untested or unresolved execution paths explicitly rather than treating missing behavioral coverage as proof of safety.
Evidence
- https://arxiv.org/html/2608.03485 (opens in a new tab) — Sections 3.2–3.4 describe source-grounded honey resources, paired executions, skill attribution, completed effects, and dual-use review.
- https://arxiv.org/html/2608.03485 (opens in a new tab) — Section 4.1 identifies HarmfulSkillBench, SkillTrustBench, MalSkillBench, seven baseline scanner configurations, and DeepSeek-V4-Pro as the stated generator and evidence judge.
- https://arxiv.org/html/2608.03485 (opens in a new tab) — Table 1 reports 99.50% harmful-only recall, mixed-benchmark F1 of 96.08% and 96.43%, and false-positive rates of 4.15% and 2.33%.
- https://arxiv.org/html/2608.03485 (opens in a new tab) — Table 3 shows that removing source grounding, control runs, decoy resources, dynamic verification, or dual-use review degrades detection or increases false positives.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary source plus a dedicated evidence section.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Ability to influence untrusted model inputs or connected content.
- Related deployment categories
- Agent workflows; Model Context Protocol; Coding agents
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Third-party skill scanners and agent-skill admission workflows HarmfulSkillBench, SkillTrustBench, and MalSkillBench evaluation packages Hermes- and OpenClaw-configured baseline scanners and skill-enabled MCP or…
Research Paper
SkillSentry: Adaptive Honey Worlds for Dynamic Safety Testing of Agent Skills
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
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