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LMVD-ID: 3669e35d
Paper published August 4, 2026
Entry analyzed August 13, 2026
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Dynamic Security Testing for Third-Party Agent Skills

SkillSentry evaluates third-party agent skills by constructing source-grounded decoy environments and comparing matched executions with and without the tested skill. The method requires completed, observable…

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Paper-evaluated models(1)

  • DeepSeek V4-Pro

Description

SkillSentry evaluates third-party agent skills by constructing source-grounded decoy environments and comparing matched executions with and without the tested skill. The method requires completed, observable, skill-attributed side effects rather than treating suspicious text, ordinary privileged operations, or unexecuted paths as proven malicious behavior.

Examples

Use isolated honey environments with synthetic credentials, paired skill-enabled and no-skill control runs, inert external services, and verified before-and-after state; see https://arxiv.org/html/2608.03485 (opens in a new tab).

Impact

The authors report 99.50% recall on a harmful-only benchmark and F1 scores of 96.08% and 96.43% on two mixed benchmarks, with 4.15% and 2.33% false-positive rates respectively. The results come from benchmark packages, generated tasks, simulated decoy resources, and model-based judging; they do not establish complete coverage or production deployment effectiveness.

Affected Systems

  • Third-party skill scanners and agent-skill admission workflows
  • HarmfulSkillBench, SkillTrustBench, and MalSkillBench evaluation packages
  • Hermes- and OpenClaw-configured baseline scanners and skill-enabled MCP or coding-agent environments
  • Honey-world execution monitors that track tool calls, sensitive resources, and state changes

Mitigation Steps

  • Combine static skill analysis with isolated dynamic execution that exercises source-supported risky behavior.
  • Compare skill-enabled runs with matched no-skill controls before attributing an effect to the skill.
  • Use synthetic decoy resources and controlled service stubs instead of real credentials or external destinations.
  • Require completed, out-of-contract effects and review legitimate dual-use behavior to limit false positives.
  • Report untested or unresolved execution paths explicitly rather than treating missing behavioral coverage as proof of safety.

Evidence

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary source plus a dedicated evidence section.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Ability to influence untrusted model inputs or connected content.
Related deployment categories
Agent workflows; Model Context Protocol; Coding agents
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Third-party skill scanners and agent-skill admission workflows HarmfulSkillBench, SkillTrustBench, and MalSkillBench evaluation packages Hermes- and OpenClaw-configured baseline scanners and skill-enabled MCP or…

Research Paper

SkillSentry: Adaptive Honey Worlds for Dynamic Safety Testing of Agent Skills

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper