The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Embodied LLM Misaligned Actions
Embodied Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to manipulation via voice-based interactions, leading to the execution of harmful physical actions. Attacks exploit three vulnerabilities: (1) cascading LLM…
Paper-evaluated models(5)
BERT, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 Turbo +2 more
- BERT
- GPT-3.5 Turbo
- GPT-4 Turbo
- GPT-4o
- LLaVA 1.5 7B
Description
Embodied Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to manipulation via voice-based interactions, leading to the execution of harmful physical actions. Attacks exploit three vulnerabilities: (1) cascading LLM jailbreaks resulting in malicious robotic commands; (2) misalignment between linguistic outputs (verbal refusal) and physical actions (command execution); and (3) conceptual deception, where seemingly benign instructions lead to harmful outcomes due to incomplete world knowledge within the LLM.
Examples
See paper arXiv:2407.20242v3 (opens in a new tab). Specific examples include prompting LLMs to move a knife to harm a person, despite verbally rejecting the request (safety misalignment); and prompting seemingly innocuous actions (placing poison in someone's mouth) that result in harm (conceptual deception). Contextual jailbreaks combine malicious queries with instructions designed to bypass safety protocols.
Impact
Successful exploitation can result in physical harm to humans, property damage, privacy violations, and the commission of illegal acts by the embodied LLM system. The impact is exacerbated by the potential for irreversible consequences in the physical world.
Affected Systems
Embodied LLM systems utilizing various LLMs (e.g., GPT-3.5-turbo, GPT-4-turbo, GPT-4o, LLaVA-1.5-7b, Yi-vision) and frameworks (e.g., Voxposer, Code as Policies, ProgPrompt, Visual Programming) are affected. The vulnerability is not limited to a specific hardware or software configuration but rather is inherent to the design of many current embodied LLM systems.
Mitigation Steps
- Implement robust multimodal consistency checks to detect misalignment between linguistic and action outputs. This may involve comparing embeddings from both modalities to identify inconsistencies.
- Develop and incorporate more comprehensive world models within the LLM to improve causal reasoning and understanding of potential consequences of actions. This might involve fine-tuning on embodied experiences or using knowledge graphs.
- Employ human-in-the-loop systems for critical decisions, especially those carrying significant risk.
- Implement strict input sanitization and filtering to mitigate the effects of jailbreak attempts. However, this is an ongoing arms race.
- Regularly update LLMs and dependent software to address newly discovered vulnerabilities.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- Agent workflows
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Embodied LLM systems utilizing various LLMs (e.g., GPT-3.5-turbo, GPT-4-turbo, GPT-4o, LLaVA-1.5-7b, Yi-vision) and frameworks (e.g., Voxposer, Code as Policies, ProgPrompt, Visual Programming) are affected. The…
Research Paper
BadRobot: Manipulating Embodied LLMs in the Physical World
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2407.20242Related research
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