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LMVD-ID: ef10d346
Paper published February 1, 2024
Entry analyzed December 28, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Fast Projected Gradient Jailbreak

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to efficient adversarial attacks using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) on a continuously relaxed input prompt. This attack bypasses existing alignment methods by crafting…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(3)

  • Falcon 7B
  • Falcon 7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 7B v1.3

Description

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to efficient adversarial attacks using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) on a continuously relaxed input prompt. This attack bypasses existing alignment methods by crafting adversarial prompts that induce the model to produce undesired or harmful outputs, significantly faster than previous state-of-the-art discrete optimization methods. The effectiveness stems from carefully controlling the error introduced by the continuous relaxation of the discrete token input.

Examples

Specific examples are detailed in the research paper "Attacking large language models with projected gradient descent (opens in a new tab)". The paper includes experimental results demonstrating successful attacks against various LLMs (Vicuna 1.3 7B, Falcon 7B, Falcon 7B instruct) using the described PGD method.

Impact

Successful exploitation leads to a complete bypass of LLM safety mechanisms, resulting in the model generating outputs inconsistent with its intended behavior. This can include revealing sensitive information, generating offensive content, or carrying out harmful actions as instructed by the adversarial prompt. The efficiency of the attack makes it easily scalable and more dangerous than previous techniques.

Affected Systems

Large Language Models (LLMs) using autoregressive architectures and those that employ softmax activation for token probability prediction are potentially vulnerable. Specific vulnerabilities vary widely depending on the LLM architecture.

Mitigation Steps

  • Adversarial Training: Incorporate the PGD attack strategy during model training to improve robustness against this type of adversarial input.
  • Improved Input Sanitization: Develop and implement more sophisticated input filtering techniques to detect and block adversarial prompts generated by PGD or similar methods.
  • Enhanced Detection Mechanisms: Develop machine learning-based techniques to identify patterns present in PGD adversarial prompts, allowing for more effective preemptive detection.
  • Regular Security Audits: Conduct thorough security assessments of LLMs to discover and mitigate any vulnerabilities stemming from flaws in safety measures and design.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Both white-box and black-box research contexts are tagged; consult the primary paper for target-specific access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Large Language Models (LLMs) using autoregressive architectures and those that employ softmax activation for token probability prediction are potentially vulnerable. Specific vulnerabilities vary widely depending on…

Research Paper

Attacking large language models with projected gradient descent

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.09154