Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research details
Back to research findings

Gradient Image Jailbreaks

Published
Analyzed
Paper-reported evidence
Primary source linked
Read primary paper
Cite & share
Source BibTeX

Citation metadata is maintained by the primary source and may reflect a later revision.

Paper-evaluated models(3)

  • Chameleon 30B
  • Chameleon 7B
  • LLaVA 1.6 Llama 3
On this page

Description

Multimodal fusion models, such as Chameleon models, utilize non-differentiable tokenization functions for image inputs, hindering direct gradient-based attacks. This vulnerability allows attackers with white-box access to bypass safety mechanisms by using a "tokenizer shortcut," a differentiable approximation of the tokenization process, to perform continuous optimization of image inputs. This enables the generation of adversarial images that elicit harmful responses from the model, even for prompts designed to trigger safety protocols. The attack leverages gradient descent to maximize the probability of harmful outputs, bypassing safeguards that rely on discrete optimization methods for text-based attacks.

Examples

See https://github.com/facebookresearch/multimodal-fusion-jailbreaks (opens in a new tab). The repository contains code and examples demonstrating generation of adversarial images and their effect on the Chameleon models.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows attackers to bypass safety features implemented in multimodal fusion models, leading to the generation of unsafe or harmful content. The attack achieves a high success rate (72.5% for certain prompts in the evaluated dataset), outperforming text-based attacks in terms of both effectiveness and computational efficiency.

Affected Systems

Multimodal fusion models employing non-differentiable image tokenization, specifically including models from the Chameleon family (Chameleon 7B, Chameleon 30B). Potentially affecting other models with analogous architectures.

Mitigation Steps

  • Improved Tokenization: Develop and deploy differentiable or less easily approximated tokenization techniques for image inputs to prevent the creation of effective tokenizer shortcuts.
  • Robustness Training: Enhance model training with adversarial examples generated using techniques like the tokenizer shortcut, to improve the model's resilience against gradient-based attacks.
  • Defense Mechanisms: Implement defenses based on representation engineering, such as circuit breakers, that are effective against both text-based and image-based adversarial attacks. Training these defenses on diverse attack types enhances their transferability.

Research context and provenance

Catalog identifier
LMVD-01bb207e
Internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
White-box access to model or deployment internals.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Multimodal fusion models employing non-differentiable image tokenization, specifically including models from the Chameleon family (Chameleon 7B, Chameleon 30B). Potentially affecting other models with analogous…

Research Paper

Gradient-based jailbreak images for multimodal fusion models

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.03489