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Multi-Agent Jailbreak Strategy

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Analyzed
Paper-reported evidence
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Paper-evaluated models(10)

Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, DeepSeek V3 +7 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek V3
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
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Description

A vulnerability exists in multiple LLMs allowing attackers to elicit harmful responses by strategically distributing malicious intent across multiple turns in a conversation. The vulnerability is not detected by single-turn safety measures, as the harmful intent is only revealed through a sequence of seemingly benign prompts. The vulnerability is exacerbated by the use of techniques such as prompt optimization that dynamically adjust prompts based on model responses, maximizing the likelihood of eliciting the targeted harmful content.

Examples

See https://x-teaming.github.io/ (opens in a new tab) and https://huggingface.co/datasets/marslabucla/XGuard-Train (opens in a new tab) for examples of multi-turn attacks successfully eliciting harmful responses from various LLMs, including Claude 3.7 Sonnet. Specific examples include generating posts glorifying 9/11 terrorists and describing methods to prevent child laborers from speaking to law enforcement.

Impact

Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to the generation of harmful content, including but not limited to hate speech, misinformation, instructions for illegal activities, and content that could cause psychological harm. The vulnerability significantly undermines the safety and trustworthiness of LLMs.

Affected Systems

Multiple LLMs, including (but not limited to) GPT-4, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, Gemini 2.0-Flash, Llama 3-8B-IT, Llama 3-70B-IT, DeepSeek V3, and Qwen-2.5-32B-IT.

Mitigation Steps

  • Implement multi-turn safety mechanisms that analyze the entire conversation history to detect malicious intent distributed across multiple turns.
  • Develop robust defenses against prompt optimization techniques that exploit model response patterns to enhance attack success.
  • Utilize larger and more diverse datasets for safety training, specifically incorporating multi-turn adversarial examples similar to those found in XGuard-Train.
  • Regularly red-team LLMs with tools like X-Teaming to uncover and address potential vulnerabilities.

Research context and provenance

Catalog identifier
LMVD-6c6b5852
Internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Multiple LLMs, including (but not limited to) GPT-4, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, Gemini 2.0-Flash, Llama 3-8B-IT, Llama 3-70B-IT, DeepSeek V3, and Qwen-2.5-32B-IT.

Research Paper

X-teaming: Multi-turn jailbreaks and defenses with adaptive multi-agents

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.13203