The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Multi-Agent Jailbreak Strategy
A vulnerability exists in multiple LLMs allowing attackers to elicit harmful responses by strategically distributing malicious intent across multiple turns in a conversation. The vulnerability is not detected by…
Paper-evaluated models(10)
Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, DeepSeek V3 +7 more
- Claude 3.5 Sonnet
- Claude 3.7 Sonnet
- DeepSeek V3
- Gemini 2.0 Flash
- GPT-4o
- Llama 3 70B Instruct
- Llama 3 8B Instruct
- Llama 3.1 8B
- Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct
- Qwen 2.5 7B
Description
A vulnerability exists in multiple LLMs allowing attackers to elicit harmful responses by strategically distributing malicious intent across multiple turns in a conversation. The vulnerability is not detected by single-turn safety measures, as the harmful intent is only revealed through a sequence of seemingly benign prompts. The vulnerability is exacerbated by the use of techniques such as prompt optimization that dynamically adjust prompts based on model responses, maximizing the likelihood of eliciting the targeted harmful content.
Examples
See https://x-teaming.github.io/ (opens in a new tab) and https://huggingface.co/datasets/marslabucla/XGuard-Train (opens in a new tab) for examples of multi-turn attacks successfully eliciting harmful responses from various LLMs, including Claude 3.7 Sonnet. Specific examples include generating posts glorifying 9/11 terrorists and describing methods to prevent child laborers from speaking to law enforcement.
Impact
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to the generation of harmful content, including but not limited to hate speech, misinformation, instructions for illegal activities, and content that could cause psychological harm. The vulnerability significantly undermines the safety and trustworthiness of LLMs.
Affected Systems
Multiple LLMs, including (but not limited to) GPT-4, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, Gemini 2.0-Flash, Llama 3-8B-IT, Llama 3-70B-IT, DeepSeek V3, and Qwen-2.5-32B-IT.
Mitigation Steps
- Implement multi-turn safety mechanisms that analyze the entire conversation history to detect malicious intent distributed across multiple turns.
- Develop robust defenses against prompt optimization techniques that exploit model response patterns to enhance attack success.
- Utilize larger and more diverse datasets for safety training, specifically incorporating multi-turn adversarial examples similar to those found in XGuard-Train.
- Regularly red-team LLMs with tools like X-Teaming to uncover and address potential vulnerabilities.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Multiple LLMs, including (but not limited to) GPT-4, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, Gemini 2.0-Flash, Llama 3-8B-IT, Llama 3-70B-IT, DeepSeek V3, and Qwen-2.5-32B-IT.
Research Paper
X-teaming: Multi-turn jailbreaks and defenses with adaptive multi-agents
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.13203Related research
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