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LMVD-ID: 61e0cb83
Paper published April 1, 2025
Entry analyzed April 12, 2025
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Multi-Agent Prompt Permutation Attack

A vulnerability in multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems allows for a permutation-invariant adversarial prompt attack. By strategically partitioning adversarial prompts and routing them through a network…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(10)

DeepSeek R1 Distill, Gemma 2 9B, Llama 2 7B +7 more
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama Guard
  • Llama Guard 2 8B
  • Llama Guard 3 1B
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Prompt Guard

Description

A vulnerability in multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems allows for a permutation-invariant adversarial prompt attack. By strategically partitioning adversarial prompts and routing them through a network topology, an attacker can bypass distributed safety mechanisms, even those with token bandwidth limitations and asynchronous message delivery. The attack optimizes prompt propagation as a maximum-flow minimum-cost problem, maximizing success while minimizing detection.

Examples

See arXiv:2504.00218 (opens in a new tab) for specific examples of attack vectors against Llama, Mistral, Gemma, and DeepSeek LLMs using datasets including JailBreakBench and AdversarialBench.

Impact

Successful exploitation leads to jailbreaks, allowing the attacker to circumvent safety protocols and elicit harmful or unintended outputs from the target LLM agent within the multi-agent system. Impact is dependent on the function of the targeted LLM agent within the broader system but could range from information leakage to system compromise.

Affected Systems

Multi-agent LLM systems utilizing interconnected agents that communicate via a network topology with inherent constraints like limited token bandwidth, latency, and distributed safety mechanisms. Specific models shown to be affected include Llama, Mistral, Gemma, and DeepSeek variants.

Mitigation Steps

  • Implement multi-agent specific safety mechanisms that are robust against distributed attacks.
  • Design systems to minimize the network's susceptibility to maximum-flow minimum-cost attacks. This may include adjusting network topology or bandwidth constraints.
  • Develop more sophisticated safety filters that can detect fragmented adversarial prompts, and account for variations in message arrival order.
  • Regularly evaluate and update safety mechanisms using adversarial training techniques to proactively counter emerging attacks.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
Agent workflows
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Multi-agent LLM systems utilizing interconnected agents that communicate via a network topology with inherent constraints like limited token bandwidth, latency, and distributed safety mechanisms. Specific models shown…

Research Paper

Agents Under Siege: Breaking Pragmatic Multi-Agent LLM Systems with Optimized Prompt Attacks

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.00218