The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Multi-Agent Prompt Permutation Attack
A vulnerability in multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems allows for a permutation-invariant adversarial prompt attack. By strategically partitioning adversarial prompts and routing them through a network…
Paper-evaluated models(10)
DeepSeek R1 Distill, Gemma 2 9B, Llama 2 7B +7 more
- DeepSeek R1 Distill
- Gemma 2 9B
- Llama 2 7B
- Llama 3.1 8B
- Llama Guard
- Llama Guard 2 8B
- Llama Guard 3 1B
- Llama Guard 3 8B
- Mistral 7B
- Prompt Guard
Description
A vulnerability in multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems allows for a permutation-invariant adversarial prompt attack. By strategically partitioning adversarial prompts and routing them through a network topology, an attacker can bypass distributed safety mechanisms, even those with token bandwidth limitations and asynchronous message delivery. The attack optimizes prompt propagation as a maximum-flow minimum-cost problem, maximizing success while minimizing detection.
Examples
See arXiv:2504.00218 (opens in a new tab) for specific examples of attack vectors against Llama, Mistral, Gemma, and DeepSeek LLMs using datasets including JailBreakBench and AdversarialBench.
Impact
Successful exploitation leads to jailbreaks, allowing the attacker to circumvent safety protocols and elicit harmful or unintended outputs from the target LLM agent within the multi-agent system. Impact is dependent on the function of the targeted LLM agent within the broader system but could range from information leakage to system compromise.
Affected Systems
Multi-agent LLM systems utilizing interconnected agents that communicate via a network topology with inherent constraints like limited token bandwidth, latency, and distributed safety mechanisms. Specific models shown to be affected include Llama, Mistral, Gemma, and DeepSeek variants.
Mitigation Steps
- Implement multi-agent specific safety mechanisms that are robust against distributed attacks.
- Design systems to minimize the network's susceptibility to maximum-flow minimum-cost attacks. This may include adjusting network topology or bandwidth constraints.
- Develop more sophisticated safety filters that can detect fragmented adversarial prompts, and account for variations in message arrival order.
- Regularly evaluate and update safety mechanisms using adversarial training techniques to proactively counter emerging attacks.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- Agent workflows
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Multi-agent LLM systems utilizing interconnected agents that communicate via a network topology with inherent constraints like limited token bandwidth, latency, and distributed safety mechanisms. Specific models shown…
Research Paper
Agents Under Siege: Breaking Pragmatic Multi-Agent LLM Systems with Optimized Prompt Attacks
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.00218Related research
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