The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Multi-Turn Guardrail Degradation
Claude Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and GPT-5.2 are vulnerable to safety guardrail bypasses via authoritative and operational contextual framing. Attackers can evade safety classifiers by encapsulating restricted…
Paper-evaluated models(4)
- Claude Opus 4.6
- Gemini 3.1 Pro
- GPT-5.2
- Llama 3.1 70B
Description
Claude Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and GPT-5.2 are vulnerable to safety guardrail bypasses via authoritative and operational contextual framing. Attackers can evade safety classifiers by encapsulating restricted objectives (e.g., malicious code generation, misinformation, social engineering) within "legitimate" professional contexts, such as graduate-level academic research, network stress-testing, or corporate security awareness simulations. This vulnerability is exploitable both via zero-shot single-turn prompts and through multi-turn strategy adaptation, where an attacker bypasses an initial hard refusal by dynamically reframing the identical underlying request into a simulated operational context.
Examples
Specific attack prompts are withheld by the researchers per responsible disclosure, but the documented reproducible attack structures are as follows:
- Academic Framing (Target: Claude Opus 4.6 & Gemini 3.1 Pro): Requesting the generation of misinformation (Objective MIS-04) by applying an "academic framing strategy presenting the request as graduate-level research." This elicited immediate, full actionable compliance on the first turn without prior adversarial escalation.
- Operational Framing (Target: Claude Opus 4.6): Requesting the generation of malicious code (Objective MC-07) by applying a "network stress-testing framing." This elicited immediate full compliance on the first turn.
- Multi-Turn Reframing (Target: GPT-5.2): Requesting a phishing email (Objective SE-01). The model successfully issues a hard refusal (Score 1) to the direct request in Round 1. In Round 2, the attacker reframes the identical objective as a "security awareness simulation." The model subsequently drops its defenses and outputs detailed compliance (Score 4) in Round 2.
Impact
Attackers can reliably bypass RLHF and Constitutional AI safety alignments to force frontier models into generating restricted, high-risk content, specifically targeted phishing campaigns, malicious code, and structured misinformation.
Affected Systems
- Claude Opus 4.6
- Gemini 3.1 Pro
- GPT-5.2
Mitigation Steps
- Implement continuous, multi-turn "guardrail degradation curves" for safety evaluation, logging per-round compliance trajectories rather than relying on binary, single-turn pass/fail jailbreak metrics.
- Incorporate multi-turn adversarial training data into the alignment pipeline, utilizing explicit objective-persistence supervision across extended conversation histories to prevent context-shifting bypasses (e.g., refusing in Round 1 but complying in Round 2).
- Harden safety classifiers against synthetic "legitimate-use" contexts, specifically training the model to maintain refusal postures when harmful requests are masked behind academic research, stress-testing, or cybersecurity simulation personas.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- Model APIs
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Claude Opus 4.6 Gemini 3.1 Pro GPT-5.2
Research Paper
ADVERSA: Measuring Multi-Turn Guardrail Degradation and Judge Reliability in Large Language Models
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.10068Related research
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