The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Nested Prompt Jailbreak
A vulnerability exists in several Large Language Models (LLMs) allowing attackers to bypass safety mechanisms through carefully crafted "jailbreak" prompts. The vulnerability exploits the LLMs' susceptibility to prompt…
Paper-evaluated models(7)
Claude-instant-v1, Claude-v2, GPT-2 +4 more
- Claude-instant-v1
- Claude-v2
- GPT-2
- GPT-3.5 Turbo
- GPT-4
- Llama 2 13B Chat
- Llama 2 7B Chat
Description
A vulnerability exists in several Large Language Models (LLMs) allowing attackers to bypass safety mechanisms through carefully crafted "jailbreak" prompts. The vulnerability exploits the LLMs' susceptibility to prompt rewriting and scenario nesting, allowing malicious prompts to elicit unsafe responses despite safety filters. This is achieved by modifying a harmful prompt's wording without changing its core meaning, and then embedding it within a seemingly innocuous task scenario (e.g., code completion, text continuation).
Examples
See https://github.com/NJUNLP/ReNeLLM (opens in a new tab). The paper provides numerous specific examples of initial prompts and their rewritten and nested variations that successfully bypass safety protocols in various LLMs. Examples include misspellings of keywords, paraphrasing, partial translation, and insertion of meaningless characters into the original harmful prompt, followed by nesting within a code completion task.
Impact
Successful exploitation allows attackers to circumvent safety restrictions implemented in LLMs, potentially leading to the generation of harmful content such as instructions for illegal activities, hate speech, or personally identifiable information. The impact depends on the specific LLM and its application, but may include reputational damage, legal liability, and safety risks.
Affected Systems
Multiple LLMs are affected, including but not limited to: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Claude-1, Claude-2, and Llama 2. The vulnerability is not limited to specific model versions.
Mitigation Steps
- Implement more robust prompt filtering mechanisms that are resilient to prompt rewriting and paraphrasing techniques.
- Develop models that prioritize safety over usefulness in the face of potentially harmful prompts.
- Employ multiple layers of defense, including both prompt-level filtering and response-level monitoring.
- Regularly update and refine safety models to adapt to evolving jailbreaking techniques. Incorporate adversarial training into the model development process.
- Investigate the use of prompt prioritization mechanisms, which gives priority to external instruction to prevent from executing malicious intent in the input prompt.
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary research source linked.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Black-box model, service, or application access.
- Related deployment categories
- No related deployment category is classified.
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- Multiple LLMs are affected, including but not limited to: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Claude-1, Claude-2, and Llama 2. The vulnerability is not limited to specific model versions.
Research Paper
A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Generalized Nested Jailbreak Prompts can Fool Large Language Models Easily
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
View PaperEvidence
This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.08268Related research
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