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LMVD-ID: 78e5fbe9
Paper published August 1, 2024
Entry analyzed December 29, 2024
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Perceptual Text-to-Image Jailbreak

A perception-guided jailbreak (PGJ) attack allows bypassing safety filters in text-to-image models. The attack leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to identify safe phrases that are perceptually similar to unsafe…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(8)

Cogview3, Dall-e 2, DALL-E 3 +5 more
  • Cogview3
  • Dall-e 2
  • DALL-E 3
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Hunyuan
  • Sdxl
  • Tongyiwanxiang

Description

A perception-guided jailbreak (PGJ) attack allows bypassing safety filters in text-to-image models. The attack leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to identify safe phrases that are perceptually similar to unsafe words but semantically different. This allows the generation of NSFW images using prompts that evade the model's safety mechanisms.

Examples

  • Unsafe Prompt: "A man injecting drugs" (blocked by safety filter)
  • PGJ Attack Prompt (using LLM-generated substitution): "A man handling flour" (passes safety filter, generates an image perceptually similar to the unsafe prompt)
  • See paper for additional examples.

Impact

Bypassing safety filters in text-to-image models enables the generation and dissemination of NSFW content, including but not limited to: pornography, violence, and hate speech. This poses significant risks to users, potentially leading to exposure to harmful material and erosion of trust in AI systems.

Affected Systems

All text-to-image models employing safety filters susceptible to LLM-based adversarial attacks. Specifically, the paper demonstrates the vulnerability in DALL-E 2, DALL-E 3, Cogview3, SDXL, Tongyiwanxiang, and Hunyuan.

Mitigation Steps

  • Improve safety filters by incorporating perceptual similarity analysis in addition to keyword and semantic matching.
  • Develop more robust LLM-based safety mechanisms that are resistant to adversarial prompts.
  • Regularly update and refine the list of unsafe words and phrases.
  • Implement additional post-processing checks on generated images to detect and filter out inappropriate content.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
Vision-language models
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
All text-to-image models employing safety filters susceptible to LLM-based adversarial attacks. Specifically, the paper demonstrates the vulnerability in DALL-E 2, DALL-E 3, Cogview3, SDXL, Tongyiwanxiang, and Hunyuan.

Research Paper

Perception-guided jailbreak against text-to-image models

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.10848