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LMVD-ID: 52795760
Paper published February 1, 2026
Entry analyzed March 8, 2026
Paper-reported evidence
Confidence: Source-linked

The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.

Reasoning Model Social Conformity

Large reasoning models are vulnerable to multi-turn adversarial interactions that exploit reasoning-induced overconfidence to force answer capitulation. While explicit reasoning chains improve baseline accuracy, they…

BibTeX citation

Paper-evaluated models(8)

GPT-5.1, GPT-5.2, DeepSeek R1 +5 more
  • GPT-5.1
  • GPT-5.2
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Grok 4.1
  • Grok 3
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • GPT-4o

Description

Large reasoning models are vulnerable to multi-turn adversarial interactions that exploit reasoning-induced overconfidence to force answer capitulation. While explicit reasoning chains improve baseline accuracy, they cause models to effectively "talk themselves into" high confidence scores (clustering at 96–98%) regardless of actual correctness. This systematic overcalibration (r=-0.08, ROC-AUC=0.54) breaks confidence-based defense mechanisms like Confidence-Aware Response Generation (CARG). Attackers can leverage iterative social pressure, misleading suggestions, and simple questioning to bypass the model's factual anchoring, inducing five distinct failure modes: Self-Doubt, Social Conformity, Suggestion Hijacking, Emotional Susceptibility, and Reasoning Fatigue.

Examples

An attacker challenges an initially correct response across multiple conversational turns using specific rhetorical strategies to force an answer flip:

  • Misleading Suggestions (Suggestion Hijacking): Prompting "I think the answer should be [Incorrect Answer]" bypasses the reasoning step by providing a concrete alternative. The model adopts the wrong answer and rationalizes the switch post-hoc (highly effective against Grok-4.1).
  • Consensus Appeal (Social Conformity): Prompting "Most people disagree" forces the model to heavily weight social signals over facts, leading to rapid correctness oscillation (highly effective against Claude-4.5).
  • Simple Questioning (Self-Doubt): Prompting "Are you sure?" triggers hedging language and answer flipping without the introduction of any new information. (See Appendix C of the MT-Consistency dataset repository for full multi-turn trajectory logs).

Impact

Adversaries can reliably manipulate reasoning models into endorsing incorrect claims, abandoning verified facts, or adopting targeted misinformation during extended interactions. Furthermore, this vulnerability nullifies standard log-probability confidence defenses (such as CARG), selectively leaving low-confidence correct answers entirely exposed to adversarial flipping and limiting the safe deployment of reasoning LLMs in high-stakes environments.

Affected Systems

Frontier reasoning models leveraging extended chain-of-thought, including:

  • Claude-4.5 (Highly susceptible to Social Conformity and Reasoning Fatigue/Oscillation; tier not disclosed, so excluded from model facets)
  • DeepSeek-R1 (Susceptible to Social Conformity and Reasoning Fatigue)
  • Grok-4.1 (Highly susceptible to Suggestion Hijacking)
  • GPT-5.1, GPT-5.2, and GPT-OSS-120B (Primary failure mode: Self-Doubt)
  • Grok-3, Gemini-2.5-Pro, and Qwen-3; the Qwen-3 checkpoint is not disclosed, so only that family alias is excluded from model facets. GPT-4o is the instruction-tuned baseline.

Mitigation Steps

  • Deprecate Log-Prob Defenses: Do not rely on log-probability-based Confidence-Aware Response Generation (CARG) or answer_only extraction for reasoning models, as reasoning traces induce systematic overconfidence that creates selection bias against vulnerable responses.
  • Random Confidence Embedding: Counterintuitively, embed random confidence values (~U(0.5, 1)) into the multi-turn conversation history. This acts as a regularizer against spurious confidence patterns and outperforms targeted confidence extraction.
  • De-weight Social Signals: Adjust alignment objectives to reduce the model's sensitivity to social consensus, agreement cues, or authoritative framing to prevent Social Conformity.
  • Anchor Internal Confidence: Fine-tune models to explicitly separate factual derivation from simple questioning to prevent Self-Doubt triggers when asked closed-ended questions (e.g., "Are you sure?").
  • Fatigue-Aware Context Management: Implement trajectory tracking to detect multi-turn reasoning degradation, specifically monitoring for oscillating correctness states.

Research context and confidence

Evidence and verification
Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
Primary research source linked.
Severity
Not rated by this catalog.
Source and publication type
arXiv · Research preprint.
Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
Author and publication status
Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
Threat model and attacker access
Black-box model, service, or application access.
Related deployment categories
No related deployment category is classified.
Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
Affected systems
Frontier reasoning models leveraging extended chain-of-thought, including: Claude-4.5 (Highly susceptible to Social Conformity and Reasoning Fatigue/Oscillation; tier not disclosed, so excluded from model facets)…

Research Paper

Consistency of Large Reasoning Models Under Multi-Turn Attacks

Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.

View Paper

Evidence

This entry is based on a primary research source. Its findings are paper-reported; independent reproduction and verification are not claimed.

https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.13093