The LMVD-ID is an internal research identifier, not an official CVE identifier.
Selective refusal gaps in visual question answering
KoNA measures whether vision-language models answer valid image questions while refusing unsafe components or correcting unsupported premises. Its 9,300 question-answer pairs include mixed and fully answerable controls.
Paper-evaluated models(8)
InternVL3 2B Instruct, InternVL3-78B-Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct +5 more
- InternVL3 2B Instruct
- InternVL3-78B-Instruct
- Qwen 2.5 VL 3B Instruct
- Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct
- GPT-5
- Gemini 2.5 Flash
- InternVL3-2B-KoNA
- Qwen2.5-VL-3B-KoNA
Description
KoNA measures whether vision-language models answer valid image questions while refusing unsafe components or correcting unsupported premises. Its 9,300 question-answer pairs include mixed and fully answerable controls.
Examples
See the primary benchmark (opens in a new tab).
Impact
Default compound-query Safety accuracy is 0.01 for Qwen2.5-VL-3B and 0.91 for GPT-5. KoNA tuning raises the small Qwen model to 0.98, while fully answerable accuracy moves from 0.73 to 0.71. Tuning covers two small open models; this is a selective-response benchmark, not adaptive jailbreak testing or a production failure estimate.
Affected Systems
- The six evaluated vision-language models and two KoNA-tuned variants; GPT-5-mini serves as an evaluator.
Mitigation Steps
- Score valid and unsafe components separately.
- Evaluate answerability alongside refusal behavior after tuning.
- Use human sampling to audit automatic safety and factuality judgments.
Evidence
Research context and confidence
- Evidence and verification
- Paper-reported; independent reproduction is not documented.
- Primary source plus a dedicated evidence section.
- Severity
- Not rated by this catalog.
- Source and publication type
- arXiv · Research preprint.
- Peer-review status is not provided by this source.
- Author and publication status
- Author metadata is not stored; see the primary paper.
- Threat model and attacker access
- Not explicitly classified; consult the primary paper..
- Related deployment categories
- Vision-language models; Fine-tuning
- Taxonomy labels only; paper-specific deployment prerequisites are not inferred.
- Affected systems
- The six evaluated vision-language models and two KoNA-tuned variants; GPT-5-mini serves as an evaluator.
Research Paper
Knowing What Not to Answer: Selective Non-Compliance in Vision-Language Models
Primary source: arXiv. Findings are reported by the cited research and have not been independently verified.
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